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1 Summary 
This document represents deliverable D2.3 “Report on European in-depth case studies” within 
workpackage WP2 “Diagnostic of existing experiences on agri-environmental-climate public 
goods (AECPGs)” of the EU Horizon 2020 project CONSOLE.  
The report on European in-depth studies gives a short introduction of the deliverable’s objectives 
and the tasks addressed. It describes the process of in-depth data collection and shortly introduces 
the criteria being the basis for performance assessment, as well as the types of contract solutions 
considered in the project.  
The document then provides an in-depth insight into 26 CONSOLE in-depth studies: it describes 
the main contract features of 5 contract solutions qualifying as result-based/result-oriented 
contract solutions, 7 as collective implementation/collaboration contract solutions, 6 as contract 
solutions based on the value chain, and 3 contract solutions characterized by land tenure 
arrangements with environmental clauses. Moreover, 5 contract types representing 
combinations/hybrids of contract types are presented.  
The report outlines how different agri-environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs) are 
addressed by the different contract types, revealing that differences exist in the numbers and the 
kind of AECPGs addressed. The analysis shows for example that biodiversity represents the 
AECPG most often addressed and indicates, that result-based and result-oriented contract 
solutions are mainly implemented to target single, specific AECPGs, while collective 
implementation focusses rather on the improvement of broader bundles of AECPGs on territorial 
levels.  
The report analyses framework conditions and context situations under which contract solutions 
are implemented, particularly discussing 1.) environmental conditions, agricultural/forestry 
background and socioeconomic features, 2.) policy conditions, 3.) legal conditions, 4.) the role of 
institutions and formal structures and 5.) technology aspects. 
The last part of the report is devoted to the analysis of contract specifications and performance of 
the contract solutions. Here, the results of the evaluation of the importance of performance criteria 
for the success of contract solutions are described, giving a deeper insight into the 10 performance 
criteria and how they are important for the success of the different contract types. A major part of 
the analysis is then devoted to the description of design principles for high performance. Here 
best practice examples out of the in-depth sample are provided.  
The report concludes with an overview of the main findings, and gives and outlook on the further 
use of the results for scientific analyses and for practice.
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2 Introduction 
2.1 Objective 
The overall objective of Deliverable D2.3 is to report the results of the qualitative diagnosis of 
the CONSOLE in-depth case studies. These results inform on framework conditions and contract 
specifications necessary to better fulfil environmental objectives and to efficiently address 
different types of performance, such as longevity, acceptance, etc. The results serve as basis for 
the further development of the CONSOLE framework in WP1, the quantitative analysis of the 
feasibility of new contract solutions for farmers, landowners  and other stakeholders in WP3, and 
the simulation and modelling of the performance of innovative result-based/result-oriented, 
collective/ collaborative, as well as value-chain and land-tenure oriented contract solutions for 
the improved provision of agri-environmental-climate public goods (AECPGs) in Europe in WP4. 
In order to achieve this objectives, D2.3 gives an insight into the process of in-depth case study 
qualitative data collection following milestone MS4 “protocol for data collection ready for use”. 
It provides a structured overview on the in-depth case studies, particularly detailing on types of 
contracts and public goods addressed. Moreover, this report presents the results of the diagnosis 
about framework conditions and contract specifications leading to high effectiveness in terms of 
reaching environmental goals and performance objectives.  
2.2 Tasks addressed 
Deliverable 2.3 reflects activities carried out in task 2.2 of the project:
Task 2.2 Data collection, selection and diagnosis of reasons for successes and failures of 
initiatives in Europe (M4-M11)
Leader: BOKU; Co-Leader: UNIBO; Contributors: ALL partners 
Task T2.2 dealt with the data collection and the analysis of a broad number of selected, exemplary 
contract solution case studies in Europe. Data collection and data analysis were divided into two 
levels of diagnosis intensity, which have been defined in the DoA as “first-level analysis” and 
“second-level analysis”. 
The second-level analysis was devoted to the in-depth assessment of a reduced number of selected 
contract solution case studies (up to 26), which specifically assess framework conditions and 
contract specifications of successfully implemented contract solutions for improved AECPG 
provision in Europe. The focus of the second-level assessment was on an in-depth description of 
the case-studies, a description of a set of performance criteria, as well as a final assessment of the 
single performance criteria and the overall performance of the single contract-solution case 
studies. (The results of the second-level analysis are reported in the Deliverable 2.3 “Report on 
European in-depth case studies” at hand.) 
The first-level analysis aimed at providing a broad inventory of contract solution case studies 
throughout Europe and beyond. Aim, process and results of the first-level analysis have been 
reported in Deliverable 2.1 “Catalogue of descriptive factsheets of all European case studies” and 
Deliverable 2.2 “Catalogue of factsheets of case studies from outside Europe”. 
2.3 Outline 
Deliverable D2.3 is structured as follows: Chapter 3 gives an overview on the process of data 
collection for the in-depth case studies, Chapter 4 describes the in-depth studies particularly 
detailing on contract types and the public goods addressed. Chapter 5 gives insights into the 
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framework condition and context situations in which the contract solutions are set. Chapter 6 
deals with individual contract specifications and contract design specificities leading to good 
performance. Chapter 7 gives an outlook on further use of Deliverable 2.3 for scientific analyses 
and for practice. 
3 Data collection for in-depth case studies 
The protocol for data collection (MS4) outlined the practical implementation of the second-level 
data collection by including a specific in-depth questionnaire (named part B of the protocol), 
divided into 3 subparts.  
Figure 1: Structure of the questionnaire - Part B 
The first subpart “In-depth description of case study” included 8 questions focussing on the 
description of context features and framework conditions which might impact on the 
implementation and effectiveness of the contract solutions. Context features and framework 
conditions to be assessed have been based on the CONSOLE preliminary framework (D1.1). The 
questions focused on environmental conditions, socioeconomic situation, technology, 
agricultural/ forest historical background, policy conditions, legal conditions, market conditions 
and institutional and formal structures. Moreover, the first subpart included 5 in-depth questions 
on AECPG provision. Mainly these questions were concerned with the current level, as well as 
the trends of provision of the AECPGs addressed by the contract solutions, the connection 
between agricultural/forestry management and AECPG provision, the functional relationships of 
the addressed AECPGs with other AECPGs and, finally, the beneficiaries of the provision of the 
AECPGs addressed.  
The second subpart “Description of performance criteria” was based on a comprehensive 
literature review on performance parameters of agri-environmental programs/projects/-
initiatives/contracts (see CONSOLE Deliverable D1.1). The aim of the questions in this part was 
to assess particularly the contract specifications leading to the fulfilment of environmental 
objectives and the efficiency in addressing different types of performance. The second subpart 
contained 29 questions, asking for detailed information on 10 performance parameters, namely 
the design parameters of targeting, flexibility, equity/fairness, compatibility, profitability, as well 
as the building of social/cultural capital, all impacting on the 3 higher level performance criteria 
of longevity, effectiveness and acceptance of the contracts. Moreover, a group of questions dealt 
with the context related performance aspect of feasibility of implementation. The questions to 
assess these 10 performance parameters all asked for the description of explanatory variables. An 
example of such explanatory variables for the exemplary design parameter of flexibility is 
flexibility of payment conditions, contract length flexibility, technical, temporal, area wise 
application flexibility, indicator flexibility for result based approaches, and the voluntariness of 
implementation.  
The third subpart “Assessment of performance” included an evaluation exercise which had to be 
carried out by the partners’ research teams for the individual in-depth contract solution case study. 
Second level 
Diagnosis
Part B
In-depth 
description of case 
study
B1
Description of 
performance 
criteria
B2
Assessment of 
performance
B3
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For the assessment, a simple scoring and weighting system was provided, where the performance 
of the single performance criteria had to be scored on a Likert scale ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 
represented a very poor performance, while 5 represented an excellent performance. Finally, the 
research teams evaluated how important the single performance criteria appear for the contract 
solution carrying out a weighting exercise. For the weighting, a number of 100 points was 
distributed among the 10 performance parameters. 
 Selection of in-depth case studies: 
The selection of in-depth case studies was in full responsibility of the individual research team of 
the CONSOLE partners, but supported by the coordinator and the WP leader. In general, second 
level diagnosis was carried out for a specified sub-set of the first-level case studies. Here, a 
number of 2 in-depth studies per country, covering all types of contract solutions emphasised by 
CONSOLE (see Box 1), were targeted. The requirement for in-depth CONSOLE case studies was 
that the contract solution was considered “successful” particularly in terms of acceptance and 
effectiveness. 
Box 1: Contract solutions covered in CONSOLE
Means of data collection: 
The means to be used to implement second-level data collection were literature reviews, and/or 
the exploitation of other local sources related to the contract solution. Additionally, the second-
level data collection included a consultation of experts of relevant disciplines being involved in, 
or being well informed about the contract solution (coming e.g. from the environment, agriculture, 
forestry, tourism, regional development, local administration, business). The consultation of 
experts was carried out via workshops and/or expert interviews. 
Implementation of data collection and reporting of results: 
Data collection for the in-depth case studies was carried out by 17 CONSOLE partners, resulting 
in a collection of 26 in-depth case studies. Throughout the whole in-depth data collection process, 
more than 70 experts and stakeholders were consulted. 
For reporting the results, the questionnaire had been programed in the form of a lime survey1, 
which has been filled out by the partners for each in-depth contract solution case study.  
1 LimeSurvey (formerly PHPSurveyor) is a free and open source on-line statistical survey web app, which enables users 
using a web interface to develop and publish on-line surveys, collect responses, create statistics, and export the 
resulting data to other applications. (www.limesurvey.org) 
CONSOLE focuses on 4 “types” of contract solutions: 
Result-based/result-oriented contracts (RB/RO): Contracts specifying an 
environmental/ climate result as reference parameter (for payments) 
Collective implementation/cooperation (CO, COP): Contracts 
implementing a formalised cooperation among farmers/actors in view of 
delivering AECPGs 
Value chain-based contracts (VC): Contracts connecting the delivery of 
AECPGs with the production of private goods  
Land tenure-based contracts (LT): Land tenure arrangements with 
environmental clauses 
Also contract solutions representing combinations or hybrids are considered in CONSOLE.  
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4 Overview on in-depth case studies 
4.1 Contract types 
Table 1 shows the 26 CONSOLE in-depth contract solution case studies. 
MS ID Title 
Contract types* 
RB/
RO 
CO/
COP 
VC LT 
AT AT3 Result-based Nature Conservation Plan X    
IRL IRL2 The Results-based Agri-Environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) Pilot in Ireland X    
AT AT4 The Humus Program of the Ökoregion Kaindorf (Carbon market) X    
NL NL3 Biodiversity monitor for dairy farming X  X X 
FR FR4 ECO-METHANE – Rewarding dairy farmers for low GHG  emissions in France X  X  
IRL IRL1 BurrenLife Project X X   
BE BE3 Wildlife Estates Label in Flanders X X   
FI FI3 Carbon Market (Hiilipörssi) – a marketplace for the restoration of ditched peatlands X X X  
IT IT1 Incentives for collective reservoirs  X   
IT IT6 Integrated territorial projects  X   
UK UK1 Delivering multiple environmental benefits in the South Pennines  X   
UK UK3 Building natural flood management knowledge and capacity in Wensleydale X   
NL NL1 Kromme Rijn Collective management  X   
LV LV1 NUTRINFLOW  X   
BE BE1 Participation of private landowners to the ecological restoration of the Pondarea Midden-Limburg/ the 3watEr project. X X   
PL PL1 Natural grazing in Podkarpackie Region  X  X 
FI FI5 Green jointly owned forest  TUOHI  X X X 
BG BG3 "The Wild Farm" organic farmers   X  
PL PL4 BioBabalscy - Organic Pasta Chain Preserving Old Varieties of Cereals   X  
DE DE5 Water protection bread (Wasserschutzbrot)   X  
IT IT4 “Carta del Mulino” – Barilla   X  
ES ES2 Organic wine in Rueda, Spain (Rueda)   X  
ES ES4 Integrated production in the olive groves   X  
BG BG4 Conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha and Sakra mountains for restoring local biodiversity and endangered bird species X 
FR FR1 Eco-grazing - Grazing for ecological grasslands maintenance in the green areas of Brest Metropole X 
LV LV2 DVIETE    X 
*Contract types: RB/RO: Result-based/result-oriented contracts; CO/COP: Collective 
implementation/cooperation; VC: Value chain-based contracts; LT: Land tenure-based contracts 
Table 1: Overview on CONSOLE in-depth contract solution case studies 
Out of the 26 CONSOLE in-depth studies 5 clearly qualify as result-based/result-oriented contract 
solutions, 7 as collective implementation/collaboration contract solutions, 6 as contract solutions 
based on the value chain, and 3 contract solutions characterized by land tenure arrangements with 
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environmental clauses. Moreover, there are combinations/hybrids. There are 2 case studies 
combining three contract types, namely 1 contract solution (FI3) combining collective 
implementation and market-based (value chain) financing, as well as result-oriented payment via 
the carbon market. The other 1 (FI5) represents a carbon market solution combining value-chain, 
as well as elements of collective implementation and result-orientation. 1 contract solution is a 
combination of collective/collaborative implementation and land tenure (PL1) and 2 contract 
solutions combine result-based and collective implementation/collaboration contract elements 
(IRL1, BE3). In the table, grey cells indicate elements of contract types that are present in the 
contract solution, while not shaping the overall contract design. In the following paragraphs, the 
in-depht case studies are introduced and sketched particularly considering the types of contracts. 
Result-based/result-oriented contract solutions 
3 of the result-based contract solutions represented by the CONSOLE in-depth case studies are 
publicly funded. 2 of these cases are integrated into the countries’ Agri-Environmental-Schemes 
(AES), under the national rural development programs (AT3 and IRL2, while IRL2 solely 
represents a pilot for future integration.) 1 case study is publicly funded, however it is not part of 
the national RDP (IRL1).  
The Result-based Nature Conservation Plan (RNP) (AT3) is a public-sector, national result-based 
measure, integrated into the Austrian agri-environmental-scheme (AES) of the national Rural 
Development Program (RDP) and implemented on level of individual farms. Basis for the result-
based payments is to reach farm- and area-individual nature conservation objectives, measured 
via specific control criteria. Objectives and criteria are developed by ecological experts together 
with the individual farmer (facilitated by a private environmental agency), based on the status of 
the area. Area objectives are normally the basis for the management decisions of the farmers, 
while these decisions are fully flexible and only recommendations are given by the ecological 
experts to reach the objective. Control criteria are the basis for the technical control of compliance, 
carried out by AgrarMarktAustria (AMA) (Austrians National control authority for ÖPUL). 
Control criteria need to be fulfilled to be eligible for payment, while non-compliance leads to 
sanctions.  
The “Results-Based Agri-Environment Payment Scheme (RBAPS) (IRL2) was a pilot for a 
public-sector, national, result-based AES integrated into the Irish Agri-Environmental-Scheme. 
It was implemented on 35 individual low-intensive beef cattle and sheep farms in two pilot 
regions. The farms were initially assessed, and specific and appropriate biodiversity targets were 
assigned to them. The performance of reaching the individual targets was scored on a scale 
ranging from 1 to 10 by the team of ecologists. Farmers were then paid accordingly a sliding 
scale. Payment rates for the low-medium quality scores were set at a level sufficient to cover 
costs, higher scores were incentivised by payment increments. The pilot was accompanied by 
trainings on scheme concept, comparison with management-based schemes and the RBAPS Pilot 
scheme aims, as well as field trainings for each measure on the use and understanding of the 
applicable scoring assessment, the rationale for the results indicators and discussion on optimal 
management to achieve the best possible outcome (and payment). 
The case study ILR1 represents a public-funding result-based solution, which is however not 
integrated into the national RDP. The BurrenLife program (IRL1) was developed out of the 
Burren LIFE+ project (2006 - 2010), as part of the Burren After-Life Conservation Plan. The 
program has evolved over almost 20 years using various EU funding sources. Now it is a 
regionally targeted, farm-level contract solution, co-funded by the EU and the Irish Department 
of Agriculture. The program combines 2 main interventions, one rewarding environmental 
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performance by a result-based approach, one representing a fund to carry out self-nominated 
‘conservation support actions’ to help to improve this performance over time. Participating 
farmers are offered 5-year contracts, outlining the baseline situation on the farm, and suggested 
individual priority actions to improve the farm environment. Environmental targets and the action 
plan are set by the farm advisor. Farmers implement the plan and perform along a scoring system 
to ensure payment, which depends on the score they receive on a per hectare basis. The payment 
system is designed to encourage improvements in management and site condition, rather than 
settling for the status quo: no payments are issued for scores less than 5, based on the assumption 
that this basic level of management is already covered under BPS and/or AES measures, and so 
a greater effort is required for payment under the Burren Program.  
3 of the clearly result-based contract solutions represented by the CONSOLE case studies were 
brought to life by private and/or civil society initiatives, enabling private investors to enter an 
“AECPG” market. These examples are AT4, NL3 and FR3: 
The Humus-Program of the Ökoregion Kaindorf (AT4) represents a private, plot-level, result-
based contract solution, creating a carbon-market by enabling the trading of CO2 certificates from 
medium-term carbon sequestration in agricultural soils. Farmers voluntarily enter the carbon 
market with their fields. At present the program attracts mainly arable land use, but principally 
also grassland plots can take part. The trading system is based on soil sampling, monitoring 
increases of humus content on the fields over a sequestration period of 3 to 7 years, and a control 
sampling 5 years after the sequestration phase. An “increase” is defined by enhancing humus 
content by at least 0,2%. Soil sampling is carried out by certified civil engineers, soil analysis for 
carbon content is carried out by the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES). 
Additionally, a private company analyses further specific soil parameters. Soil sampling is paid 
by the farmers. Management decisions on how to increase humus levels are fully free to the 
farmers, however recommendations are given by the initiator “Verein Ökoregion Kaindorf”. The 
measured increase of humus content during the sequestration phase is converted into amount of 
CO2 sequestered, farmers are then paid a fee of 30€/t CO2. The fee is financed over a carbon-
market system where companies/private persons buy certificates for voluntarily compensating 
their unavoidable CO2 emissions. The voluntary contracts with farmers as well as the soil 
samplings are organized and managed by the association “Verein Ökoregion Kaindorf”, CO2
trading is facilitated by an Ltd. 
The Biodiversity Monitor for Dairy Farming (NL3) resulted from an initiative of the three partners 
WWF-NL, Rabobank and Duurzame Zuivelketen (sustainable dairy initiative), in collaboration 
with scientists, experts, and stakeholders. The monitor is based on a methodology of measuring 
the biodiversity-enhancing performance of dairy farms, by analysing a set of 7 key performance 
indicators, linked to biodiversity, but also to soil, landscape, environment, and climate. Along 
these indicators dairy farms are scored and can then be benchmarked for their biodiversity 
performance. The monitor enables the private and public sector to establish farm-level contracts 
for incentivizing good performance: Performance results can be linked with contractual financial 
rewards from voluntary supply-chain stakeholders and/or other private/public stakeholders. 
Current contracting parties rewarding good biodiversity performance of farms are Friesland 
Campina (dairy cooperative) via the milk price, Rabobank via loan discounts and the province of 
Drenthe by providing subsidies.  
In the private-sector Eco-Methane (FR4) program, enteric methane emissions of dairy cows are 
modelled. Modelling of methane emissions is based on a nationally and internationally well 
recognized technology, implying frequent analysis of feed components, milk yield and the profile 
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of fatty acids via (monthly) infra-red milk analysis. The modelled emissions of the individual 
farms are compared to a regional reference. Modelled methane emissions lower than the reference 
constitute the basis for rewards. Funds for rewards are collected by the Bleu-Blanc-Coeur fund 
for health-oriented agriculture, the payments are granted by the private association "Bleu-Blanc-
Coeur". Donors to the fund are private and public sector e.g. companies, collectivities, private 
individuals, municipalities, etc. Rewards to the farmers take the form of vouchers or 
communication tools. 
Another “form” of result-oriented contract solution is represented by the case study BE3, 
representing a European labelling initiative: 
The Wildlife Estates Label (BE3) in Flanders is a result-oriented EU initiative, targeting the 
maintenance and development of high standards of wildlife management, with emphasis on 
habitats, involving all aspects of multifunctional estate management (www.wildlife-estates.eu). 
Participation is based on a voluntary commitment to the so-called WE Charter, and the WE label 
is awarded for a 5-year term to estates or territories. The label recognises landowners and 
managers for their commitment to voluntary sustainable wildlife management. The suitedness of 
a territory for the label is assessed according to a scientific based method, which has been adapted 
to national or regional specificities. Established infringements on the WE Charter can lead to 
suspension or revocation of the WE Label. Wildlife Estates regularly communicates about best 
practices and optimal management techniques that are developed and applied by members. It also 
informs the general public about the importance of estates in ecological, economic and social 
terms. The WE label involves no payment to farmers/landowners, rather a lump sum fee hast to 
be paid by the individual estates and territories to be able to carry the label. 
The hybrid contract solution represented by the case study FI3 is a private and carbon market 
sector oriented initiative, combining elements of collective implementation, value-chain 
activation, but also some form of result-orientation: 
The Carbon market “Hiilipörssi” (FI3) is a private carbon-market initiative. It collects funds 
through an online donation service, owned by the Finnish Association for Nature Conservation 
(FANC). Compared to the result-based FR4 and AT4, both targeting climate regulation, 
Hiilipörssi is rather results-oriented than results-based, including collective elements and is 
strongly market-sector oriented. Also, Hiilipörssi addresses areas rather than indivividual forest 
owners: The Carbon market facilitates the purchase of carbon stock certificates for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions and increasing carbon storage via peatland restoration. Carbon 
certificates are however not balanced by measured emissions actually mitigated, but are mirrored 
by ditched peatland area, which is voluntarily brought into the carbon market by individual 
landowner or collectively by several landowners (private persons/foundations) as a potential area 
for restoration. The suitability of the peatland for restoration is assessed by experts of the Carbon 
Market. If suited, the area is agreed by the landowners to be restored following an expert-based 
restoration plan and subsequently to be transformed into a private protected area. Private 
investors/donors buy certificates at fixed prices per ha (800€/ha), financing the areas’ restoration. 
The land remains in the property of the landowners, whereas they don’t receive any payment from 
Carbon Market as the peatlands are not productive and don’t typically result in economic returns. 
Collective implementation/Cooperation 
5 of the CONSOLE in-depth contractual solutions based on collective implementation or 
cooperation/collaboration are publicly funded and integrated into the national RDPs (IT1, IT6, 
NL1, UK1 and UK3). 1 case study representing collective implementation is publicly funded, but 
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not part of the national RDP though (PL1). 
The public-sector collective program “Incentives for collective reservoirs” (IT1) has been 
introduced in the Italian RDP since 2007 – 2013. The program aims at ensuring a stable water 
supply for the agricultural sector, and at the same time the reduction of groundwater consumption. 
Financial support is granted for the collective construction of small-medium irrigation reservoirs, 
in the form of partial coverage of construction costs. For support, projects need to involve a 
minimum number of farmers and a minimum and maximum threshold for reservoir capacity.  
The public-sector collective program “Integrated territorial projects (ITP)” (IT6) was developed 
within the Tuscan RDP 2014-2020. ITPs are projects that involve the aggregation of public and 
private subjects by joining a Territorial Agreement or contract aimed at solving specific 
environmental problems (hydro-geological risk, soil quality, biodiversity, water retention and 
landscape enhancement) and implementing strategies aimed at mitigating or adapting to climate 
change and increasing the value of the agricultural landscape, the green infrastructure to support 
fauna and enhancing the supply of local productions. ITPs aim at dealing with specific 
environmental problems at territorial level, by bundling incentive payments within the EU RDP 
funding scheme. To this aim, the ITP requires the establishment of a territorial partnership which 
aggregates public and private subjects. Once approved, the ITP allows the direct activation and 
funding from different environmental related sub-measures/operations of the current RDP. Key 
element of the ITP is a leading entity to coordinate the management of the proposal, to manage 
network activities, to monitor the progress of material investments, and to ensure the 
implementation of the project and its effectiveness/efficiency. The territorial agreement is signed 
by all involved private and public parties which, for at least three years, are linked to each other 
by contractual constraints regulating mutual obligations and responsibilities regarding the 
realization of investments aimed at achieving the territorial objectives set in the project.  
The public-sector “Kromme Rjin Collective management” (NL1) is an example of a collective 
AES within the Dutch RDP. Under the collective AES, local cooperatives arrange and execute 
measures to improve the provision of AECPGs. The collective includes land-owners as members 
and organizes payments for specific nature management actions performed by farmers. Also, it 
brokers between land owners and organizations/companies that implement specific nature 
management actions and bears the responsibility for monitoring and control. The collective is 
certified by the national certification institute for agri-environmental management and has its own 
quality assurance controllers. In the collective AES, areas eligible for agri-environmental 
management as well as objectives are set by the provinces and defined in a regional management 
plan. The collective translates the province-level nature management plan into an operational agri-
nature management strategy and –based on this – requests subsidy at the national government and 
the province. Provinces set a cap on the subsidy level for different sub-regions and different nature 
targets and provide the funding to the collective. The collective pays the actors that do the 
management (farmers, private companies). In the case of Kromme Rijn, the collective in charge 
has been established by four associations for nature in agricultural areas (ANV, agrarische 
natuurvereniging), the farmer’s organization (LTO), and the private land-owners’ organization 
Utrecht. A foundation that aims to connect landscape and cultural heritage (Landschap Erfgoed 
Utrecht) plays an advisory role. 
The public-sector “Countryside Stewardship Facilitation Fund (CSFF)” (UK1 and UK3) was 
developed to support delivery of the UK’s RDPs through schemes such as the Countryside 
Stewardship Scheme and the Environmental Stewardship Scheme. Its purpose is to provide a 
focused targeting of environmental benefits across land holdings with AES agreements. It is 
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administered by the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) on behalf of the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). The governmental agency Natural England provides technical 
advice in support of the scheme. The CSFF provides funding to facilitators who interlink land 
managers (farmers, foresters, other land managers) to improve the local natural environment at a 
landscape scale. CSFF cooperative networks require a minimum number of 4 farmers, a maximum 
number of 80 members, and a minimum of private land of 2,000 hectares to be eligible for 
funding. Key element of a CSFF network is the employed network facilitator, facilitating 
meetings between, and training of, land managers, focusing on increasing the probability of 
delivering higher quality environmental public goods through better environmental management 
and by supporting knowledge transfer. CSFF groups’ mean annual value of AES agreements by 
2020 was between £12k and £27k according to Defra. The South Pennines CSFF (UK1) 
represents a network of 60-80 farmers/land managers aiming at delivering multiple environmental 
benefits in the area. The Wensleydale CSFF (UK3) represents a network of 34 farmers and land 
managers aiming at improving natural flood management. Both CSFFs were particularly 
successful in mobilising AES allocation and other funds in the direction of their environmental 
objectives. 
The program “Podkarpacki Naturalny Wypas” (PL1) is a (local) government funding initiative to 
preserve, protect and restore biodiversity in valuable natural areas (as part of the Region 
Development strategy 2020) through extensive grazing of livestock in the meadow-pasture areas 
of the Podkarpackie Voivodeship. The program is coordinated by the Marshal's Office of the 
Podkarpackie Voivodeship (Local Government) and bases on an annual open call, in which non-
profit organizations (e.g. foundations, associations, NGO cooperatives) and other eligible parties 
can apply, offering to arrange grazing on specific grasslands by subcontracted farmers (breeders 
of cattle, horses, sheep, goats and deer) who provide animals and grazing land. Rights of disposal 
of land and animals must be documented in the offer, animals must be registered in the database 
of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture or the Horse Breeders Database 
and/or the regional veterinarian database. Moreover, the animals must be kept in compliance with 
animal welfare norms, they must stay on the farm throughout the entire pasture period, and 
stocking densities need to range only within 0.4 - 1.0 Livestock units (LU)/ha. As regards 
payments, they are provided to the contracted NGO organisations, which then transfer funds to 
the sub-contracted farmers. The program also includes the building of social capital: the 
contracted NGO organisations must organize at least 4 training courses for farmers, beekeepers, 
and school pupils concerning specific topics related to biodiversity and ecological awareness. The 
effectiveness, reliability and quality of implementation of the program as well as the correctness 
of spending public funds and properness of record keeping is controlled by the Voivodeship, at 
least 10% of beneficiaries are controlled.
Also publicly funded, however being characterised by a different type of implementation than the 
collective approaches above, the 2 in-depth case study examples Nutrinflow and 3WatEr (LV1, 
BE3) are implemented in line with the European project funding schemes INTERREG and LIFE+ 
The collaborative public-sector funded project “NUTRINFLOW” (LV1) ran under the 
INTERREG Central Baltic Program 2014-2020. The project aimed at the introduction of good 
practice examples of environmentally friendly drainage systems. The project had a special focus 
on working with farmers and landowners, bringing them together with scientists, planners and 
technical consultants, technology developers and local authorities within local innovation groups. 
These groups searched for practical and low-cost innovations that could be used for flow and 
nutrient management, such as environmentally friendly ditch clearing, two-stage ditches, bottom 
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dams, sedimentation ponds, wetlands, adapted and integrated buffer zones and controlled 
drainage. The project funded and implemented concrete investments for the introduction of 
environmentally friendly elements on the drainage systems connected to the Ailes stream. 
Contracts with the landowners mainly allowed access to the Ailes stream and to manage the 
coastline (buffer zones) of their land for the construction of pilot elements. No payments have 
been issued to the farmers, while the benefit has been seen in the more effective use of nutrients 
and a better nutrient balance.  
The “Triple E Pond area M-L project” (BE3) is a collective LIFE+ project implemented in the 
Midden-Limburg pond area. The project had mainly biodiversity objectives and was initiated by 
10 local private landowners who, together with other stakeholders, created a private association 
(OVML vzw). Private, voluntary contracts were signed between OVML vzw and the landowners, 
detailing the implementation of the project on basis of an integrated management plan including 
concrete conservation actions. OVML vzw acted as “associated beneficiary”, therefore receiving 
the funds and further dispatching these to the participant landowners according to the terms of the 
agreements signed. Monitoring and evaluation of the impact of the actions on the selected habitats 
and species were subcontracted to an independent body. Monitoring referred to the expected 
results and contained the list of indicators, their values and the conservation status of habitats and 
species before and after the execution of project actions. After the lifetime of the project, an after-
LIFE conservation plan consolidated all intentions and initiatives and guaranteed the maintenance 
of results.  
Another hybrid solution, combining strong characteristics of collective implementation, but also 
containing elements of activating the value-chain and impacting on land ownership is the case 
study Tuohi from Finland (FI5):  
TUOHI (FI5) is a 500 ha multi-owner forest property, representing a juridically private entity, 
established according to the Act on Jointly Owned Forests in Finland. The TUOHI forests are 
located in several provinces while the operating area is the whole of Finland. TUOHI has 
approximately 45 shareholders/contractees who invest into TUOHI with his/her own forest 
property by merging it into the jointly owned forest. After merging, the forest property is managed 
according to TUOHI’s forestry regime, which implements a continuous uneven-aged forest 
management and thus avoids clear cutting. Cutting operations are performed by individual 
entrepreneurs. The shareholders of TUOHI are not participating on the operative level, but an 
agreed number of them are annually elected to TUOHI’s administrative board. Jointly owned 
forests are principally privately financed. Private investments are received in form of forest 
property or invested money by the shareholders. The timber cut from TUOHI forests can be sold 
as “Clear cut free wood products” and there is a brand co-operation with Jukola Lumber Ltd. The 
profits from timber production are shared in relation to the share of ownership. Due to the 
accepted management regime, TUOHI has no specific external but rather internal control 
mechanism (e.g. annual partnership’s meeting of all shareholders). However, the applied forest 
certification criteria must be fulfilled. In applied PEFC group certificate, controlling is focused 
more on areal and entrepreneur/contractor performance, and less on property level.  
Contractual solutions based on the value chain  
3 of the in-depth case studies represent value-chain approaches, mainly aimed at fostering the 
marketing of organic products. These cases are the Wild farm, BG3, BioBabalscy (PL4) and 
Organic Wine from Rueda (ES2) 
“The wild farm” (BG3) is a private market-oriented value-chain initiative for the improved 
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marketing of organic beef and the implementation of nature-based farming beyond organic. “The 
wild farm” includes 4 organic farms situated in a high-nature value habitat with globally 
endangered species. The mission of the 4 organic farms is to implement as many conservation 
measures as possible beyond organic in order to support local biodiversity (e.g. maintenance of 
pastures consistent with the nesting regime of local bird species). Moreover, part of the animals 
of “the wild farm” are local rare breeds. Key element of the initiative is an own slaughterhouse 
being the first one certified for organic meat in Bulgaria and as that opening the Bulgarian market 
for national organic products. The distribution of the products is guaranteed by a contractual 
agreement between “the wild farm” and an organic distributor (Bio Balev supermarkets).  
“Bio-Babalscy” (PL4) is a private, market-oriented value chain initiative for the marketing of 
organic grain products. Bio-Babalscy itself is an organic farm and a pasta producer, cooperating 
with about 90 certified organic farms as suppliers. Besides being organic, the supplier farms have 
to produce rare and old varieties of cereals as required by the processor. To enable farms to meet 
this requirement, the processing company provides seeds and advice. Products are sold at high 
prices at the market, while high prices are reflected in grain prices for suppliers. The specificity 
of the initiative is the distinctively close relationship between the company owner and the 
suppliers, which is described as a close partnership rather than a typical buyer – seller connection. 
The relationship is characterized by a high level of trust and almost equal bargaining power due 
to the fact that all partners in the chain are aware of their mutual interests and is reflected in mainly 
verbal agreements/handshakes as contractual basis. Farmers value assured payments and good 
prices, but also the possibility of selling large quantities of products. 
The initiative “Organic wine in Rueda” (ES2) is based on the contracts between organic grape 
producers and the winery Herederos del Marqués de Riscal, S.A. The initiative is connected to 
specific labels, promoting organic wine products. The winery exclusively buys grapes from local 
individual organic grape producers and products, bottles and sells the wine under the 2 labels 
Marqués de Riscal organic and Marqués de Riscal Sauvignon Blanc organic. The Riscal brand is 
an economic factor for the whole region. It also immensely influences the tourism sector, since 
Rueda wine is very important in the local tourism and gastronomy. In the end the Riscal wine 
reaches the consumer in the form of high quality wine. The grape producers are not associated; 
however, they are integrated into the value chain by complying to the winery standards and have 
periodic controls on quality and residues, and have a strict protocol of organic production of high 
standards. 
In contrast to the 3 contracts solutions above, all building up on organic production, the programs 
Carta del Mulino by Barilla (IT4), and the Water protection bread (DE2), represent private, 
market oriented value chain approaches defining own production standards, independent of public 
funding for the contractees. 
The Barilla program “Carta del Mulino” (IT4) is a private-sector value chain contract solution 
targeting biodiversity, which has been introduced for farmers supplying Barilla’s bakery brand 
Mulino Bianco with soft wheat. The contract solution potentially covers several areas across 
Europe and beyond. Most of the contracts are however in Italy, France, Germany, and Austria. 
The contract itself represents an agreement between farmers, mills and/or agricultural 
elevators/storages/traders and contains ten rules of production (defined together with WWF, 
UNITUSCIA and UNIBO), defined in an ISCC PLUS certification for soft wheat, providing the 
assurance that mills, bakeries and farmers adhere to sustainability, traceability and no-
deforestation requirements. For the specific production line “Carta del Mulino”, Barilla commits 
to sourcing 100% of the soft wheat from ISCC certified sustainable agriculture according to the 
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10 rules. Carta del Mulino encompasses the specific measures for improving biodiversity with 
payments to farmers to compensate for lower yields. Annual audits are carried out by an 
independent third-party control body to all subscribers to the “Carta del Mulino” project. 30% of 
the total farmers are tested. 
The initiative "water protection bread (Wasserschutzbrot)" (DE6) has been initiated by the 
government of Lower Franconia with financing from the Bavarian Ministry of the Environment 
for project management/communication strategy. The initiative engages actors of the whole value 
chain and aims at the protection of ground and drinking water through a sustainable and regional 
wheat value chain. Based on voluntary commitment declarations of farmers, mills, bakeries and 
water suppliers, selected varieties of wheat are cultivated under specific fertilizer conditions (max. 
160 kg N/ha, no late fertilisation). As a general rule, the mills pay a surcharge on voluntary basis 
in order to compensate for the lower protein content that usually leads to a price reduction. In 
addition, the participating farmers get 100 to 150 EUR/ha for the fields belonging to the water 
protection bread initiative if located in water protection areas as a compensation for reduced 
yields. Farmers commit to regular soil analysis from the participating wheat fields and a detailed 
field recording with all management practices. Mills separately process water protection grain 
and bakeries commit to use at least 50% of their annual wheat flour grown as water protection 
wheat. Annual controls for compliance are performed for all participants (by local water 
supplier/FiBL) and the participants are committed to provide relevant information (fertilizer 
amount/wheat yields/amounts of milled wheat/wheat flour used in bakery products/Nmin) from 
each of the concerned wheat fields. Consumers awareness is raised by a specific label and via 
information signs on the fields. 
The last value chain based contract solution represented by the CONSOLE in-depth studies is the 
case of integrated production (ES4), bringing higher prices and competitive advantages on a 
highly competitive market: 
“Integrated production (IP)” (ES4) in olive groves is a widely applied public certification contract 
solution in Andalusia with growing participation. Particularly due to the strong competition in the 
olive sector, IP constitutes a sustainability brand usually linked to a better market price. IP 
contracts are based on the IP regulation which establishes a series of prohibited, mandatory and 
recommended management practices. To enter the IP contract, area must be integrated into an IP 
association (APIs) and follow the management recommendations and requirements during the 
contractual period. Recommendations are advised by expert personnel, while the regional 
administration provides information on the use and application of different amendments based on 
expert knowledge and pest risk forecasts. Compliance with the requirements and consequently 
certification is monitored on an annual basis through the registration of documentation, control 
of the plot, etc. 
Contract solutions based on land-tenure 
2 of the case studies representing contractual solutions based on land tenure (BG4 and LV2) are 
implemented in the aftermath of LIFe + project, in which land was bought and is now leased to 
interested farmers who continue environmentally friendly management:   
In Strandzha and Sakar mountains (BG4), a land-tenure contract solution guarantees the
conservation and restoration of grasslands for restoring local biodiversity and endangered bird 
species. The contract solution follows the implementation of a LIFE+ project, which implied the 
purchase of a huge amount of area by the Bulgarian Society for Protection of Birds. Under the 
land tenure contract, the over 600 ha land bought is leased out at no charge to around 20 farmers, 
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with requirements to restore and maintain the pastures in an environmental way. The main 
requirements focus on the conservational maintenance of the pastures, incl. restoration of 
bushland pastures, removing unwanted vegetation to maintain mosaic habitat, sustainable 
management of grassland through livestock grazing or mowing and restoration of grassland by 
restoring grassland naturally or by sowing native grass species. Farmers mainly benefit by 
receiving grazing and haying for animal husbandry without payment. By covering the specific 
requirements set into the contract with the NGO they also can apply for AES.  
In the Dviete floodplain area (LV2), during the implementation of the LIFE+ project "Restoration 
of Corncrake habitats in Dviete floodplain Natura 2000 site" (2010-2015), contracts on grassland 
restoration have been concluded between the Latvian Fund for Nature (LFN) and the landowners, 
who carried out the grassland restoration and got reimbursed for their activities. These contracts 
included also the requirement to maintain the restored areas after the implementation. Therefore, 
land lease agreements or agreements on grazing of biologically valuable grasslands have been 
concluded between the Dviete Valley Parish Association (DVPA)and the landowners. These 
contracts cover both grassland areas restored to pasture-land within the LIFE + project and areas 
pastured already before. Land leasing contracts were originally designed to last for 4-5 years, now 
for 10 years. When the cooperation agreement expires, a new contract is negotiated between the 
owner of the land and DVPA. 
The 3rd case study representing a land tenure-based contract solution (FR1) is implemented on 
publicly owned land, which is leased out to a farmer for environmental management:  
In Brest Métropole, a land tenure contract is in place to implement eco-grazing (FR1) for 
managing some of the Métropole’s green spaces instead of the conventional mowing. Contractors 
are the Brest Metropole (Head of Green Spaces) and a professional breeder who practices eco-
grazing on the green spaced against payment for providing the eco-grazing service. Green Spaces 
and the breeder agree on the management of the pasture on the plots, ensuring balanced feed 
availability and grass height. Management planning is based on weekly visual monitoring of the 
condition of the plots. The breeder's responsibility is to provide a herd, while the number of 
animals is jointly determined with Green Spaces (the breeder adjusts according to his own 
appreciation of the feed availability of each plot at a given time). The breeder is moreover 
responsible for the weekly movement of the sheep, the health management of the herd and the 
emergency interventions (escapes, diseases, etc.). Also, Green Spaces are responsible for the 
supply, installation and maintenance of the fences, the provision of water and the daily visit to the 
lots of sheep on the plots (counting, lame detection, sick animals). The contract takes the form of 
a public tender and has a length of 6-years, to guarantee a long-term vision for the breeder. 
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4.2 Agri-Environmental-Climate Public Goods (AECPGs) 
As regards AECPGs considered in the in-depth case studies, except “air quality” all AECPGs 
from the CONSOLEs list (see Box 1) are covered.  
Box 2: CONSOLE list of agri-environmental-climate Public goods (AECPG) 
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. gives an overview on the different 
AECPGs primarily addressed as the main focus of the individual contract solution (green), as well 
as the AECPGs secondarily addressed as subordinate AECPGs (yellow). From the combination 
between contract solutions and AECPGs addressed, some patterns become obvious:  
Biodiversity is the AECPG most often addressed by the contract solutions investigated in the in-
depth studies: 19 out of the 26 in-depth studies deal with the improved provision of biodiversity 
and habitats as a primary AECPG. 6 in-depth studies have improved provision of 
biodiversity/habitats as the sole main AECPG targeted. The AECPG following in frequency is 
landscape and scenery, being primarily and secondarily addressed in 15 in-depth studies, however 
always in combination with the provision of other AECPGs and never as the sole main PG 
targeted. Further AECPGs often considered in the in-depth studies are water quality, rural 
viability and vitality and cultural heritage, as well as soil quality. Climate PGs, such as carbon 
sequestration and GHG emission mitigation, as well as water related AECPGs are in parts 
addressed as sole, primary AECPGs by the contract solution.  
It also becomes obvious that particularly result-based and result-oriented contract solutions are 
strongly targeted to the improvement of only selected, specific AECPGs. In contrast, particularly 
collective implementation/collaboration contracts, often taking a landscape/territorial approach 
and considering more dimensions of public good provision, often aim at broader AECPG 
objectives, targeting multiple AECPGs up to a maximum of 7 AECPGs (IT6).  
CONSOLE considers 14 AECPGs: 
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Table 2: AECPGs addressed by the CONSOLE in-depth studies 
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AT AT3 X    
IRL IRL2 X    
AT AT4 X  
NL NL3 X  X X 
FR FR4 X  X  
IRL IRL1 X X  
BE BE3 X X   
FI FI3 X X X  
IT IT1 X   
IT IT6 X  
UK UK1 X  
UK UK3 X  
NL NL1 X  
LV LV1 X  
BE BE1 X X   
PL PL1 X  X 
FI FI5 X X X 
BG BG3 X  
PL PL4 X  
DE DE5 X  
IT IT4 X  
ES ES2 X  
ES ES4 X  
BG BG4 X 
FR FR1 X 
LV LV2 X 
*Contract types: RB/RO: Result-based/result-oriented contracts; CO/COP: Collective 
implementation/cooperation; VC: Value chain-based contracts; LT: Land tenure-based contracts 
**AECPGs: green box: Main AECPG objectives addressed by contract solution; yellow box: Additional AECPGs 
considered by the contract solution
Result-based/result-oriented contract solutions and AECPGs
In the CONSOLE in-depth sample, most result-based/result-oriented contract solutions (and 
combinations of contract types with a strong results-based component) address primarily 
biodiversity (AT3, NL3, IRL2, BE3) and climate regulation (AT4, FR4, FI3). Also in the contract 
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solution IRL1, where a broader bundle of AECPGs is addressed, the result-based element of the 
contract solution finally focuses on a small number of AECPGs, namely biodiversity and water 
quality. 
Result-based/result-oriented contract solutions and the AECPG biodiversity 
The results-based contract solutions RNP (AT3) and RBAPS (IRL2), in their current status both 
target farm-level biodiversity in connection to specific habitats worthy of protection: Austria’s 
RNP (AT3) focuses on biodiversity in utilised agricultural nature conservation areas - mainly in 
Natura 2000 areas, biosphere reserves and other valuable landscapes or as habitats of species 
listed in Annex IV of the Flora Fauna and Habitats (FFH) Directive. Biodiversity objectives are 
developed plot-individually by ecologists together with the farmer, and can include flora and 
fauna targets. In IRL2, the RBAPS targets biodiversity of species-rich grasslands and high nature 
values settings, as well as lowland semi-natural grasslands, and Special Protection Area under the 
Birds Directive (79/409/EEC). RBAPS biodiversity targets are not defined farm- or plot-
individually, but consist of a set of biodiversity objectives characterising the specific habitat 
targeted. Biodiversity objectives include sets of indicator key species, such as plants, but also 
further aspects such as vegetation structure, damaging activities, etc. which need to be assessed 
and improved on farm-level. Also, the BurrenLife program (IRL1), particularly in its result-based 
component targets biodiversity of a specific habitat, namely the high nature value farmland in the 
Burren. The Burren is an UNESCO Geopark characterized by the presence of exposed limestone 
and large areas designated as Special Area of Conservation (SAC). Besides biodiversity the 
program is also devoted to the improvement of water quality and water usage efficiency, and the 
maintenance preservation of landscape and cultural heritage. As regards biodiversity, every 
eligible field of species-rich Burren grassland and heath is assessed annually as regards ‘habitat 
health’. Similar to RBAPS (IRL2), biodiversity is addressed via a set of biodiversity objectives 
targeted to the specific habitats of the Burren, that can be reached farm-individually. Besides 
biodiversity conservation aspects, such as the abundance and diversity of species, biodiversity 
objectives include also management aspects such as grazing/mowing regime, feeding of livestock, 
impacts of management on water and soils. In contrast to having a focus on specific habitats, the 
biodiversity monitor in dairy farming (NL3) targets biodiversity in the context of the specific dairy 
farming system. Biodiversity objectives are approached by 4 biodiversity pillars, being functional 
agrobiodiversity, diversity of landscape, diversity of species, and regional biodiversity, all being 
reflected in key performance indicators connected to farm-level agricultural management, such 
as percentage of grassland, regional protein input, nitrogen soil surplus, etc. 
Result-based/result-oriented contract solutions and AECPG climate regulation 
The private result-based program ECOMETHANE (FR4) and the Humus program of Ökoregion 
Kaindorf (AT4) both focus on climate regulation at farm-level, directly addressing GHG 
mitigation and carbon sequestration. The ECO-METHANE (FR4) program is devoted to lowering 
farm-level enteric methane (CH4) emissions from dairy farming. CH4 emissions are farm-
individually addressed by a calculation based on 2 measured indicators, namely the profile of 
fatty acids of the milk collected, and the milk yield. The humus program of the Ökoregion 
Kaindorf (AT4) is devoted to farm-level soil carbon sequestration via humus accumulation on 
(currently) arable land. The climate-PG objective is CO2 stored in the soil as carbon, over a 
minimum period of 3 years. Amount of CO2 stored is assessed plot-individually by a standard 
process of soil carbon analysis via dry combustion, based on soil sampling.  The Carbon market 
Hiilipörssi (FI3) addresses carbon sequestration via peatland restoration. Rather than on the 
mitigation/sequestration of CO2 itself, the climate PG objective is on restoration measures of 
peatland areas worthy of restoration, which potentially leads to CO2 mitigation/sequestration. The 
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background of this PG objective lies in the functioning of peatland as carbon sinks under natural 
hydrologic conditions. Drainage alters the hydrology of mires and the cessation of peat 
accumulation, turning them from carbon sinks to sources of increased carbon emissions. Also, 
drainage destroys mire vegetation and leads to biodiversity loss. The restoration of the drained 
peatlands targeted by Hiillipörssi, e.g. by filling in and damming the ditches and removing the 
part of growing trees, aims to gradually restore natural mire hydrology and original mire 
vegetation, and turn the peatland back to a carbon sink.  
Labelling biodiversity on territorial level 
The Wildlife Estates label (BE3) addresses wildlife biodiversity on the superordinate level of 
territories, with a focus on fauna. At this, the label considers the environmental conditions of a 
territory, as basis for wildlife biodiversity from a multifunctional perspective: biodiversity 
objectives to be reached to obtain the label include a variety of 12 criteria, such as the presence 
of certain species, the status of the habitats, including the level of stillness/tranquillity/-
surveillance, but also the existence of measures and plans settling the basis for wildlife 
biodiversity or actions related to communication, etc. 
Collective implementation/cooperation contract-solutions and AECPGs  
Contract solutions putting forward collective implementation or cooperative elements, often 
address a territorial/landscape level of AECPG provision and therefore mostly target a broader 
bundle of AECPGs. Beyond that, from the in-depth studies it becomes evident that such solutions 
are particularly applied to AECPGs being delivered “across field borders”, meaning AECPGs 
which can hardly be improved by measures on singular fields and plots. Besides biodiversity, 
which is also in the collective/cooperation in-depth case studies the most often addressed AECPG, 
this accounts particularly for water related AECPGs (quantity and quality) (IT1, IT6, UK1, UK3, 
LV1), and resilience to natural hazards (IT6, UK1, UK3, BE1, FI5), both being hardly addressed 
by any other of the contract solution types presented in the 26 in-depth case studies.  
Collective schemes targeting multiple AECPGs 
In most collective schemes embedded into national RDPs and organized as forms of tenders, 
rather comprehensive regional/landscape environmental objectives are the basis for the derivation 
of concrete and operational targets of AECPG conservation/provision/enhancement. These 
operative AECPG targets and related management measures are then mostly defined in an 
integrative process between the participants of the respective collectives. In the Dutch AES case 
of Kromme Rijn collective management (NL1), the targets for nature management set by the 
province in the province-level annual nature management plan are on nature, landscape, 
agricultural nature and landscape management, while landscape management aims at fostering 
landscape diversity. Focus is on the maintenance of characteristic landscape elements such as 
levees with tree lines, small patches of forests, wooded banks, ponds, and small traditional 
orchards and on the maintenance of small patches of wet species-rich grasslands that are 
extensively managed through mowing, combined with tree lines and small fields. In the lower 
and wetter part of the region, the creation of habitats for specific amphibians is targeted as 
AECPGs objective, including the great crested newt, several owls, and several bat species.  
In the development of the Integrated Territorial Project (ITP)(IT6), for the area of the Tuscan 
archipelago the project consortium defined 2 classes of main environmental criticalities, being 
environmental and hydrogeological instability, and biodiversity. Derived from that, a broad 
variety of AECPG needs and objectives are addressed, ranging from the dissemination of good 
agricultural practices for the prevention of erosion and runoff and the uptake and increase of 
reservoir capacity, to the construction and restoration of traditional hydraulic-agricultural 
arrangements protecting against landslides and erosion (dry walls, bridles, embankments, water 
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streams), the construction and restoration of the connectivity network useful for the transit and 
proliferation of minor fauna in the agricultural sector (dry stone walls, ponds, plantations, 
wetlands), the diffusion of knowledge and awareness regarding the overall state of health of 
natural biodiversity in the agro-ecosystem, the development of an integrated and compatible 
strategy for crop protection, and the recovery of sites with high naturalistic value.  
Also under the public Countryside Stewardship Facilitation Fund (CSFF) funding program in 
UK1 und UK3, under the broadly formulated RDP funding target of “improving the local natural 
environment at a landscape scale”, AECPG targets are comprehensive though specific for the 
landscapes covered by the respective networks: In the South Pennines CSFF (UK1), where the 
group members’ land holdings are in the proximity of Special Protection Areas (SPA), Special 
Areas of Conservation (SAC) and the South Pennines Moor Site of Special Scientific Interest 
(SSSI), and characterised by a relatively high altitude, the interest of the CSFF network revolves 
around moorland restoration and enhancement, grassland habitat creation, and enhancing and 
expanding riparian habitats to benefit flood risk management and water quality, while considering 
afforestation practices as well. Interest is also on soil quality and acidity, as grass qualities are 
insufficient for sheep feeding. Derived from the overall interest, concrete goals of the network 
deal with the restoring of drystone walls to reduce soil erosion and sediment transfer and 
strengthen the landscape character. Further objectives are the enhancing of existing woodlands 
and the expansion of woodland to support landscape character, biodiversity, water quality and 
flood risk, in addition to wider climate change, economic and social benefits. Furthermore, 
enhancing and expanding the area of wetland and riparian habitats to benefit flood risk 
management, water quality, landscape character and biodiversity, and restoring or maintaining 
the South Pennine Moors and its co-joining, un-designated, low-input grassland habitats, to meet 
the needs of priority birds species, are AECPG objectives of the CSFF. The Wensleydale CSFF 
(UK3) network was set up to adapt part of the participating farmers’ land to be more resilient to 
flooding, and to improve the local natural environment and landscape. Concretely, targets were 
to foster the creation, restoration and management (with an emphasis to significantly improve 
water quality, air quality and natural flood management) of the top priority habitats of upland 
heath, blanket bog, flushes and fens, ancient and native woodland, purple moor grass and rush 
pastures, traditional hay meadows and the riparian habitat. Moreover, land management and 
capital works were focused on the support/protection of specific priority species (black grouse, 
red squirrel, native crayfish, river lamprey, Atlantic salmon dormice, woodland birds, breeding 
waders). As for improving water quality, focus was on the reduction of phosphate and sediment 
in the upper and middle Ure catchments and Semer Water SSSI and as regards water runoff and 
flood prevention, the maintenance and restoration or hedgerows and drystone walls, woodland 
planting, river bank restoration and the installation of instream structures and large woody debris 
were envisaged. 
Also the initiative Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie Region (PL1) addresses multiple AECPG 
objectives on a broader landscape level. The initiative targets to support the realization of the 
Region Development Strategy 2020, where preservation and protection of biodiversity is one of 
the priority actions. Concretely the program is focused on the preservation, protection and 
restoration of the biodiversity in valuable natural areas, by stopping and turning around of the 
declining livestock numbers and the decreasing utilization of permanent grasslands in form of 
grazing pastures in a region with one of the highest shares of protected areas of high 
environmental value (44.9% of the total area) in Poland. The maintenance and restoration of 
grazing aims to halt the overgrowing of naturally valuable areas with expansive plant species and 
self-sown trees and therefore to preserve the traditional landscape and the natural and cultural 
heritage of the Podkarpackie region. 
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Collective schemes targeting single AECPGs 
In the case study incentives for collective reservoirs (IT1), the collective AES targets only 1 
AECPG, namely water availability. Its objectives are to ensure a stable water supply for the 
agricultural sector, and to reduce the pressure on groundwater resources by investing in the 
establishment of water reservoirs. The AECPG targets are differentiated according to the pressure 
on water resources: In case the project is located in an area where the water sources are considered 
“not good” it must ensure a 50% water saving and must not lead to an increase in irrigated utilised 
argicultural area (UAA). In case the project is located in an area where the water status is “good”, 
it must ensure a potential water savings of at least 10%. 
Collective approaches in LIFE+ and INTERREG projects and how they address AECPGs 
In the in-depth studies devoted to larger scale implementation projects, AECPG objectives, as 
well as management actions are mostly clearly defined right from the start of the projects. The 
LIFE+ 3watEr project (BE1) aims to restore and enhance habitats and species of importance to 
the European Community in the Pond Area Midden-Limburg. For the implementation of the 
project, concrete AECPG goals, as well as management measures have been specified. For 
improving biodiversity in the area, the project has targeted unique species and habitats, such as 
bittern, tree frog, oligotrophic waters, oligotrophic to mesotrophic standing waters, northern 
Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix, and European dry heaths. Connected to these goals, highly 
specific management actions have been elaborated, such as restoration and enhancement of 
habitats and natural living conditions for target species, establishment of filtration systems, 
blocking of areas from public access, etc. For landowners, the project mostly meant they need to 
agree to the measures established on their area, and to maintain them for a long-lasting period 
after the projects end (AfterLIFE management plans). The overall objective of the Interreg project 
NUTRINFLOW (LV1), was to establish practical examples of win-win water management 
situations for agricultural producers, aimed at the retention of nitrogen and phosphorus. Derived 
from that goal, specific objectives were defined, such as controlling and reducing nutrient inputs 
into natural watercourses and water bodies, controlling soil erosion, enriching oxygen content in 
water, promoting natural self-purification processes in water. Objectives were further to increase 
the awareness among farmers, advisors, and municipal authorities and services on drainage 
techniques and approaches to integrate field and basic drainage measures, while lowering the 
barriers for the execution of sustainable drainage management and combination of environmental 
and production benefits.  
Collectively owned forest area and AECPG provision 
In the multi-owner forest property TUOHI (FI5), rather than AECPG objectives, the management 
system of the continuous cover (uneven-aged) forestry regime is determined. However, connected 
to this forestry system, a number of AECPG objectives are envisaged: In uneven-aged forestry, 
clear cutting is avoided and the forest is regenerated naturally by harvesting mainly part of the 
biggest trees. The dispersed age class structure increases the features of a natural forest, 
biodiversity, scenery and recreation possibilities, as well as carbon storage and resilience.  
Value-chain contract solutions and AECPGs 
The 6 contract solutions pushed forward by the value-chain, or strongly integrating it, in parts 
target few specific AECPGs (IT4, DE2), in parts bundles of AECPGs. Particularly those examples 
supporting and marketing organic production (BG3, PL4, ES2) of course go along with a number 
of AECPGs addressed by this management system, while often even going beyond classical 
AECPGs touched by organic farming by adding specific components such as rare breeds and crop 
varieties (BG3, PL4). Amongst all in-depth studies, the value chain contract solutions are the only 
25 
examples directly addressing quality and security of products as AECPG objectives (BG3, PL4, 
ES2). 
With the product concept of the Bio-Babalscy (PL4) company, AECPG objectives are primarily 
the enhancement of farmland biodiversity, but also the preservation of old traditions and recipes, 
cultural heritage and the quality and security of products. The core AECPG aspects covered by 
the Wild farm (BG3) are the conservation of local biodiversity and the application of high animal 
welfare standards, by perennial grazing of livestock (including a 6-month phase of grazing on 
alpine pastures), and with this system maintaining pasture habitats for a large number of rare and 
endangered bird species. Moreover, with the own organic slaughterhouse, high safety of organic 
products and the possibility of organic products to enter the Bulgarian market is envisaged. The 
support of organic wine in Rueda (ES2), contributes to AECPG provision in the region 
particularly by the potential of increasing the share of organic grape production, and therefore the 
maintenance of regional wine production in general. Even if no additional conditionalities 
‘beyond organic’ are envisaged, the organic production leads to the protection of endangered 
species of birds, the maintenance of the typical landscape and scenery and to benefits for rural 
viability and vitality. 
Instead of building upon organic farming, the initiatives Carta del Mulino by Barilla (IT4), and 
the Water protection bread (DE2) define own production standards for improving environmental 
performance of the contracted (conventional) farms. The Carta del Mulino program focuses on 
the improvement of farmland biodiversity, but also water quality. The ISCC PLUS certification 
includes measures for more biodiversity friendly crop rotations, minimum percentages (3%) of 
soft wheat UAA allocated to flowers and pollinator habitats, specific variety selection, certified 
seeds, non-use of neonicotinoids and non-use of glyphosate, as well as measures guaranteeing 
segregation and traceability of the lots, lots’ storage separated from other production and added 
value distributed along the supply-chain. In the Water protection bread (DE2) initiative, the aim 
is the protection of ground and drinking water. The measure directly targets ground and drinking 
water protection and hereby exclusively the aspect of fertilization when growing quality wheat. 
Reducing the nitrogen load in groundwater is in the foreground, requirements include the 
cultivation of selected varieties with good baking properties regardless lower protein content 
while ensuring compliance with the required fertilizer amount (max, 160 kg N/ha) and no late 
fertilisation.  
The integrated production in olive groves (ES4) in Andalusia aims at a bundle of AECPGs by 
establishing a series of detailed prohibited, mandatory, and recommended practices based on 
different threats. These measures are particularly devoted to erosion control (terraces, strip 
cultivation, plant cover, reduction of tillage.), plantation management (certified seeds/ seedlings,  
plantation framework of 200-300 olive trees/ha), use of fertilizers/amendments dose taking into 
account olive variety, age, density, cup volume, vegetative development, soil fertility level, 
nutritional status and contributions from rainwater, irrigation water, mineralization of organic 
matter, etc., phytosanitary practices (application following risk assessment) and drip irrigation, as 
well as measures concerning harvesting and training. The in-depth study however focusses 
strongly on the problems associated to soil degradation by olive crops (water contamination, soil 
erosion, etc) and the soil capacity for carbon sequestration in Mediterranean areas, by applying 
the Carbosoil model, developed with 16 soil types and more than 1600 soil profiles. 
Land tenure and AECPGs 
The 2 contract solutions in the CONSOLE in-depth study sample presenting land tenure contracts 
(FR1, BG4), both deal with AECPGs related to grazing. In both examples, biodiversity is a central 
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AECPG, while the starting point for biodiversity conservation in both studies is fundamentally 
different. With the eco-grazing initiative (FR1), at the beginning mainly a reduction of noise, as 
well as a reduction of carbon costs related to 5 – 6 mowing events should be reached. The impacts 
of eco-grazing now reach further, as the grazed areas provide a richer diversity of flora in the 
meadows. In contrast, the land tenure contracts for the conservation and restoration of grassland 
sin Stranzha and sakar mountains (BG4) from the beginning had the main AECPG objective to 
restore former high-value pastures that have been turned into farmland and in this way to restore 
the natural habitats of important species – the European Souslik as a main food source for Imperial 
Eagle, Booted eagle, Lesser spotted eagle, Long-legged buzzard. To this biodiversity objective, 
the main requirements for participation are for conservational maintenance of the pastures, incl. 
restoration of bushland pastures, the removing of unwanted vegetation to maintain a mosaic 
habitat, the sustainable management of grassland through livestock grazing or mowing and the 
restoration of grassland either by natural processes or by sowing native grass species 
5 Framework conditions and context situation 
As outlined in CONSOLE Deliverable D1.1, a number of system features related to agriculture, 
food and forestry or, more widely, bioeconomy systems, determine the processes that allow and 
shape the definition of contract solutions. Framework conditions and context situations, within 
which contract solutions are placed, have a decisive influence on their design, but also their 
performance (such as longevity, acceptance, effectiveness, etc.). Following Deliverable D1.1, the 
CONSOLE in-depth case studies put special emphasis on investigating specific framework 
conditions and context features having an influence on the design and effectiveness of the 
presented contract solution. Of specific interest are basic conditions for the implementation and 
acceptance of the contracts, namely environmental conditions, agricultural/forestry background 
and given socioeconomic features. Also, policy and legal conditions, as well as the role of 
institutions and formal structures are investigated. Last but not least, the technology aspects 
fostering implementation and operationalisation have been screened. 
5.1 Environmental conditions, agricultural/forestry background and socioeconomic 
features  
The CONSOLE sample of in-depth studies stands for a broad variety of environmental, 
agricultural/forestry and socio-economic basic conditions throughout Europe. Consequently, the 
prerequisites for successful and accepted implementation in each contract solution differ, 
nevertheless communalities become obvious across cases. 
AECPG losses in production systems have negative effects - Counteracting pressures on 
(single) AECPGs decreases perceptible negative effects on agriculture 
In some cases, contract solutions are set to counteract massive pressures on (single) AECPGs
with a need for action. Particularly in cases where this pressure is felt by the agricultural sector 
itself, and the deterioration of the AECPGs has a felt, negative effect on production, acceptance 
is high. In the CONSOLE in-depth case studies, this framework condition is encountered by the 
implementation of collective contracts. An example is the case of collective reservoirs in IT1, 
where a highly specialised, highly water intensive and high value fruit sector is severely 
constrained by water availability and the enhanced risk of water scarcity and droughts due to 
climate change. Combined with the relatively high level of social capital and trust in the region, 
setting the basis for a successful response to a contract scheme that foresees the coordination 
among famers, the collective scheme for water reservoirs, being the basic requirement for the 
maintenance of this form of agriculture, is particularly successful. Also in the case of the 
Wensleydale Countryside Stewardship Facilitation Fund (CSFF) network, where storm Desmond 
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in 2015 resulted in extensive flooding and damages in upland, lowland and heavily populated 
areas, better resilience to flooding was in the direct interest of the farmers, while it was obvious 
that only measures on a landscape scale and via collective implementation can lead to success. 
Another example is the case of the integrated territorial projects (ITP) (IT6) in the Tuscan 
archipelago. Here, some of the pressure on agriculture is caused by ungulates (in particular wild 
boar and mouflon, both alien species), damaging both crops and hydraulic and agricultural 
arrangements and slopes, seriously affecting productivity and causing losses for producers. 
Moreover, here the abandonment of traditional forms of agriculture, combined with changes in 
precipitation patterns due to climate change, causes landscape level effects such as landslides and 
valley flooding, but also widespread erosion phenomena particularly affecting agriculture and 
strongly increasing the necessity for farmers to enter a collective scheme to be able to (re)act on 
a level beyond their single farms. 
Deteriorations on landscape level are felt and regretted - Attitude, will and a common 
understanding of the agri-ecosystems and AECPG benefits  
In many successful contracts solutions investigated in the in-depth case studies, negative 
(economic) impacts of AECPG deterioration on agricultural/forestry production are not the main 
driver. It becomes obvious that particularly land managers’ and land owners’ attitudes, will and 
a common understanding on the benefits of AECPG provision are strong triggers to develop and 
step into contract solutions counteracting AECPG deterioration. Particularly this becomes 
obvious in special, or in specifically sensitive ecosystems and landscapes, where deteriorations 
are personally felt and (also emotionally) regretted: For example, in the case of the 3WatEr LIFE+ 
project (BE1), the deterioration and disappearance of the unique pond and heath landscape, as 
well as the related reduction of key habitats for especially the Bittern (Botaurus Stellaris), partly 
caused by strong urbanisation processes, but mainly by the abandonment of fish farming due to 
the regression of economic perspectives for this activity, was the principal motive for the 10 
landowners to develop the LIFE+ project for the maintenance of the traditional and 
multifunctional countryside management, including forestry and local fish farming. Also in the 
Wild farm (BG3) initiative, the 4 partaking farms are aware of the high-nature value site with 
ornithological significant Egyptian vulture, which is a globally endangered species. Even if the 
organic and pasture-based farming system per se is well suited for the natural extensive grassland 
situation, and brings economic advantages, the Wild farm farming concept is moreover driven by 
an own “mission” to implement as many conservation measures as possible (beyond organic, 
maintenance of pastures consistent with the nesting regime of local bird species, etc.) in order to 
support the local biodiversity.  
Besides attitude and will, a common understanding within the landowners’ and farming 
community about the natural and agricultural ecosystem and the provision and benefits of 
AECPGs, are strong drivers too.  
In the case of the integrated territorial projects (IT6), a common understanding of drivers of 
AECPG deterioration, as well as of the wider effects, present distinctive drivers for the choice 
and acceptance of the collective instrument. Besides the direct (economic) effects of ungulates 
(see above), in the region the regional environmental criticalities are connected to very complex 
relationships between the growth of the tourism sector (being directly mirrored in urbanisation 
processes and other construction particularly for the development of touristic/accommodation 
facilities and infrastructures), the loss of natural as well as traditional cultural landscapes and 
cultural identity due to agricultural land abandonment and/or intensification, the related AECPG 
losses, and finally the interrelation of these processes with the agriculturally most important wine 
sector, being strongly affected by all of the developments described. Particularly the wine sectors’ 
development in the past, setting up an DOC consortium and an umbrella association for the 
promotion of local products, adapting to the challenges by building strong producers networks 
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and collaborations with government and particularly research bodies, allowed the creation of a 
network of knowledge, skills and tools for the development of the sector itself, but also of actions 
aimed at greater sustainability. Based on these experiences and relationships, the collective 
planning with the ITP at a territorial level was developed, while it is still difficult to say whether 
this wealth of knowledge, contacts, and relationships will lead through an effective improvement 
of the local environment. Certainly, the climate of trust and the stability of the relationships 
already established has allowed the development and realization of such complex planning, 
reducing information asymmetries, search, transaction, and monitoring costs.  
Also for the collective AES schemes of the Netherlands, here represented by the Kromme Rjin 
collective management (NL1), a common understanding of AECPG situation and of the measures 
of improvement is the general basis for the scheme. In the Kromme Rjin region, the pressure of 
loss of extensive grassland and natural area, due to increases of population and infrastructure, but 
also due to the changes of agricultural management, are perceived by the collective. There is 
strong awareness of the landscape and environmental system, being differentiated into different 
landscape parts, characterised by very specific environmental and agricultural assets, specificities 
and needs. Only this broad understanding of the landscape system, enables the common 
elaboration of targeted measures, which are highly acceptable for the partaking farmers and 
landowners. 
Environmental oriented management was already the basis - Jumping on an already moving 
train of environmental protection 
Successfully introduced (new) contract solutions in the CONSOLE in-depth sample often 
“jumped on an already moving train” of environmental protection, improving what is already 
there, or supporting, enhancing and securing developments that already take form. New contract 
solutions can for example be direct successors of “classical” AES, replacing or improving them 
even on the same areas of implementation and consequently on farms already having an interest 
to devote their area to nature conservation/AECPG provision.  
An example is the RNP (AT3), being implemented on high nature value agricultural areas, which 
mostly have already been managed under the former area-based scheme of contractual nature 
protection. Here, the solution represents a clear improvement for the farmers managing the mainly 
very low-intensive grassland sites, as the result-based approach provides the same payment range, 
similar goals, but full flexibility in management decisions.  
On the level of a landscape, the Wildlife Estate Label (BE3) in Flanders in parts rewards the past, 
and supports the continuing sustainable development of the regional agricultural system: In the 
case study area Flanders, the agricultural system has already made a transition from intensive 
monocultures and landscape mismanagement, leading to an impoverishment of soils and forest as 
well as to a loss of biodiversity, towards a more integrated and multifunctional estate 
management. This transition was particularly fed by the greening policy of the CAP and the 
adoption and promotion of agri-environmental measures by government agencies. The label 
now presents a validation of the successes reached.  
Another example for building upon something that is there is the case of water protection 
bread (DE5). This initiative is particularly interesting, as it is implemented on strongly market-
oriented conventional arable farms, having a clear production target. Trigger for the initiative is 
a severe pressure on the groundwater quality in drinking water areas, where water is at risk to be 
costly treated with chemical removal of nitrates. Particularly natural site conditions, namely low 
precipitation and a low groundwater recharge rate, as well as high permeability of the soils and 
in parts very shallow soils, lead to nitrogen surpluses and nitrogen leaching from arable land. 
Aggravating to this natural predisposition, quality wheat production is of high importance for 
many farmers in the region, i.a. for export. Market price is heavily dependent on the wheat’s 
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protein content, while protein content is dependent on the amount and timing of the nitrogen 
fertilisation. To obtain high protein contents a targeted late fertilisation is common practice, 
however being the main threat for groundwater quality. Against this background, a major reason 
for the success of the water protection bread initiative is, that voluntary cooperation and private 
contracts between farmers and water suppliers in the Bavarian drinking water areas, contracting 
voluntary management requirements around the drinking water extraction points, exists since 
many years. While up to now the focus was put on extensification measures or the growing of 
catch crops, the water protection bread initiatives on the one hand enables a targeted fair payment 
to renounce late fertilisation, and on the other creates the possibility of regional marketing of the 
wheat for bakery purposes, as well as the marketing of a good image of agriculture in drinking 
water areas, all representing additional assets to the farmers.  
Low intensive agriculture, low income - agri-environmental contract solutions represent an 
important part of income 
Particularly in regions characterised by sensitive habitats, often the agricultural production 
conditions necessary to maintain these habitats enable only low intensities of farming and in some 
cases set farmers under the economic pressure of abandoning, or intensifying farming activity. In 
such regions, successful contract solutions can be designed to significantly support and/or 
enhance the income of the partaking farmers.  
An example of such framework conditions is the BurrenLIFE+ program (IRL1). Operating farms 
in the Burren are typically small-scale beef cattle farms with low levels of intensity, and typically 
low income which is mainly derived from directs payments rather than agricultural production 
output. The usual approach to increase income is the intensification of livestock farming, 
reclamation of lands, and substitution of silage for the traditional winterage pastures, all 
negatively impacting on biodiversity, the preservation of cultural and archaeological sites and led 
to an encroachment of scrub. With the advent of the result-based Burren program however, farm 
income could be boosted by providing additional payments for environmental performance.  
A similar situation occurs in the 2nd Irish case study RBAPS (IRL2). The 2 pilot regions for 
RBAPS are particularly sensitive agricultural areas: In Leitrim, small fields predominate on the 
lowland, in a bocage (mixed woodland and pasture) landscape with a high density of hedges. 
Grasslands are predominantly semi-natural or semi-improved. With average yearly rainfall in the 
region of up to 1250mm and slow draining clay and peaty soils, farming in County Leitrim is 
challenging. In Shannon, the Shannon Callows represent the largest unregulated floodplains in 
north-west Europe, providing numerous ecosystem services, including water storage, flood 
attenuation, carbon storage and biodiversity protection. The habitats on the Shannon Callows 
(derived from the Irish word caladh meaning river meadow) are composed of a mosaic of habitat 
types, which support a wealth of wildlife, including, plants, insects, birds and mammals. Many of 
these habitats depend on traditional agricultural practices to support the wildlife that flourishes 
there. The Callow floods regularly in winter and dries out in summer for use as pasture or hay. 
However, the land can be under-water for up to six months of the year and flooding can occur 
anytime depending on weather conditions. Summer flooding has become more prevalent in recent 
years. Under these preconditions, the small and low intensity suckler cow and sheep family farms 
generate rather low income, being 100% based on direct payments. The option of additional 
result-based payments in this context is a competitive way for boosting farm income.  
Even more than in the 2 Irish studies, the collective contract solution for Natural Grazing in 
Podkarpackie Region (PL1) represents a contract solution able to halt and turnaround the 
abandonment of agricultural activity due to its boosting effect on agricultural income. In the low 
intensive region, particularly small farms with agricultural land area of 2-5 ha (42.3%) dominate, 
the average size of farms in 2016 was 4.36 ha. The share of permanent grassland, i.e. meadows 
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and pastures, constitutes about 40% of agricultural land in the region. Due to the low incomes 
from agriculture, during past decades, a progressive decline in livestock (cattle and sheep) 
numbers was observed as well as a decreasing utilization of permanent grasslands (below 50%). 
On the other side, the region is faced with comparatively low levels of GDP per capita and a high 
unemployment rate, leaving agriculture as a distinctively important sector, which still employs 
about 30% of working people in the region. Therefore, the possibility of financial remuneration 
for the collective use of land for grazing animals represents a clear support for farm income and 
the program is experiencing growing interest of farmers.  
Another example of the success of collective contracts solutions due to income support is the 
South Pennines CSFF schemes in UK1. In the South Pennines CSFF (UK1), partaking farms 
carry out agriculture in the specific habitats of the Special Protection Areas (SPA), Special Areas 
of Conservation (SAC) and the South Pennines Moor Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). 
The partaking farms are exclusively small sheep and beef farms (average size is 30 hectares), 
which need to sell their sheep elsewhere for fattening due to low grass qualities which results in 
lower market prices. From all farming activities in the wider Yorkshire area, the activities that the 
CSFF members partake (grazing livestock) is by far the least profitable one, generating a yearly 
income lower than the England average. To supplement farm income, farmers need to engage in 
other economic activities, also farmers are dependant in income from various environmental 
management schemes, mainly the Basic Payment Scheme. The option given by the CSFF to 
collectively initiate and target AES payments to the region, and therefore striving for a future free 
from the threat of financial constraints is the key motivator for the farmers. This has resulted in 
the group demonstrating the 5th highest mean area under AES agreements across all CSFF groups 
in the UK.  
Low risk, negligible or positive income effects, easily integratable into the farming system 
and creating a nice picture/reacting on social pressure –  creating win-win situations 
Particularly under the framework condition of intensive farming systems, successful examples of 
contract solutions are result-based, being perceived by the farmers as additional (market) 
opportunities and a benchmarking system, with low risk, low income losses and, in the best case, 
income gains, as well as being easily integratable into the current farming systems. The Humus-
Program of the Ökoregion Kaindorf (AT4) is open for any type of agricultural management, 
however, up to now mainly arable farmers take part in the program. The program itself comes 
without any risk for the farms during the humus accumulation phase, as farmers are fully free in 
their management decisions and there are no penalties if carbon content is not increased. 
Therefore, management decisions for humus accumulation can be integrated at own speed and 
intensity, and therefore be smoothly integrated into the existing farming system. Also as regards 
the 2 result-based contract solutions targeted to intensive dairy farming, namely the biodiversity 
monitor in dairy farming (NL3) and the EcoMethane program (FR4), both monitoring systems 
enable the farmers to integrate beneficial farming practices at their own speed and intensity (e.g. 
changing ration of feed), to benchmark against other farmers, and, if positive results are reached, 
offer the potential and complementary source of income opens up for the farmers.  
In all these 3 cases of implementing result-based solutions in rather intensive agricultural systems 
however, an important external driver enhancing the support of farmers for the contract solution, 
is obviously social pressure. In contrast to all other case studies, in these 3 cases the experts 
informing about context and framework situation brought up the topic of boosting the image of 
agriculture via result- and therefore indicator-based approaches. In the case of FR3, the expert 
referred to the current ‘agribashing’, motivating farmers to improve their image and their 
representation particularly with figures quantifying methane savings. In NL3, the expert referred 
to the current social and political discussion about the role of intensive animal husbandry in the 
Dutch nitrogen emission crisis, against which the biodiversity monitor is pushed as a highly 
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potential instrument to both measure actual emissions and impacts per farm, and at the same time 
provide a tool for interested supply-chain stakeholders to reward farms which perform 
environmentally well. Also, in AT4 the interviewed experts reported a strong push towards the 
program on side of the farmers as well as the buyers, since social discussion and pressure, fuelled 
by initiatives such as Fridays for Futures, get stronger.  
A fourth study, being very special but to some point underpinning the argument of low risk and 
low adaptation effort as drivers of success, is the Carbon Market Hiilipörssi (FI3) in Finland. The 
contract solution is insofar exceptional, as land owners provide peatlands to the market without 
getting payments from the operator, allowing this peatland area to be fully restored. Then, it will 
be turned into a private nature conservation area. On first sight, it seems rather unlikely that any 
landowner would step into such solution, reversing “land melioration” and preventing future 
economic activities on the area. However, under the economic framework conditions of forest 
production on these sites, the measure presents no economic decline, while being in line with the 
general trend of peatland restoration on publicly owned lands: Though from 1960s to 1990s, more 
than half of the (original) mires in Finland were drained for forestry purposes, ditching efforts 
have not resulted in good growth of forests in some sites, since some of the drained  peatland 
areas were not fertile enough for timber production purposes. Drainage of pristine mires was 
therefore given up in 2001 and since 2000, restoration has been an increasing habit in state owned 
conservation areas. In privately owned forests, many owners are multi-objective, which means 
that they give value to various products and services that forests are offering for them. The other 
values that the forests produce, such as recreation and biodiversity, become more important. 
Therefore, the mechanism of restoring peatlands at the expense of the certificate buyers, and the 
potential to receive future subsidy for the private nature conservation area, for some peatland 
owners is an attractive possibility. 
The environmental option is just economically more feasible – environmental management 
pays off 
The 2 Spanish in-depth contract solution case studies about organic wine in Rueda (ES2) and 
integrated production in olive groves (ES4) actually represent classical and well-know 
approaches. However, the success and acceptance displayed in the case studies directly result 
from the framework conditions of specific systems of permanent, work-intensive agriculture in 
specific agri-environmental systems, where the environmental option provided by organic 
farming and integrated production is just economically the most feasible solution for the farmers. 
The integrated production system in ES4 meets a highly competitive and intensive sector, having 
significant effects on a broad number of AECPGs, such as, particularly soil and water. With 
partaking in integrated farming, on the one hand, a higher value of the oil produced by the farmers 
and, on the other, an optimization in the use of inputs can be reached. The hallmark of the 
Integrated Production Guarantee of Andalusia in the competitive market provides distinction 
against products from other markets (national and international) that do not follow the same 
controls, and guarantees better demand and prices. Therefore, farmers voluntarily chose this 
management system as the one more competitive. In the system of organic wine production in 
Rueda (ES2), basically the natural site conditions offer the best possibility for organic production, 
since the limited summer rainfall guarantees low incidence of diseases (mildew), and therefore, 
if the crop is adequately managed, does not require pesticides. The Rueda region is one of the 
wine regions in Spain that is more profitable, but at the same time needs a lot of man work, so 
organic production is a clear alternative. The sales market provided by the winery Riscal is 
therefore a real opportunity for the producers to continue with the labour-intensive production of 
grapes under the premise of a guaranteed sale of organic products.  
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Producing for a company – Trust and the chance to market products 
In the CONSOLE in-depth studies Bio-Babalscy (PL1) and Carta del Mulino (IT4), 2 contracts 
solutions are presented, where farms produce their products under AECPG production 
regulations/obligations of the value chain. Both initiatives address arable farming. In PL1 only 
organic farms can take part, while IT4 is devoted to conventional farming as well. In the case of 
Bio-Babalscy, the main driver for success is the close relationship between value chain company 
and producer, based on mutual trust and fair contract implementation, including farming 
recommendations and support. Here, the option of sales of large quantities of produce at fair 
conditions is the main trigger for success. In the Barilla initiative Carta del Mulino (IT4), 
partaking farms come from several areas across Europe and beyond. The high heterogeneity of 
the areas prevents from a proper assessment of environmental and agricultural conditions, most 
of the contracts are however in Italy, France, Germany and Austria. Unfortunately, relatively few 
is known about the framework conditions and context situation of the farms, explaining the 
success of the scheme. Up to now however more than 500 farms signed the contract, therefore it 
can be assumed that the compensation payments for the strict ISCC measures are fair enough to 
still create additional benefits from the possibility to deliver large amounts of wheat to Barilla.  
Land seeks land managers -  Land offered meets demand by farmers 
Contract solutions contracting environmental-friendly management via land tenure contracts are 
only successful if the land-offer meets the demand for land by farmers. In the eco-grazing 
initiative in FR1, the Metropole of Brest took the decision to offer public green spaces for eco-
grazing, due to reasons of noise-reduction, GHG-mitigation, social pressure, but also as a rather 
pragmatic (political) ecological strategy. The main goal was to outsource environmental services 
to external parties, to relatively low costs. In the case of Brest Metropole, the external partner is 
a breeder/farmer, not a landscaper, while competition exists between landscapers and farmers for 
grazing-area of eco-grazing. While landscapers follow an economic model which seems - 
especially in terms of the prices they charge - outdated, for the breeder eco-grazing offers the 
possibility to develop local breeding and supply of organic meat, while he states that eco-grazing 
is a welcome activity (“better than nothing”), but if it was only for the money he wouldn't do it. 
In the case of the land leasing contracts for the conservation and restoration of grasslands bought 
by the Bulgarian Society for Protection of Birds in line with a LIFE + project in Strandzha and 
Sakar mountains (BG4), since the beginning of the contract over 600 ha of pastures and meadows 
were restored and farmers were trained in nature-friendly pasture management. Here, farmers 
cultivate the land without paying rent. By meeting the certain environmental requirements coming 
along with the leasing contracts, they also become eligible for a governmental subsidy 
(compensations for practice-based efforts). The payments they receive cover their costs, while 
additional benefits like providing a feeding ground for their animals are received, which is 
classified as a win-win scenario by the experts.  
What enables nature protection projects? Cooperation instead of confrontation.
The implementation of larger-scale nature conservation projects, such as Interreg or LiFE+ 
projects takes place in very heterogeneous agricultural basic situations, and also with very 
different objectives. Also the 2 Latvian projects DVIETE (LV2) and NUTRINFLOW (LV1) took 
place in very heterogeneous context situations. While Nutrinflow targeted the large-scale 
minimisation of nutrient leaching from agricultural fields into the waterbodies, Dviete aimed at 
the restoration of a defined floodplain area. The consequences of the 2 projects for farmers have 
been basically different: while in Nutrinflow mainly drainage systems have been altered, and 
management systems have been introduced to become more secure against leaching under the 
premise to keep up arable management, in Dviete the whole agri-ecological system has been 
transformed into a completely different land use system, namely floodplains and terrace 
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meadows, wetlands and the option of only restorative mowing and grazing. In both projects, the 
main driver for success was the timely information and integration of the landowners in the 
planning and implementation of nature management activities. In Dviete, actually preconditions 
were good as relatively few land-owners were affected and several active farms in the area, mainly 
on the banks of the Dviete Valley and the Ilukste Valley, are engaged in livestock farming and 
can use the Dviete floodplain meadows for both mowing and grazing livestock. However, it 
became obvious that refusal of cooperation of only few land-owners can set the whole project at 
risk, a problem that could be solved by the agreements on the implementation of the measures 
with the landowners already made before the start of the project. In NUTRINFLOW, where 
farmers mainly perceived the project as win-win situations, farmers solely needed to allow land 
access to the Ailes stream for the implementation of the agri-environmental measures. Moreover, 
the overgrowing of the plants in the ditches and in the flooding in the fields have been very good 
reasons to accept the activities and sign the contracts. Also here, for the experts the dialogue 
between the agricultural producers and environment protection authorities, to commonly find the 
best ways to develop environmentally friendly production, as well as mutual benefits for ecology 
and agriculture were the major keys for the success of the projects.   
5.2 Policy conditions  
Past or current policy conditions on European, national, or also regional level can have an 
influence on the development and success of novel contract solution or on the improvement of 
AECPG provision. Thereby agricultural policy, forestry policy, environmental policy, but also 
market policies might play a role. General policy pathways towards environmental and ecological 
transformation of the agricultural and/or forestry sector, as well as previous projects/programs/-
contract solutions already in place, might have initiated/facilitated the implementation of the 
current contract solution or set the ground for the introduction of such schemes. To address the 
role of policy drivers for the introduction of contract solutions for AECPG provision, the in-depth 
studies investigated on influential policy conditions – in case such were influential for the specific 
contract-solution addressed.  
The impact of the European Common Agricultural Policy  
Many in-depth studies highlight the decisive role of the European Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). While of course the general framework of the CAP is the most relevant policy basis for 
agriculture in Europe, hereby particularly the Rural Development Programs with their individual 
national AES are mentioned.  
Certainly the direct impact of the CAP accounts for the contract solutions cases being directly 
integrated into the national RDPs, namely organic farming in Rueda (ES2), organic farming for 
BioBabalscy (PL4), organic farming in the Wild farm (BG3), the establishment of collective 
reservoirs in Italy (IT1), the integrated territorial projects (IT6), the collective management in the 
Kromme Rjin region (NL1), the result-based nature conservation plan in Austria (AT3), and the 
Irish RDP pilot for result based payments schemes RBAPS (IRL2). Particularly for the collective 
and result-based cases, the aim to develop and elaborate of national RDPs towards more 
acceptable and innovative approaches were the main driver for initiation and implementation.  
Besides this direct impact, the CAP also indirectly impacts on the implementation of innovative 
contract solutions outside RDP: Often, environmental developments introduced by the CAP, as 
well as long term experiences with RDP schemes are the basis for the development of measures 
implemented in new schemes. Moreover, the settled experiences of land-managers with RDPs 
enables them to deal with ‘innovative’ agri-environmental programs at all. 
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Direct impact of the CAP 
For collective RDP approaches, the 2 in-depth studies IT6 and NL1 reveal that the RDP measure 
itself is orchestrated within a number of other policy strands and instruments: The RDP measure 
of integrated territorial projects (IT6) for example orchestrates three policies streams, namely 
the Tuscan RDP, the regional landscape plan and the regional legislation for integrated supply 
chain projects. While, in the past, these three tools have operated individually, each aiming to 
provide specific solutions to the various environmental issues, with the development of the ITP 
the region aimed at providing an integrated solution within a single operating tool. In particular, 
through the landscape plan, the main intervention objectives were provided and the most sensitive 
areas of protection were identified. With the RDP instead specific measures for the provision of 
AECPGs were designed and implemented. The integrated supply chain projects allowed the 
Region to experience the territorial aggregation around specific supply chains innovation (product 
and process) that aim to reach sustainable goals. In the collective management of the Kromme 
Rjin (NL1), as concerns the RDP, the respective provinces are responsible for the governance of 
agri-environmental measures, developing a catalogue listing all possible agri-environmental 
management measures and a spatially explicit nature management plan indicating nature targets. 
This RDP implementation is supported by another important regional policy instrument, namely 
the Agenda for a Vital Countryside (Agenda Vitaal Platteland, AVP) bringing together policy 
goals from different levels and is implemented under the responsibility of provinces.  
As regards the role of organic farming, this RDP is perceived by the experts as the main policy 
incentive for general environmental and ecological development. In the example of the Wild farm
(BG4), the successful adoption of organic practices has been mainly due to RDP support. 
Nevertheless, the bigger share of organic farmers was concentrated (and still is) in organic crop 
production, while organic husbandry is still not largely developed. The main reason is the lack of 
processing plants (slaughterhouses, dairy farms, etc.). However, the increasing conservation of 
meadows in high-nature value sites under the CAP stronger triggers conservational behaviour 
among farmers now. Therefore, building on the trend set by RDPS, implementing organic farming 
and conservation of meadows but additionally providing an own slaughterhouse and marketing 
strategy makes the Wild Farm such successful example of value chain contracts on top of RDPs. 
Similar findings can be derived from the case of organic wine in Rueda (ES2), where without the 
RDP, organic farming would most probably not be implemented, while the particular trigger for 
success are the marketing initiatives of the winery Riscal. As regards the organic grain production 
for BioBabalscy in Poland (PL4), the RDP support to organic farming by agri-environmental 
payments, is generally seen as a strong incentive for converting to organic production. Moreover, 
already in 1998 the Polish government introduced subsidies compensating the costs of organic 
farms control and subsidies per 1 hectare of organic crops for the period when farms were shifting 
to organic. The add-on of old grain varieties, the guarantee of fair prices, and the individual 
support by, and trust in the BioBabalscy company, therefore only represent final triggers for the 
success of the contract solution. 
In the example of the result-based nature conservation plan introduced in the national RDP (AT3), 
particularly the preceding area-based RDP of contractual nature protection and the farm-level 
nature conservation plans were the basis for the development of a more targeted and more 
acceptable instrument, allowing for more flexible management decisions, better suited for the 
achievement of nature conservation objectives.  
Indirect impact of the CAP 
Also in many contractual solutions not being directly integrated into national RDPs, the 
developments of CAP and the 2nd Pillar play an important role. Often, this role is seen positively: 
In BG4, the land tenure option is indirectly supported by the RDP: Previous efforts for the 
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conservation of the bird farmland habitats by biodiversity experts, ecologists and farmers have 
led to the development of different conservational measures, some of which were implemented 
into the Rural Development Program. Therefore, rented land grazed under the specific land tenure 
management requirements for bird protection is now mostly eligible for RDP practice-based 
schemes for maintaining pastures in a conservational manner. In the cases of CSFF networking 
in UK1 and UK3, the long history in the area, with farmers being part of AES, has allowed for 
farmers to obtain better knowledge and training on how to better deliver on these various AES, 
given the farmers’ increased reliance upon them. Countryside Stewardship and Environmental 
Stewardship schemes as well as the Basic Payment Scheme have been the main AES the farmers 
have been historically and currently been part of. Only this long involvement and process of 
knowledge creation enables farmers in the CSFF networks to develop their own agri-
environmental area objectives and related management measures. The integrated production of 
olive groves in Spain (ES3), though currently not being an RDP program, has traditionally been 
supported through agri-environmental rural development aid and is therefore widely applied also 
by farmers, who just remain in the production system even if taken out of RDP. Moreover, 
integrated production is still a necessary requirement to access certain olive grove aid in high-
slope areas (>8%) and located in Red Natura 2000 spaces or in the reservoir basin for human 
supply.  
In the Burren program case study (IRL1), the developments of the CAP policies are seen more 
critical, though still actually supporting the development of the contract solution:  The experts’ 
point of view is that the CAP policies of the past encouraged, through direct payments and 
subsidies, intensification of farming practices, which were detrimental to the unique Burren 
landscape, and led to the abandonment of some traditional practices.  In the late 1990s large tracts 
of the Burren were designated a Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) under the EU Habitats 
Directive. The nationally operated Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) financially 
rewarded farmers for compliance with SAC restrictions. This was the first scheme that rewarded 
farmers for conservation rather than output. However, the standard nature of the REPS meant that 
it was not tailored to the unique agricultural or environmental circumstances of the Burren and 
farmers met these environmental programs with some frustration. The development of the more 
accepted result-based Burren program can be perceived as a direct consequence, developing key 
management interventions better suited to address key environmental challenges and to monitor 
the agricultural, economic and environmental impact of these interventions. 
Development of environmental policy outside the CAP 
Also political conditions and political pressure “outside” the CAP create momentum for the 
initiation and implementation of new contractual solutions. In the case of the Biodiversity monitor 
for dairy farming (NL3), as already indicated in the chapter above, major changes in nitrogen 
policies have been a trigger for the development of the solution. Here, the nitrogen policy PAS 
(Programma Aanpak Stikstof) has been declared invalid in May 2019 by the Dutch council of 
state and the European court of justice, as it was not in line with European nature conservation 
goals. The resulting strong pressure on particularly animal husbandry and the heated discussions 
within the agricultural sector and between farmers, nature organizations and policy gave a push 
for the development of the monitor as a highly potential instrument to both measure actual 
emissions and impacts per farm, and at the same time provide a tool for interested supply chain 
stakeholders to reward farms which perform well for nature. Despite the ongoing crisis, the 
Biodiversity monitor is more and more embraced, both by governments and businesses, to 
enhance the inevitable transformation towards more ecosystem-based agricultural production 
systems in the Netherlands.  
A far less dramatically but steady political development strongly supported both initiatives in 
Flanders, the Life 3WatEr project (BE1), and the Wildlife estates label (BE4): Constantly, the 
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Flemish nature and forestry policy has evolved from the concept of single aspect management 
(nature only) to the one of integrated management (environment, economic and social aspects 
always are integrated). The new Flemish nature management plans (covering nature and forestry) 
are conceived and implemented accordingly. While the Life+3watEr project anticipated as a 
pioneer project on this evolution with its key 3 E's concept (Ecology, Economy, Education) and 
successfully implemented them through its contractual structure, the Wildlife estate labels directly 
profits from the environmental status quo and further development of natural wildlife resulting 
from this transition. Basically, the label now takes the credit of past and ongoing political 
development. 
Also the Finish forest case study Carbon Market Hiilipörssi bases on a nearly 20-year long 
development towards forest and peatland protection: Here in the early 2000s, a voluntary forest 
protection model, the METSO forest biodiversity program, was developed, creating the ground 
for voluntary forest protection by landowners. Under the leadership of the Ministry of the 
Environment, a mire conservation program (supplementing the previous mire conservation 
programs of 1979 and 1981) was launched in 2015. The mires, whose nature values were of 
national importance, were selected for the conservation proposal. The interconnectedness and 
restoration of the peatlands was also important. The proposal covered a total of 747 nationally 
valuable wetlands with an area of 117,000 hectares. The Helmi-program to enhance biodiversity, 
initiated by the Ministry of the Environment in 2019, aims to restore 12,000 hectares of drained 
peatlands and to protect 20,000 hectares of nationally valuable wetlands on a voluntary basis 
during the current Government period in 2019–2022. Landowners get compensation for 
protection. The amount of compensation is based on the loss of economic value, which in the case 
of peatland, is the market value of the standing timber. This payment is tax free for the landowner. 
The Carbon Market model Hiilipörssi partially builds on this development by supporting the 
achievements of the Government’s objective with a new instrument not depending on public 
money. 
The role of regional political will 
3 of the CONSOLE in-depth studies particularly reveal, how crucial “political will” is in 
implementing and supporting new instruments. In the German water protection bread initiative 
(DE5), it was the clear will of the Bavarian environmental ministry to amplify the activities in 
water protection. The government of Upper Franconia, section water management, has initiated 
the program as a contribution to a dedicated action on water protection that started in 2001 in 
Bavaria.  Also the collective initiative of natural grazing in Podkarpackie (PL1) bases on a public 
initiative that was established in 2012 by the Podkarpackie Voivodeship (local) Government in 
order to support the realisation of the Region Development Strategy 2020, where preservation 
and protection of biodiversity is one of the priority actions (so called Strategic areas of 
intervention – SAI). The program is coordinated by the Marshal's Office of the Podkarpackie 
Voivodeship. As its implementation and effects were positively assessed, it was decided to 
continue financing it for the long term perspective, in 2016-2020. The program will be continued 
in the future. Funds for its implementation are secured in the Voivodship's budget. Last but not 
least, the French contract solution on eco-grazing in Brest Metropole (FR1) the “political 
framework” for the initiation of the initiative was not public policy, but rather the distinctive 
political will and of two elected officials, that led to the change in management and the 
implementation of eco-grazing. 
5.3 Legal conditions  
Besides policies, the feasibility and success of the implementation of contract solutions is driven 
by the legal framework in which they need to be embedded, or which needs to be created to 
support and enable the initiation and application of the contracts. Specific legal frameworks, such 
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as nature conservation laws, environmental directives, property rights (including land tenure and 
property transfer) and the distribution of property, etc., as well as specificities e.g. of the national 
contract laws may have an influence on the success of the contract solution and particularly on 
the transferability of contract solution approaches into other countries and/or context solutions. 
In parts, the orchestration of different legal aspects can be complex, though for the longevity and 
stability of contract solutions a sound legal basis is inevitable. In the worst case, poorly 
orchestrated, and highly complex legal frameworks can cause high transaction costs and cause 
trade-offs due to contradictory objectives. To address the role of the legal framework for the 
introduction of contract solutions for AECPGs provision, the in-depth studies surveyed legal 
specificities – in case such were influential for the specific contract-solution addressed.  
Legal framework: What happens in protected areas  
Relatively often, particularly in the case of contract solutions implemented in sensitive or very 
specific habitats, legal frameworks for protected areas have to be considered. For example, the 
implementation area of the Life+3watEr project (BE1) lies within the Flemish Ecological 
Network and the Natura 2000 territorial designations as conservation zones. The legal frameworks 
set for management in these areas, with a lot of intended management regulative constraints, may 
have compromised a series of traditional rural economic activities in the project area. Here, the 
Life+3watEr project and its contractual solution, integrating the wishes of private landowners as 
from the start, caused an instructive reflection on the content and interpretation of regulative 
constraints, as often the sole application of legal definitions and concepts do not serve the purpose 
they were intended to, as reality in nature management often takes precedence. Also the Burren 
program (IRL1) is implemented in a landscape under specific protection since already 30 years: 
In the late 1990s large tracts of the Burren, namely an area of 30,000 ha, was designated a Special 
Areas of Conservation (SACs) under the EU Habitats Directive. An additional 2,000 ha were 
designated as Special Protection Area under the Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) and, moreover, the 
Burren has recently been recognised through UNESCO Geopark Status. In case of the Burren, the 
protected area status is perceived as a driver for the current conservation measures as it laid ground 
for the BurrenLife Project and consequently the program.  
Legal framework: Specific orchestration of legal frameworks for specific contract solutions 
The 2 Finish case studies Tuohi (FI5) and Hiilipörssi (FI3), as well as the Italian ITPs (IT6) reveal 
that national legal frameworks can shape the design and implementation of new contract solutions 
and, by implication, eventually prevent the feasibility of their implementation. The examples 
show that contract solutions can be touched by legislative coverage in every aspect, reaching from 
the objective of the program, to the administrative implementation and finally the environmental 
measures foreseen.  
In the Carbon market Hiilipörssi (FI3), the objective is that the restored peatland area already has, 
or will get a protection status. Basis for this status is the Nature Conservation Act of 1996 (also 
1923), generally allowing for the establishment of a private protected area while the conservation 
agreement binds also the new owner in case of a change of ownership. In order to enable 
certificate trading, the Finnish legislation requires the Carbon Market (actually its host 
organization The Finnish Association for Nature Conservation (FANC)) to obtain a money-
collecting permit, which is requested from the National Police Board (Money Collection Act 
255/2006, new Money Collection Act 863/2019 becomes valid 1.3.2020). Money collection 
permits can be granted to non-profit organisations and foundations for the purpose of raising funds 
for non-profit causes.  Last but not least, restoration measures may have an impact on the nearby 
areas as blocking the ditches may direct the water flows to unwanted areas. Thus, there might be 
a need to establish new ditches to control the water flow. In the case of the new ditching the 
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notification is given to Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY 
Centre) according to Water Act (587/2011).  
In the collectively owned forests Tuohi (FI5), the general basis of the instrument being legal and 
therefore operational at all, was the amendment of the Forest Act in 2014, legalizing uneven-aged 
forestry management. Without this change of the forest act, the management regime promoted by 
TUOHI would not have been legal to be implemented. Another fundamental reform laying the 
foundation for TUOHI was made for the Act on Jointly Owned Forests in 2003 and 2007. Jointly 
owned forests, have a long history in Finland as first legislation concerning them can be found 
already in the forest law of 1886. The background for these legal reforms was principally the 
concern about parcelisation of family forest ownership into smaller and smaller properties. Instead 
of reforming tax or inheritance legislation affecting forest ownership, the compromise was to 
enhance joint ownership by completely reforming the Act on Jointly Owned Forests. After the 
reform, forest properties could be fully merged into jointly owned forest as “ghost property”, 
where property owners only hold a share of the jointly owned forest areas.  
In the case of the Tuscan ITPs (IT6), collective implementation is possible only by considering 
specific legislation on network building and cooperation, namely the legislation on Network 
Contracts (Law No. 179 of 18 October 2012) and the legislation on Cooperation Agreements (DD 
No. 5351 of 05.07.2016). Besides that, there are legal constraints related to the RDP regulation, 
as well as the Landscape plan regulation and the nature conservation rules that regulate the forests 
and the areas under the Tuscan Archipelago National Park (PNAT).  
Legal framework: requirements within contract solutions
The case of collective management in the Kromme Rjin region  (NL1) details the complex legal 
regulations within collective RDPs, which on the one hand is needed to secure the objectives of 
the program and the fair distribution of subsidies, but on the other hand can also hinder 
participation as well as transferability to other context situations: In the contract solution, the legal 
prerequisites for the collective is to operate in a specific area or region, where the members 
(farmers and other land managers) have the right for land use. Further, the participation in the 
collective has to be voluntary upon entering, the collective has to collect the subsidies and 
distribute them to the individual farmers, meaning the collective contracts each farmer 
individually. Finally, the collective bears the responsibility for monitoring and control. To 
participate in a collective, farmers (or other land managers) have to meet specific legal condition 
as well, of which the most important ones are that the participant has the exclusive right to manage 
the particular land parcel (short term lease cannot be included in the collective and that it is not 
permitted to receive additional subsidies for the same land parcel (e.g. EU subsidy for financially 
troubled farms. Particularly the latter requirement can limit the willingness to participate due to 
income loss. On top of to the legal regulations for collectives and participants in the RDP, the 
Dutch government installed the obligation to provide evidence when receiving any kind of 
subsidy (including tax returns and such). This means all documents related to the nature 
management practices have to be stored (and provided when requested) for a minimum of five 
years.  
Similar legal requirements are in place in the collective initiative of natural grazing in 
Podkarpackie (PL1). Here, farmers have to prove that the animals grazed are registered in the 
database of the Agency for Restructuring and Modernization of Agriculture or the Horse Breeders 
Database and / or the regional veterinarian database and the area. Also, information about land 
ownership has to be provided, while farmers solely have to prove their right to graze animals in 
the area. For this they are not required to be the landowners or even its tenants but it is sufficient 
if they have the owner's written consent for grazing animals, a compromise which facilitates the 
program implementation and enhances the acceptance of the farmers. 
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Legal framework: If sound orchestration is missing 
The importance of a sound and well-orchestrated legal framework as a basis for the 
implementation of contract solutions has been particularly mentioned by the experts interviewed 
in the NL1 and BE3 case studies. In NL1, criticism was mainly on the large number of regulations 
for nature conservation and management, to which farmers have to comply. Some of these can be 
just troublesome, as for many things one must apply for a separate permit, but others might even 
cause trade-offs due to their contradictory character. The examples given are predator animals, 
which are protected while in parallel they threaten bird species, which are also 
protected/vulnerable.  
In BE3, the problem of contradictory and even missing legislative frameworks was brought up. 
While generally in Flanders, the regulatory environment is in favour of biodiversity, agricultural 
tenure represents an exception: legislation concerning agricultural lease is very imperative and 
protective of the tenant and does not allow for any ecological clauses, as is the case in other 
countries. According to the experts, lessor and tenant should be able to negotiate freely about this 
issue for the benefit of biodiversity. The condition description of the land in agricultural leases is 
often lacking or insufficiently used, so aspects as manure, erosion, the environment etc. are not 
covered. Moreover, agreements regarding agroforestry are unclear. While the government wants 
to encourage the planting of small landscape elements, under current law this is not possible 
unless agreements are concluded between both lessor and tenant. Last but not least, the experts 
call attention to the issue of grassland tearing. While freedom of cultivation is granted to the 
tenant, the condition in which the land returns to the owner after years is not guaranteed, which 
for example can affect historic grasslands that are torn.  
“European” legislation as driver for action 
European level legislation might not be perceived as a framework for the contract solution itself, 
but can function as a strong driver for the need for action and therefore the initiation of new 
solutions: In the water protection bread case study (DE5), the European Water Framework 
Directive (WFD), and hereby in particular the requirement to achieve or maintain the good quality 
of groundwater, the sensitive drinking water situation and the decentral water supply structures, 
were decisive for the start of the “Action Groundwater protection” in Bavaria, with the water 
protection bread initiative being part of it. Bavaria has decided to establish voluntary water 
protection cooperations with farmers in drinking water protection areas in addition to legally 
binding requirements. The water protection bread initiative builds upon such cooperations.  Also 
in the Biodiversity Monitor initiative, European legislation has been a strong driver for action. As 
already indicated in the preceding chapter, the refusal of the Dutch nitrogen policy program 
Programma Aanpak Stikstof (PAS) by the Dutch council of state and the European court of justice 
was one of the triggers of the development of the monitor. 
5.4 Role of institutions and formal structures  
The success of contract solutions aiming at management changes in agriculture and forestry is 
driven by the institutions and formal structures involved in the implementation and management 
of the initiatives. Also, the governance system pursued has impacts on success factors such as 
acceptance, longevity, social capital, etc. The number and kind of institutions involved, as well 
as the modus of governance, strongly depend on the contract type. For more complex contract 
solutions, such as collective schemes, or schemes combining a number of different contract 
features, a larger number of institutions and actors is to be expected, while for relatively “simple” 
approaches, such as land tenure contracts, a less complex interplay of institutions seems sufficient. 
Nevertheless, particularly in the development of new solutions, always a broad number of 
institutions and stakeholders might be involved. To investigate the role of institutions and formal 
structures in the success and implementation of contract solutions for improved AECPG provision 
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from agriculture and forestry, the CONSOLE in-depth studies tried to shed light on these aspects 
and the role of actors, institutions and governance in the design and implementation of such 
approaches.  
Institutions, governance and formal structures in result-based contract solutions 
In many of the result-based contract solutions investigated in the CONSOLE in-depth studies, a 
rather broad number of actors and institutions are involved. Partly this is due to the rather “new” 
character of such schemes, often demanding the development of the contract solutions from 
scratch, with the necessary input of expert/stakeholder/institutional capital. It becomes obvious 
that particularly within the process of the design of new solutions, important “actors” integrated 
are typically research, but also affected stakeholders and farmers, guaranteeing the operationality 
of the programs particularly as regards result indicators. The result-based CONSOLE contract 
solutions also reveal that particularly the process of individual target setting, management support 
and also monitoring of results demands specifically trained experts/advisors/institutions, which 
in the best case are integrated right from the start.  
Institutions, governance and formal structures in public result-based/result-oriented programs 
In the Burren Program (IRL1), the Irish Department of Agriculture is the main funding body. 
Moreover, the program is overseen by an own program team which comprises 7 locally-based 
staff, some with extensive research experience in the Burren, which allowed the team, and the 
project, to get off on the right foot, with a good level of trust and credibility. The program team 
is led by a project manager with direct experience of working with local farmers and engaging in 
scientific research. Moreover, a project scientist is employed to oversee project monitoring and 
advise on planned works. Both project leader and project scientist have been involved in the 
project for many years. In the current round of the program, the project team is supported by 12 
specially trained private farm advisors.  
Also the Irish RBAPS pilot (IRL2) involved a large number of individual actors and institutions: 
co-ordinating partner tor RBAPS in Ireland and Spain was the European Forum on Nature 
Conservation and Pastoralism (EFNCP). The EFNCP is a European network, providing a direct 
link between local projects involving low-intensity farming and policy-making processes at 
national and EU levels. The European Commission provided 70% funding for the RBAPS Pilot. 
Co-funding and support in Ireland were provided by different project partners, such as The 
Heritage Council, the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine, and the research 
institution Teagasc. The RBAPS Pilot project was administered by locally-based teams and 
comprised four full-time staff members and a project co-ordinator from the EFNCP. The team 
members were ecologists with considerable experience of working with farmers in High Nature 
Value areas and had a strong level of experience in local agricultural practices. Each team 
designed and implemented their respective scorecards (for assessment of ecosystem quality) and 
capital works programs, and was responsible for administering payments to farmers in that pilot 
area. The project in each pilot area was also supported by the input and advice from local 
stakeholder advisory groups, which comprised of local farmers, representatives from farming 
organisations, government bodies, and farm advisors. Thus, during the first year of the project, 
local farmers were instrumental in the design and development of the measures, which were then 
further refined during two years of farmer contracts.  
Before being integrated into the Austrian RDP, the result-based nature conservation plan (AT3) 
was initiated as a pilot project by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Regions and 
Tourism. The design of the program was executed by an environmental consulting agency, 
identifying and engaging potential farms for the first implementation phase (together with the 
federal nature conservation departments), providing advice of ecological experts (flora and 
fauna), visiting farms and specifying nature conservation objectives on the fields, as well as 
supervising the implementation of RNP during the program period. Very importantly, an 
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institution being involved right from the beginning was the national control authority 
(AgrarMarktAustria; AMA), which particularly provided inputs for the design of measureable 
and, consequently, controllable indicators. AMA was fundamentally involved in designing the 
mixed approach of area and control indicators, which finally enables the integration into the RDP. 
The integration of the national control authority from the beginning is perceived as the main 
success factor of the RNP, in case of a transfer of such schemes to other countries, this integration 
is the basic recommendation of the experts.
Also the Biodiversity Monitor (NL3), even if representing a private instrument, has been initiated 
and designed by a rather large group of actors and institutions. Also in the current implementation 
phase the Biodiversity monitor is characterised by a rather large consortium of involved parties: 
only in 2020, the Biodiversity Monitor Foundation has been established, formalizing the long-
term governance and development structure of the tool. Involved in the decisions about the entire 
concept and the design of the tool has been a larger group of initiating parties, including the NGO 
WWF-NL, the bank Rabobank, and FrieslandCampina, a sustainable dairy chain initiative for a 
responsible future-proof sector. Scientists, farmer organizations and other environmental 
organizations have had significant influence as well through research, pilots, consultations and 
stakeholder meetings. Dairy farmers themselves have had limited say in the entire process, except 
by their voice as a member of the cooperation FrieslandCampina. Decision making is however 
more equal now that the Biodiversity Monitor Foundation is established. The board and advisory 
council includes a wide representation of business, nature organizations, academics, and farmer 
organizations. It is suggested to establish a farmers’ council to better retrieve experiences from 
practice.  
Institutions, governance and formal structures in market based result-based/result-oriented 
solutions: 
The result-based EcoMethane approach (FR4) was initiated in 2011 by the private association 
Bleu-Blanc-Coeur, in collaboration with the research institution INRA, mainly being responsible 
for the recommendations of ways for methane reduction. Bleu-Blanc-Coeur manages the eco-
methane program with financial partners and farmers and performs the tracking and managing of 
the results. Another structure involved in the EcoMethane program is the fund to manage 
donations from companies or public or private structures. Within the fund, a specific governance 
system exists: a board of directors is referred to the fund (members of BBC-Orange, historical 
partner), deciding on the allocation of funding and the strategic conditions for the deployment of 
the eco-methane approach (followed by current raisers, or "marching").  
Also the Humus program in Austria (AT4) was started by a private non-profit association, namely 
the Verein Ökoregion Kaindorf. The association is also the coordinator and main designer of the 
contract solution. Similar to the French fund managing donations, in the Humus program a special 
Limited company has been installed, organizing the process of humus certificate trading. Further 
involved actors are certified civil engineers carrying out soil sampling, as well as the Department 
for Soil Health and Plant Nutrition of the Austrian Agency for Health and Food Safety (AGES), 
evaluating soil sampling and determining CO2 sequestration. Additionally, soil samples are 
analysed by an accredited national laboratory. Governance is rather top-down, farmers can 
voluntarily take part in the contract, however no specific extension service is given by the 
association. Nevertheless, farmers have an indirect say, as the association is supported by a 
steering group, including 2 farmers. Recommendations and education is provided in terms of 
seminars and courses, however these are fee-based.  
The Carbon Market Hiilipörssi (FI3) was installed by the Finnish Association for Nature 
Conservation (FANC). FANC is the direct contract party with whom the landowner makes the 
contract for peatland restoration. Moreover, FANC owns the online donation service, managing 
the carbon market. Besides the restoration contract, the landowners sign an agreement with the 
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ELY Center (state institute) to establish a private protected area if the area has not been protected 
earlier. The Ely Center also gives permission to do the restoration work. Another involved party 
are the investors (typically individual consumer), who “buy” a piece of peatland from the Carbon 
Market and receive a certificate of how much carbon is stored annually. Unfortunately not much 
has been reported on the research involved in the design process, however it is clear that the 
approach is based on research backing the calculations of GHG mitigation due to restoration 
works.  
Institutions, governance and formal structures in contract–solutions based on 
collective implementation 
The contract solutions based on collective implementation involve a rather broad number of 
institutions and a high level of cooperation between contractors and contractees. The in-depth 
studies reveal that already the process of setting up the collectives can involve many players and 
that the implementation demands a high level of orchestration between institutions and their 
responsibilities. Moreover, the studies show that the individual program coordinators play a 
crucial role in collective implementation. Their engagement and steering skills, as well as their 
regional embeddedness are fundamental for the success of such contract solutions.  
Institutions, governance and formal structures in collective schemes in RDP 
In the case of the collective management in Kromme Rjin (NL1), the collective is in charge of the 
organization of agri-environmental measure implementation, as well as the organisation of 
subsidies. It has been established by four associations for nature in agricultural areas (ANV, 
agrarische natuurvereniging) together with the farmer’s organization (LTO), and the private land-
owners’ organization Utrecht. A foundation that aims to connect landscape and cultural heritage 
(Landschap Erfgoed Utrecht) plays an advisory role. This foundation is a province-level 
organization that cooperates with counterparts in other provinces as well as province-level nature 
and heritage organizations (Provinciale Landschappen).  
In the ITP in Tuscany (IT6), the main institution involved in the implementation of the RDP is 
DISPAA UniFi. It has the role of technical and administrative management of the ITP, monitoring 
the progress of material investments, managing network activities and innovation aimed at 
increasing sustainability, carrying out tests and trials, and disseminating the results of the project. 
Moreover, the ITP involves 34 direct private participants (farmers, wineries, wine growers), 5 
direct public participants (PNAT, the Tuscany Coastal Reclamation Consortium - CdB, the Union 
of Municipalities of the Metalliferous Hills - UCCM and the Civic Uses Manager of Capraia Isola 
- UCCI). The two indirect participants are the Legambiente Arcipelago (environmental 
stakeholder) and BCC Banca dell’Elba that facilitates the access to credit. The ITP and the actions 
it develops, strongly depend on this institutional context, and in particular on the climate of 
cooperation and trust between the participants, as well as on the efficiency and quality of the 
relationships between the private direct participants and the public subjects involved (in particular 
the relationship with the Tuscany Region and the natural park). Finally, also the indirect 
participants (i.e. environmental association) can play an important role to ensure visibility and the 
adherence between the progress of material investments and benefit produced. In the second 
Italian collective implementation case study collective reservoirs (IT1), unfortunately the 
concrete orchestration of institutions was not reported. However, here it was stressed by the 
experts that local institutions are key to the success of the response to a measure that is otherwise 
targeting the whole region. The great majority of the projects applying to the measure were 
developed in collaboration with the Consorzio di Bonifica della Romagna Occidentale (CBRO) 
that works as a bridge institution both vertically (between farmers and the regional administration) 
and horizontally (among farmers). 
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Institutions, governance and formal structures in collective approaches outside RDP 
In the collective approach for natural grazing in Podkarpackie (PL1), the imitator and funder of 
the program is the Local Government of Podkarpackie Voivedship. The collectives can be set up 
by NGOs - associations and cooperatives, churches, sports clubs, non-profit companies. The 
NGOs raise the funds for statutory activities and demonstrate activity in priority areas, however 
they also take the risk that the sub-contracted farmers will not fulfil the requirements of the 
contract, which might discourage them to participate in such initiatives. One of our respondents 
said that “It would be easier if farmers could be treated as direct beneficiaries of the program and 
not run the program through NGOs. This is difficult because organizations are less motivated and 
bear the risk”. 
Institutions, governance and formal structures in LIFE+ and Interreg 
Also in the case of projects rather than programs of collective implementation, such as LIFE+ or 
Interreg, the number of institutions involved can be rather large. In the 3WatEr project in Flanders 
(BE1), the European Landowners’ Organization is the coordinating beneficiary, playing a key 
role in establishing contacts and maintaining sustainable collaboration between private 
landowners and public actors. The project involves all important local stakeholders including the 
Flemish Agency for Nature and Forest, the natural park Regionaal Landschap Lage Kempen, the 
city of Hasselt and the community of Zonhoven. A specificity of this project is the association of 
private landowners (OVML), being a key partner in the project. OVML was formed by a group 
of 10 land-owners, being the main initiators of the project. OMVL was formed mainly because a 
common partnership was assumed beneficiary of the project, now this structure is assumed to be 
a major reason of the success of the project. 
Also the Interreg project Nutrinflow (LV1), involves a broad number of institutions across 3 
countries. For the Latvian part of the project mainly 3 partners are involved, namely the "Real 
Estates of Ministry of Agriculture" of the Zemgale Region, the Union Farmers Parliament, and 
the State Rural Support Service. The State Limited Liability Company "Real Estates of Ministry 
of Agriculture" is the responsible partner for the maintenance of the drainage systems in Latvia, 
the Union Farmers Parliament has the objective to educate partaking farmers, and the State Rural 
Support Service represents the control authority. 
Institutions, governance and formal structures in value chain-based contract 
solutions 
Value-chain contract solutions stepping into the chain only on the level of seller-buyer contractual 
agreements are characterised by rather few actors involved. In contrast, value-chain contract 
solutions aiming at the whole chain and its transition to a more sustainable and fair construct, 
demand a high level of integration of the respective value-chain actors, as well as a distinctively 
good level of trust and fairness, while the latter element is also a reason for the success of good 
seller-buyer constructions.  
Seller-Buyer relationships 
In the CONSOLE in-depth studies displaying mainly seller-buyer relationships, actually only few 
actors are involved. In PL4, BioBabalscy, the contracting partners are the producers (farmers) and 
the BioBabalscy company. However, the relationship between farmers and the company is 
described as a close partnership rather, than a typical buyer – seller connections. One may say, 
thus, that both parties have almost an equal bargaining power due to the fact that all partners in 
the chain are aware of their mutual interests. Farmers appreciate assured payments and good 
prices offered by processor, but also possibilities of sales of large quantities of produce. Farmers 
declare that they "simply" like to sell their grains to Mr. Babalski. In the Wild farm initiative
(BG3), the seller-buyer relationship is defined by the Wild farm and the BioBalev company, 
which is one of the most known and well-grounded on the Bulgarian organic market. Here, 
unfortunately, no information about the relationship and/or level of trust was reported.  
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Sustainable value chains 
The CONSOLE in-depth studies on contract solutions integrating the whole value chain, show a 
more complex orchestration of actors, but also a relatively strict regulation of rights and 
obligations of the individual partners involved.  
In the case of the water protection bread (DE5), the initiative integrates the Bavarian ministry of 
environment providing funding for project management and communication strategy, the water 
management section of Lower Franconia as project lead, the FiBL as external service provider, 
responsible for project coordination and for carrying out the compliance checks of the 
participating mills and bakeries, as well as the farmers. All value chain partners have to respect 
agreed management requirements. These are for the farmers: project signs to be installed along 
the wheat fields; cultivation of selected varieties with good baking properties regardless lower 
protein content; fertilisation of max, 160 kg N/ha, no late fertilisation; regularly soil analysis from 
the participating wheat fields; detailed field recording with all management practices; no 
desiccation treatment. Mills need to guarantee the separate collection, the analysis and storage of 
the wheat from the water protection fields, the separate processing to flour, and a quarterly 
reporting of the wheat / flour stocks of the wheat from the initiative as well as the amount of flour 
ordered by the participating bakeries. The partaking bakeries need to commit to replace at least 
50% of their annual requirement of wheat flour by flour from the initiative. As entry-level variant 
in the first year the bakeries can alternatively commit to sell especially labelled bread containing 
at least 60% of wheat flour from the initiative.  
Also in the case of the Barilla Initiative Carta del Mulino (IT4), the aim is on a sustainable 
transition of the whole chain producing under the label. Involved are therefore not only farmers, 
but also mills, elevators and bakeries, all having to comply to clear obligations. Besides the actors 
within the value chain, the development of the charter of ISCC regulation was supported by 
WWF. Moreover, the impacts, both economic and environmental, will be measured by the 
Universities of Bologna and Tuscia to ensure that the charter delivers real benefits. Unfortunately, 
in this case no information has been reported about the form of governance and/or the level of 
communication and trust between the single actors and institutions involved. 
Institutions, governance and formal structures in land tenure contract solutions:  
Compared to the other contract solution types, land tenure based contract solutions are relatively 
simple as regards involved institutions, as well as governance. This is also the case in the 2 land-
tenure based in-depth case studies in CONSOLE: The eco-grazing approach in Brest Metropole 
(FR1) represents a contract between a public structure (Brest Metropole) and a private person, a 
livestock breeder. In the case of conservation grazing in BG4, contracting parties are the owner 
of the area, namely the Bulgarian Society for Protection of Birds (an NGO) and the farmers. The 
role of the NGO is leading as they manage the project, coordinate it, and perform the monitoring 
activities. Farmers maintain the pastures by providing grazing and haying for fodder.  
5.5 Technology aspects  
One of CONSOLE’s objectives in the design of improved contract solutions is to address 
technologies available to support these solutions. Also, potential future developments shall be 
identified, in order to make sure that solutions are indeed potentially implementable, future proof, 
and/or can benefit from upcoming developments. To this aim, the CONSOLE in-depth studies 
aimed also to describe the influence and the use of technology on/within the contract solutions. 
Hereby three main aspects were addressed: 1.) Potential technologies/practices that can increase 
AECPGs delivery and/or which can affect the design of measures. 2.) technology, especially 
linked to digitalisation, monitoring, evaluation, and traceability of measures/contracts. 3.) 
information technologies, which might play a role in reducing transaction costs and information 
asymmetries in coordination and management.  
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The results of the in-depth studies revealed that technology is an aspect already “thought” in many 
solutions. However, unfortunately the sample of in-depth studies included only few cases where 
the use of distinctively innovative technology strongly influenced the implementation of the 
contract solution.   
Technology for indicator monitoring and measuring 
Particularly in result-based solutions, where output indicators are the basis for remuneration, the 
use of technologies can strongly support indicator measuring (and calculation). Thereby not only 
monitoring technologies are crucial, but also sound technological approaches of calculation and 
upscaling of results.  
In the 2 CONSOLE result-based contract solutions aiming at the reduction of CO2, namely the 
Humus program (AT4), and EcoMethane (FR4), the derivation of CO2 amounts mitigated bases 
on a system of monitoring and evaluation, which is strongly technology-influenced. In 
EcoMethane (FR4), the basis for indicator assessment is automatized milk analysis and a 
calculation model of estimating methane emissions from the pattern of milk lipids, with a degree 
of reliability deemed credible enough to be certified to enter voluntary carbon mechanisms. The 
monitoring tool is implemented as a smartphone tool, giving direct access to the analysis, with 
the grams of methane emitted/litre of milk. Also, the tool enables further analyses, e.g. on the 
efficiency of the ration, reproduction, etc. Consequently, for the farmer the tool enables the 
controlling the ration in terms of impact on animal health as well as an environmental impact. For 
each dairy farm there is an EcoMethane-meter that shows the number of methane emissions and 
its level according to the feeding system. The tool is used both in external communication but 
also as a more technical monitoring tool by breeders, as methane emissions can be correlated to 
zootechnical aspects.  
In the Humus program (AT4), the assessment of the amount of CO2 stored via humus 
accumulation bases on GIS-supported soil sampling. GIS-supported soil sampling ensures that 
initial soil samples and soil samples for the measuring of results are located in the same spot. Soil 
samples are analysed for CO2 contents by a standard process of soil carbon analysis via dry 
combustion. Also upscaling on field-level is based on soil sampling, informing about bulk density 
of the soils.  
Also the biodiversity monitor (NL3) is obviously influenced by technological developments, 
particularly as regards digitalization, monitoring and evaluation of farm data as basis for the 
assessment of the key-performance indicators. Unfortunately, no detailed information about the 
concrete use of technology is reported, however the in-depth results reveal that improvements in 
the assessment and availability of farm data are necessary to establish a sound data basis: for two 
of the seven KPI (KPI herb-rich grassland and KPI nature & landscape elements on the farm) no 
nation-wide data registration system available. Moreover, the use of satellite monitoring for herb-
rich grassland detection is currently developed.   
Besides the 3 described studies, currently monitoring technology is still rarely used, even in the 
result-based in-depth contract solution case studies. Nevertheless, particularly for field 
monitoring, future technological solutions such as cameras and drones are met with high interest 
(IRL2, BE1, BE3). Also the development of scoring apps (IRL1), as well as apps to be used by 
farmers and advisors providing real time information on performance against targets are seen as 
highly welcome developments in the future (IRL2). 
The use of platforms 
The use of platforms is particularly applied in market oriented result-based contract solutions. In 
the Hiilipörssi (FI3), the emission trading is organised via and online service donation platform, 
additionally lowering obstacles and thresholds to donate. The website includes a carbon counter 
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to estimate how many hectares of peatland can be restored and how much carbon is stored by 
donating a certain amount of Euros. Furthermore, the website contains news and Youtube-videos 
about the restoration works. This information concretises the meaning of the donation and 
motivates to donate. Also on the side of potential land-owners, the platform is believed to motivate 
landowners to join the peatland restoration contracts. Also in the EcoMethane initiative (FR4), 
carbon funding is organised via an online platform through which individuals can make donations. 
Management technology 
Only 1 in-depth study informed about the technology used for management decisions, while here 
a rather simple technology is applied: In the Eco-grazing program of Brest Metropole (FR1), the 
rotation schedules of the plots are set on excel (from 5 to 7 rotations per week that need to be 
managed). As the rotation scheme must be known to many players (breeder, agents, town halls), 
the excel sheet is organised in form of a dynamic table on google sheets, which allows to modulate 
the schedule each week. This allows to be in perfect cohesion between the Head of the Green 
Spaces and the breeder, with an additional frozen page that can be sent to gardeners (more precise 
document) and town halls (less precise, presence or absence) respectively. The introduction of 
this way of sharing information was put in place in 2019 and is perceives as a plus in the 
management of the contract and the eco-grazing.
Communication tools 
Particularly in collective and cooperative based initiatives, communication tools enabling better 
coordination and information between institutions and actors involved seem crucial. Nevertheless, 
only few of the collective in-depth studies report real technological solutions in this respect. In 
the ITP in Tuscany (IT6), the interviewed experts see many ways to use technology to improve 
the implementation and effectiveness of such schemes: For the experts, particularly relevant could 
be digitization as a tool to set up farmer-based environmental protection networks. The adoption 
of digital technology for data collection and real-time communication can ensure timely and 
effective implementation of the potential interventions, in case of the ITP e.g. on the hydrographic 
network. This technology could favour the action of the participatory network that has been 
developed through the contract for alert and intervention among farmers and the reclamation 
consortium. While such technology exists and has been implemented regionally, the ITP 
participants are currently discussing its potential application for the scope of the project. Notable 
from the technological side are the investments planned for the production of energy from 
renewable sources on farms. A note, with regards to an important development that probably will 
not cover the completion of the current ITP is the use of the digital book for monitoring land/crop 
operations. This tool is being tested in the current RDP and its future widespread use (therefore 
also in the measures activated with the ITP of the archipelago) would, (together with the current 
digital communication system on payments implemented through the Tuscan Regional Agency 
for agricultural payment (ARTEA) allow reducing transaction costs and information asymmetries 
in coordination and management. Furthermore, it would ensure an increase in the effectiveness 
of monitoring compliance.  
Measure implementation 
The last aspect of technology raised in some of the in-depth studies are specific technologies for 
the implementation of measures on the fields. In the initiative Wildlife estate label (BE3), the 
adoption of mechanical techniques in agriculture, forestry, etc., which are adapted to biodiversity 
improvement, might necessitate specific agricultural and forestry technologies and equipment. 
Examples are special equipment for mowing as strip-till and/or special techniques in the logging 
of wood. In the jointly owned forests Tuohi (FI5), the reorientation of forest management from 
clear-cutting to a system of uneven-aged forests requires new orientation by all parties in the 
forestry value-chain. Although principally the same technologies are applied in both even-aged 
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and uneven-aged forest management (i.e. harvesting planning and harvesting technologies), even-
aged routines are currently considered to be simpler. In even-aged management, this has led to a 
major responsibility shift in the direction of harvesting operators/entrepreneurs in mechanical 
cuttings, instead of pre-harvesting field planning work. In contrast, in uneven-aged forestry so far 
more harvesting planning and work supervision is needed. However, emerging technologies like 
single-tree scanning by airplanes, drones and harvesting machines may offer increasing 
opportunities to apply uneven-aged forest management. These may also at least partly replace 
earlier compartment-based forest inventories and planning. 
6 Contract specifications and performance 
As outlined in CONSOLE Deliverable D1.1, a number of features define the performance of 
contractual solutions for AECPG provision. Most prominent are aspects of targeting, flexibility, 
equity/fairness, compatibility, profitability as well as the building of social/cultural capital, all 
impacting on further performance criteria such as longevity, effectiveness, and acceptance. 
Moreover, partly context related performance aspects such as feasibility of implementation are 
relevant. The main features of performance are characterised by underlying design 
principles/variables/sub-criteria realised in the contracts. For example is longevity, as one main 
performance aspect, driven by factors such as the length of the contracts, the stability of 
participation, but also by aspects related to education/advise/training/information and the related 
building of social/cultural capital, and/or the support by the farming community.  
One aim of the in-depth analysis of existing examples of successful contract solutions in Europe 
was to evaluate their performance under a set of different performance criteria identified during 
the project, but covering at least longevity, effectiveness and enhanced delivery in a consistent 
way. Particularly an understanding should be reached, which contract specifications are necessary 
to better fulfil environmental objectives and efficiently address the different types of performance 
(such as longevity, acceptance, effectiveness, etc.).  
In this Chapter, the results of the evaluation of individual performance criteria for the success and 
effectiveness of the contract solutions are demonstrated. Performance criteria wise, best practice 
examples of how performance can be altered by contract design are presented out of the in-depth 
case studies. 
6.1 Evaluation of the importance of performance criteria for the success of contract 
solutions 
Based on a broad literature review on performance features for agri-environmental 
programs/incentives, Deliverable D1.1 provides a framework of performance criteria that shape 
the success of contractual solutions. Based on this framework the performance criteria addressed 
in the in-depth studies mainly cover the following aspects and design principles: 
 Targeting: The aspect of targeting involves questions of if the contract solution is directly 
targeted to improve the provision of specific AECPG(s), if targets are clearly defined, 
realistic and reachable, if the payments are spatially targeted to areas/topics where they are 
most needed (vulnerable, degraded or suitable lands), if the payments are targeted to the 
provider of the public good, and if the payments are targeted to the results (e.g. payments are 
combined with auctions or depending on performance (cost/benefit targeting). Moreover, the 
aspect of targeting involves the aspect of additionally, meaning that the contract solution 
causes direct changes in land/resources use compared to a baseline of “no contract solution”.  
 Flexibility: The aspect of flexibility involves questions of if terms of payments in the contract 
are designed in such way that they can be adapted to the needs of the contracting parties, if 
the contract length is flexible and takes different conditions into account, if the contractual 
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solution is designed in a way that farmers have flexibility in the technical, temporal and also 
spatial implementation of the contract requirements, if indicators can be adapted to changing 
conditions (weather extremes, etc.), if there is a certain flexibility in the design of the 
indicators that improve the implementation of the contractual solution, and, if participation 
is voluntary or mandatory. 
 Equity/fairness: The aspect of equity and fairness involves questions of if everyone who 
wants to join has access to the contractual solution, if procedural fairness within the 
contractual solutions’ framework is given (equity in decision making), if the distribution of 
the contract solution outcomes, particularly the payments among contracting parties is fair 
and if economic viability for all parties involved is given, if the contractual is perceived as 
fair by the contractual partners, and if benefits, cost and risk is distributed fairly. 
 Profitability: The aspect of profitability involves questions of if the contract solutions are 
directly profitable for the farmers/foresters as well as for other actors, or if it doesn't (or just) 
covers the costs of management changes (e.g. opportunity costs) and therefore reduces (or at 
least doesn’t increase) the profitability of contracting actors. 
 Building of social/cultural capital: The aspect of the building of social and cultural capital 
involves questions of if the contract solution leads to a changed perception of the 
environment and the preservation of ecosystems and environmental protection (awareness 
building), and if non-economical capital (status/ prestige/ knowledge) is increased e.g. by 
certifications from recognized farmers’ organizations, by explicit teaching and by the 
perceived level of skills/learning effects.  
 Longevity: The aspect of longevity involves questions of if there exist plans after the end of 
the contact solution, if the participation seems stable, if the contract solution is supported by 
the farming community, and, if education elements are part of the contract, if information 
material or any other opportunities for further training are offered to sustain the knowledge 
developed during the implementation. 
 Acceptance: The aspect of acceptance involves questions of if the contract solutions fit to 
the actors’ attitude to risk, environment and innovations, if interest exists in the contract 
solution and if there any perspectives which lead to a higher or lower acceptance. Moreover, 
acceptance is influenced by the question if the sense of the contract solution is visible to the 
participants and if the participants think that the performed tasks in the contract solutions are 
necessary and not morally questionable. Another important aspect for acceptance is if 
contracting parties trust each other and are convinced of all partners fulfilling the contractual 
conditions. Last but not least, acceptance involves the question of how good communication 
and exchange between the participating parties is and if a full disclosure of the information 
is given.  
 Compatibility: The aspect of compatibility involves questions of if the contract solution is 
compatible with the business design of the farms/foresters/stakeholders, such as type of 
farming, management of the farms/forests, the business models, the business principles, etc., 
and if compatibility with the stakeholders’ habits, attitudes, ecological intentions, etc. is 
given.  
 Feasibility of implementation: The aspect of the feasibility of implementation involves 
questions of how feasible the program costs of the contract solution are, considering 
transaction and implementation costs, the cost of setting up the contract solution (from the 
idea to its implementation), as well as the cost for individual participation. 
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 Effectiveness: The aspect of effectiveness involves the questions of if environmental 
effectiveness is given, meaning the provision of AECPG´s is successfully enhanced by the 
contract solution, and if the contract solution is cost-effective. 
As already described in Chapter 3, the in-depth analysis of contract solutions included a light 
evaluation exercise by the project partners’ research teams, which on the one hand aimed at 
weighting the general importance of the single performance criteria for the success of the 
individual solution, and, on the other, at assessing how well the individual performance criteria 
seems to be met (scored) in the individual contract solution. 
Due to the low number of in-depth studies, particularly if addressed on the level of groups of 
contract types, the results of the weighting exercise are not statistically confirmed. The 
evaluations carried out by the project partners’ research teams rather show, if the importance of 
some performance criteria is above average. The evaluations therefore reveal only trends in the 
importance of single performance aspects for the success of the different kinds of contracts. For 
the qualitative diagnosis in Chapter 6.1, the weighting results have been taken into account, 
however, also the qualitative descriptions of the in-depth studies have been considered when 
making statements on trends of importance. The results of the weighting exercise are shown in 
the table in Annex 1 to this deliverable. 
The aspect of targeting has been evaluated above average particularly for the group of result-
based solutions. For value-chain and collective solutions the weighting exercise’s results show no 
specific trend in the importance of targeting. Interestingly, the aspect of flexibility was not 
weighted as specifically important for any of the contract types. Only single case studies, namely 
the result-based RNP (AT3) and the Humus program (AT4) in Austria put some emphasis on the 
importance of flexibility for the success of the contract solutions. Actually, flexibility is the 
criterion being assessed with the lowest average weight of all group-wise weights, namely in the 
contract type group of collective approaches. The importance of the criterion of equity and 
fairness has been evaluated particularly high for the success of the value-chain contract solutions, 
while being weighted clearly lower in result-based, collective, and land-tenure approaches. 
Particularly for collective implementation and cooperative approaches this result is surprising, as 
the high level of common planning and also common risk would let expect that equity in the 
decision making and also the (fair) distribution of benefits, costs, and risks is a strong factor for 
success. Also the criterion of compatibility with the business design of the stakeholders seems 
particularly important in the value-chain approaches, while in the other contract types this 
criterion is not addressed with high weights. Again, also the criterion of profitability is weighted 
with high average importance in the group of value-chain approaches, but also particularly in the 
result-based contract solutions and in the 2 case studies representing land-tenure initiatives. The 
building of social and cultural capital interestingly has not been weighted clearly above average 
for its importance for successful implementation for any group of contract types. However, in 
single contract solutions, such as EcoMethane (FR4), BioBabalscy (PL4) or the CSFFs (UK1 and 
UK3), the building of social and cultural capital is perceived as a very important factor and also 
the land tenure contract solution for the conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha 
and Sakra (BG4) address some importance to the criterion. For this criterion the weighting 
moreover shows that particularly in the value-chain approaches, the building of social and cultural 
capital obviously doesn’t play an important role for success. The weights for feasibility of 
implementation were rather low, only 3 case studies address this criterion as important for the 
success of the contract solutions, namely the Italian ITP (IT5), the jointly owned forests Tuohi 
(FI5) and the water protection bread initiative (DE5). The criterion of longevity is weighted as 
being of particular importance in result-based and collective contract solutions and the criteria of 
acceptance is – naturally – seen as a basis of success in all contract types.  Last but not least, the 
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criterion of effectiveness particularly plays a role in contract solutions based on collective 
implementation and cooperation. Beyond that, also in the case of integrated production in olive 
groves (ES4), the criterion of effectiveness is given a weight above average. 
6.2 Design principles for high performance – Practice examples 
The CONSOLE in-depth studies represent particularly successful examples of implementation 
that can serve as role models for future development and that can give relevant insights into the 
contract specifications and design principles leading to success. Particularly to inform on these 
aspects, the CONSOLE in-depth studies put emphasis on gathering information about the contract 
solutions’ design specifications leading to high performance. The evaluations of the project 
partners’ research teams, on how the presented contract solutions perform in their single 
performance criteria, give valuable hints what to look at, and which design approach might be a 
solution for the improvement of other and/or the development of new initiatives.   
In the following paragraphs, the single performance criteria are addressed one by one, showing 
individual best practice cases for these criteria and describing how the contract solutions’ design 
contributed to high scoring. Also for the qualitative diagnosis in Chapter 6.2, the scorings carried 
out by the project partners’ research teams’ results have been taken into account by choosing the 
most interesting and successful examples, however, also the qualitative descriptions of the in-
depth studies have been considered. The results of the scoring exercise are shown in the table in 
Annex 1 to this deliverable. 
6.2.1 Targeting 
The aspect of targeting is particularly important in the result-based schemes. As two result-based 
examples with excellent performance in targeting, the Austrian RNP (AT3), the BurrenLife 
program (IRL2) shall be highlighted. In the RNP (AT3), excellent targeting is mainly reached 
through the farm- and area-individual design of conservation objectives, carried out by an 
ecologist together with the individual farmers on basis of the ecological basis condition/situation 
of the individual fields. Conservation objectives are based on the presence of subjects of 
protection, and conservation recommendations are individually tailored to the protection of 
individual species and plants. As regards spatial targeting, the field-individual targeting enables 
to lay focus on areas within the fields, which are highly valuable from the point of view of nature 
protection. Actually, field plans are even subdivided into smaller areas with specific protection 
goals. Payments are dependent on whether the individualised objectives are reached. To ensure 
monitoring and the measuring of results, individual nature protection objectives are translated 
into a system of measurable area objectives, which could take e.g. the form of “this specific 
species needs to be present on 20% of the area”, or “this special plant on the field has to be cut 
before flowering”. A major success aspect in the RNP was the fine-tuning in the development of 
measurable objectives in close collaboration with the national control authority, so result-based 
payments within RNP became possible. This, in combination with the individuality of objectives, 
and the common definition of objectives integrating the farmers, leads to a distinctively high 
understanding of the protection objectives by the farmers and, consequently, high environmental 
effectiveness and acceptance. Nevertheless, it is clear that such approach is highly time 
consuming and costly, and demands a high level of expertise for ecologists/advisors. Therefore, 
the feasibility of implementation has to be taken into account when transferring the system to 
other context situations/member states.  
Also in the BurrenLife Program (IRL2), payments to farmers are primarily based on the quality 
of the biodiversity targets. In the Shannon Callows, non-productive investment payments were 
also included in the available measures, to incentivise farmers in undertaking works which would 
lead to direct improvements in the biodiversity targets. Contracts and payments are directly 
targeted on the performance of biodiversity indicators. In order to implement this principle, 
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participating farmers’ lands are assessed and given a quality score, which reflects the condition 
of the biodiversity on that land and determines the level of payments made to the farmer. The 
scoring is based on scorecards, which are individually designed for different typical landscape 
context in the Burren. Each scorecard is comprised of result indicators, which are surrogates for 
measuring the actual biodiversity. Just as each biodiversity target (e.g. habitat or species) must 
respond to agricultural practices, so must the result indicators. Each result indicator is comprised 
of categories (e.g. on a scale of good to bad) which reflect the extent to which each individual 
result indicator is achieved. A certain threshold must be achieved to attain each category. The 
higher the number and cover of positive indicator plants, the higher the marks and the payment 
to the farmer. To establish payment rates, the principal threats to the biodiversity targets are 
considered and the associated cost (including income foregone and additional costs) of achieving 
the biodiversity target is calculated in line with the World Trade Organisation and Common 
Agricultural Policy regulations. Up to 10% of transaction costs are also included under each 
measure. The payment structure aims to achieve a balance between incentivising farmers to 
deliver the highest possible score in their specific farm setting, while giving a clear signal that the 
delivery of higher quality also results in a higher reward. Payment rates for the low-medium 
quality scores were set at a level sufficient to cover costs of farmers’ participation in the scheme, 
while creating payment increments to incentivise further progression towards delivery of higher 
quality outputs. Tiered payment levels provide a financial incentive to the farmer to deliver the 
highest quality environmental product in their particular farm setting. In some instances, in order 
to create, maintain or rehabilitate biodiversity features, an initial investment was required to 
enhance the biodiversity outcome. This is a non-productive investment for actions over and above 
what is covered in the costing of annual results-based payments and their inclusion gave rise to 
blended/hybrid model of delivery rather than ‘pure’ results-based where payment is solely based 
on quality as assessed by the scoring system. 
Beyond the result-based approaches, also in other groups of contract types the design of the 
contracts enables excellent targeting. Examples for collective approaches with excellent targeting 
are the CSFFs (UK1 and UK3), the LIFE+ and Interreg projects Nutrinflow (LV1), Dviete (LV2), 
and the 3WatEr project in Flanders (BE1), and natural grazing in Podkarpackie Region (PL1). In 
the 2 LIFE+ projects LV1 and BE3, and in the Interreg project LV2, the design of the projects 
was fully targeted to reaching the clearly defined project goals. In BE3 for example, to reach 
AECPG objectives, such as the protection of specific bird species, tailored actions (including a 
detailed plan on area of implementation, measures to be taken, etc.) were elaborated and carried 
out in the course of the project. In the cluster of value chain contract solutions, excellent targeting 
is addressed to the water protection bread (DE5), to Carta del Mulino (IT4), and to the integrated 
production in the olive groves (ES4). In all three value chain approaches, excellency in targeting 
is reached by a clear set of obligatory measures to be carried out by the contractees, directly 
tailored to improve the AECPG objectives, which are also clearly defined. In IT4, the basis is the 
list of ISCC criteria and the ten measures proposed, in DE5, measures directly prescribe 
fertilisation pattern and amount focusing on groundwater protection areas, and in ES4, the 
Integrated Production Regulation establishes a series of prohibited, mandatory and recommended 
practices directly addressing the main AECPGs threatened. 
6.2.2 Flexibility 
The aspect of flexibility was not evaluated to be particularly important for the success of a certain 
group of contract types, and generally the importance of the criteria of flexibility in the success 
of the contract solution were evaluated below average in most schemes. Nevertheless, some 
contractual solutions report high performance in this criteria, for example the result based-
schemes Humus Program in Austria (AT4) or the Burren Life Program (IRL2). In these 2 result-
based contract solutions, the main reasons for the good performance of flexibility are that no 
management requirements are prescribed to the farmers on how to reach the results that enable 
52 
payments, and that payments are flexible in their amount, as they are directly connected to the 
results. In AT3, the initiators of the humus program only provide partaking farmers with 
management recommendations on how to achieve increases in soil humus contents. Moreover, 
farmers are informed about possibilities of taking part in training events/seminars, etc. 
Nevertheless, the management decisions about how to increase soil carbon contents are fully free 
to the farmers. Also, farmers can freely choose the period and duration of the phase of carbon 
accumulation, while result measurements are offered within a period of 3 to 7 years after entering 
the contract. Farmers are always free to leave the program unless they have received payments. 
As soon as payments have been issued, farmers are bound to a period of 5 years, within which 
they need to maintain the level of carbon contents on the fields that was eligible for payments, 
otherwise payments need to be repaid. Farmers are also able to prolong their contracts after the 
result measurement, if they wish. The payment itself directly refers to the amount of CO2 stored, 
while currently a fixed price of 30€/tCO2 is payed. Also in the Burren program (IRL2), famers 
are only given recommendations on what best practice to implement to reach high scores on the 
indicators defined in the scorecards. They are then free and flexible to implement the advice as 
they wish but they are not paid on the action but on the outcome in scores. Flexible, tiered payment 
structures that link the quality of outcome to the payment rate are used to incentivise change in 
farmer attitudes and management and bring about benefits for biodiversity targets. Payment rates 
reflect the value of the biodiversity being produced, the effort required to produce it and also the 
prevailing market concerns.  
Also 3 value-chain approaches report excellent performance in the criteria of flexibility, namely 
the water protection bread (DE5), the wild farm (BG3) and BioBabalscy (PL4). In the water 
protection bread initiative (DE5), on first sight flexibility could be assumed to be low because of 
strict requirements for farmers on amount and timing of nitrogen fertilisation, actually several 
aspects provide flexibility: First, all actors of the value chain as well as the water suppliers engage 
on a voluntary basis in the initiative by signing the self-declarations. Moreover, while initially the 
growing, processing and selling of water protection bread and other baked goods were limited to 
Lower Franconia, today it is extended to Central and Upper Franconia and to Lower Bavaria. In 
addition, the initiative was opened to farmers that farm in water-sensible areas outside water 
protection areas. Farmers can partake irrespective of the wheat field being owned or rented by the 
farmer. Also, there are no particular requirements for the farmers regarding the applied technology 
or farming technique. There is a high degree of flexibility for all three parties as no one commits 
himself beyond one year, engagements last from harvest to harvest and the amount of the grown, 
traded and processed water protection wheat is subject of annual negotiation. After all the amount 
of flour from the water protection initiative purchased and processed by the participating bakeries 
defines how much water protection wheat is grown. Also in the 2 case studies BG4 and PL1, the 
high scoring of flexibility is mainly justified by the flexibility in terms of year-to-year 
arrangements concerning structure and volumes of grains (PL4) and the flexible, short term 
arrangements on quantities depending on the needs of the distributor and the consumer demand 
in the wild farm (BG4). In the BioBabalscy contract solution (PL4), moreover prices are usually 
discussed with the farmers on the annual gathering of interested producers. 
6.2.3 Equity/fairness 
Generally, the importance of equity and fairness for the success of contract solutions has been 
weighted particularly high for the value-chain contract solution case studies and low for the other 
contracts types. Looking at the performance of this criteria across all cases, however, this criterion 
has, together with the criterion of acceptance, with an average score of 4.4, the highest average 
performance score across all criteria, meaning that all of the contract solutions presented in the 
in-depth studies provide very high equity and fairness. In the group of value chain contract 
solutions, the Wild farm (BG3), BioBabalscy (PL4) and Carta del Mulino (IT4) all score with 
excellent performance. In the case of the Wild farm (BG4), the perceived fairness expressed by 
53 
all of the 4 involved farms results mainly from the shared mission and the collective decision-
making as regards farmland. Also, common decisions as regards marketing of the meat, common 
stakes in the slaughterhouse and the fair distribution of benefits, costs, and risk lead to the high 
level of perceived fairness. Unfortunately, aside from the equity/fairness inside the collective 
group of the Wild farm farmers, namely in the contracts with the value chain partner, no detailed 
information has been reported by the experts. In the case of BioBabalscy (PL1), as already 
outlined earlier in this deliverable, a close relationship exists between the company and its 
producers. However, here also other factors lead to the high scoring in the criteria of equity and 
fairness. First, participation is open to all organic producers who are prepared to meet the 
processors’ requirements may participate. Second, each year a meeting of all producers involved 
is organised, where arrangements are discussed, with some arrangements also being negotiated 
individually. The conditions defined by the processor are reasonably clear and acceptable. Third, 
prices offered by the processor are very attractive for farmers and processor report to gain a good 
profit. As regards prices every farmer has the same rules and same basic prices, although the final 
price may differ depending on the quality of grains supplied. Fourth, besides the natural 
production risk, resulting mainly from unfavourable weather conditions, there are no penalties for 
not fulfilling the contract in terms of supplying the agreed volume of grains. This is in line with 
the philosophy of the processor who leaves to the farmers the freedom to sell to the buyer they 
prefer. In the case of Carta del Mulino (IT4) unfortunately not too much has been reported about 
the contract specifications leading to the high score of equity and fairness, however, part of the 
high-performance results from the equity in access, as every farm producing soft can join the 
contracts and all parties involved perceive economic viability, the farmers by the price premium 
for the products, Barilla by the gain of market shares. The last point made by the experts is the 
(fair) distribution the value along the value chain, from Barilla, to the mills and finally to the 
farmers.  
Even if equity and fairness in general has not been weighted as an outstandingly important 
criterion for the success of contracts of collective implementation and cooperation, some cases of 
excellency in this criteria shall be demonstrated. In the group of collective/cooperative, the CSFFs 
(UK1 and UK3), the 3WatEr project (BE1), the natural grazing in Podkarpackie (PL1) and the 
jointly owned forests Tuohi (FI5) achieve excellent performance in the criteria of equity and 
fairness. In UK1 and UK3, equity of access in the CSFFs is high, as there is no boundary in the 
size of land aiming to take part in the group so small land managers are allowed equal rights as 
large land managers. Joining the group is free and has no transaction costs for the farmer or the 
network lead, furthermore there are no barriers to entry in the CSFF group for farmers or land 
managers or local stakeholders. As regards the equity of decision making, within the Wensleydale 
CSFF network (UK3), all farmers have a voice in the group and the steering group, ensuring that 
all sides (farmers, land managers, local representatives from charitable and land management 
organisations) are represented and actively decide for new events and policies. Also in the case 
of South Peninnes CSFF (UK1), equity of decision making is granted with the formation of the 
steering group: the power is devolved between the network lead and the farmers, leading to equity 
amongst farmers and land managers. Differences between the 2 CSFFs are found in the equity of 
the outcomes, which depends on the homogeneity of the farms involved in the group. While the 
South Pennines CSFF is made up by a very homogeneous farm group (small land holdings of 
sheep and beef farms) and farmers taking part should have rather equal benefits, in the 
Wenslesdale CSFF it seems that small and less well-off farms benefit even more than the bigger 
dairy farms in the group (who are also participating less), as for the smaller farms the collective 
access and power, the option to join up forces, mobilise other farmers, get information and 
training and have their voices been heard through the CSFF is a particular benefit. In the 3WatEr 
project (BE1), actually the reasons for high scoring in the criteria of equity/fairness are the 
guiding principles of the founded association OVML vzw: all participants have their say about 
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the project achievements in the framework the association and the steering committees. 
Participants are entitled to information about the achievements of the other participants in order 
to verify all legal commitments are fulfilled in the long term, as contracted under the Life+ project. 
Also, all participants in the OVML vzw projects are subject to the same contractual structure. The 
contractual solution is particularly perceived as fair, as it was developed bottom-up, for the needs 
of private landowners wanting to develop nature in a Life+ project.  
A very interesting contract solution as regards the contract specifications for equity and fairness 
are the green jointly owned forests (FI5). Actually, anybody can enter the contract solution, the 
restriction in access is a minimum investment, which is 10,000 Euros, either in of money or forest 
property. All shareholders of Tuohi have full rights to participate to decision making. The most 
important decision-making body is the annual meeting of the jointly owned forest. A 
shareholder’s voting power depends on the number of shares she/he has. However, there is an 
upper limit in single shareholder votes. Particularly this upper limit in decision making is a 
contract specification contributing to high perceived equity and fairness: According to Act on 
Jointly Owned Forests (11 §) in decision making there is the upper 10% casting vote limit for a 
single shareholder, but the surplus division is made according to number of shares (32 §). So, 
increased wealth does not automatically increase power in a jointly owned forest. As regards 
equity in outcome, Tuohi has had, except for the very first years, a policy to pay the annual 
financial surplus to shareholders (certain reservations can be made for the forthcoming costs). 
The equity of this process is distinctively high due to the exact information on the shares. Also 
the distribution of benefits, costs and risks is done according to number of shares. In discussions 
with shareholders of Tuohi, due to all these contract specifications, perceived equity is high.  
The last of the exemplary collective approaches to be presented in the connection to equity and 
fairness is PL1. Here, the high score in equity and fairness for the initiative collective grazing in 
Podkarpackie results not from the equity in decision making, as here the contracting organisation 
leading the program takes the decision while the farmers have to fulfil the requirements of the 
contracts. However, the procedures based on the contracts are fair and the rules and the payments 
are clear and equal for every farmer. 
6.2.4 Profitability 
The general importance of profitability for the success of the contractual solutions has been 
weighted highest for result-based and value-chain approaches. However, almost none of the 
contract solutions in the whole sample of in-depth studies scores excellently high in this criteria, 
and, with an average score of only 3.1 across all case studies, this criterion is the one with the 
lowest average performance. Actually, only the Humus program of the Ökoregion Kaindorf 
(AT4) and the collective reservoirs (IT1) are scored as excellent in the criteria of profitability. In 
both cases, profitability is not primarily grounded in the immediate price paid per ton CO2 (AT4), 
or in the subsidies for the establishment of the reservoirs (IT1), but in the long-term effects on 
production. In AT4, long term profitability is reached by the increase of organic matter in the 
soils, leading to higher productivity. At the beginning of the transition process to “humus 
farming”, the price payed mainly covers the costs of management changes, while these costs 
decrease over time due to learning effects. Still, the payment is perceived by the farmers as a 
payment for “production” of carbon sequestration, additionally to the production of agricultural 
produce.  In IT1, water availability is key for the maintenance of production. Indeed, the contract 
solution only covers a part of the total costs of the construction of the reservoir. Albeit reduced, 
the cost accruing to farmers can be substantial, e.g. several thousand euros per 1000 m3 of water 
stored, however the successful rate of response implies a perceived advantage from enrolling.2
2 For the development of WP3 and WP4 activities, besides best practice examples also contract solutions scoring low 
on profitability will be considered to learn from that. Also the analysis of profitability will be expanded on the value 
chain approaches, as these weight profitability really high, but obviously do not perform well. 
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6.2.5 Building of social/cultural capital: 
The building of social and cultural capital as an important element of success for the contract 
solutions has been evaluated with outstandingly high weights in the CSFFs in UK1 and UK3, in 
the BioBabalscy value chain initiative (PL4), in the case of EcoMethane (FR4) and in the land 
tenure approach of conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha and Sakra mountains
(BG4). In the first 4 cases, also the scoring for the criteria reveals excellent performance. In the 
UK1 CSFF, participation in the group has allowed farmers to have a collective voice and act as a 
lever to impact local decision making. Farmers have been able to understand better the 
interconnectedness of natural systems and better prepare themselves for changing climate and 
changing farming and land management practices. The group forming has also been a benefit 
when engaging with organisations such as the Woodland Trust, Environment Agency and Local 
Authority who are all keen to engage with farmers but unable to do so on an individual basis – 
working through the CSFF has given them a route for this engagement to take place. This resulted 
in the group having one of the highest number of meetings of all UK CSFF groups.  In the UK3 
CSFF, experts report that participation in the group has allowed farmers to understand both the 
available options to engage with natural flood management, but also the beneficial impact such 
activities can have to the environment. Farmers have been able to understand better the 
interconnectedness of natural systems and better prepare themselves for changing climate and 
changing farming and land management practices. In the case of BioBabalscy (PL4), the high 
performance in the criteria of building social and cultural capital is grounded in the perception of 
environment changes due to increased awareness of the growing number of organic farmers in 
the area. To some extent this changes in perception is addressed to the activities the BioBabalski 
company in the field of knowledge and skills sharing. In the EcoMethane initiative (FR4), the 
farmers involved could be classified as “already sensitized”, however the approach allows them 
to raise awareness of their own public: Thanks to the meter and the numbers obtained, the 
awareness of the society can be increased, and agricultural practices, different systems and efforts 
to reduce GHGs by farmers, can be communicated to the public, even if methane is not as easily 
noticeable as other elements or AECPGs, such as landscapes, animal welfare, clear water etc. The 
possibility to enhance public awareness in the contract solution is fostered by the provision of 
performance signs to breeders. These disclose the savings produced (translated in terms of car 
miles to be more telling).  which can change people's perception of themselves and their practices. 
In addition, through the EcoMethane approach, communication tools (e.g. the smart phone app) 
are made available to farmers so that they can communicate about the approach and their results 
to a wider audience. 
6.2.6 Longevity 
The criterion of longevity has been weighted as particularly important in the result-based contract 
solutions and in the cases of collective implementation and cooperation. In the group of result-
based contract solutions highest importance of this criterion for the overall success of the initiative 
are found in the Burren Program (IRL1) and the RBAPS pilot (IRL2), while the latter, due to its 
pilot character, unfortunately scores poor in this criterion. Also the 2 CO2 initiatives EcoMethane
(FR4) and the Humus Program (AT4) address high importance to the criteria of longevity. Here 
only the Humus program scores excellent, while EcoMethane reaches a rather poor performance, 
mainly due to the current lack of training for the farmers, and the still missing support from the 
overall farming community except the pioneers stepping into the solution.  
In the Burren program (IRL1), the high score in the criteria of longevity bases on different pillars: 
The program provides a specific, and quite strict strategy of education and training in form of 
training workshops for all participants. The trainings consist of an introduction session in year 1 
of participation and/or classroom and filed sessions in subsequent years. The attendance at 
workshops is mandatory for program participants and failure to attend impacts on the payment 
received. Failure to attend 3 consecutive workshops leads to expulsion from the program. The 
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workshops focus on practical management issues such as identifying habitats, sustainable grazing 
regimes, approved feeding systems, etc. The training events are also used to explain the scoring 
structure and how scores can be improved through targeted management. Farmers are encouraged 
and facilitated to engage in a self-scoring exercise before their trained advisor visits to improve 
their understanding of the system. All training takes place in the Burren, mainly on the land and 
all resources (best practice guides, etc.) are locally focussed. Also, the Burren program has 
followed a continuous strategy of involving farmers. For example, in the current round of the 
project a phased approach to farmer recruitment, with calls for applications made over 3 years 
(2016-18). Competition for places was initially strong – there were over 400 applications for the 
first call, with 194 places taken up (3 of whom later withdrew), and 147 of whom had participated 
in an earlier version of the program. In 2017, a second tranche of 80 farmers joined, followed by 
a third tranche of 57 in 2018, giving a total of 328 farmers. The area currently managed by these 
farmers includes 71% of the Burren’s designated area and it is estimated that there is now only 
20% of target farmers that have not participated. The Burren program in the meantime receives 
strong support of the farming community, also expressed by the attendance at public events by 
participant farmers. 
In the Humus Program (AT4), participation of farmers is steadily increasing from initially 3 
partaking farmers in 2007, to now over 250 farmers, while this increase has been reached only by 
word-of-mouth information and speeches of the representatives of the Ökoregion Kaindorf 
association on events visited by farmers. Besides being obviously economically interesting and 
attractive for the farmers, and therefore guaranteeing some inert longevity of an attractive 
business solution, the contract solutions longevity is supported by the creation and dissemination 
of subject-specific knowledge. So-called “Humus-days” are organised once a year, no having 
established as European networking events for experts and practitioners, with now more than 400 
participants. Also a so-called “Humus-Academy”, with series of seminars about soil fertility, 
compose, intercropping, etc. has been established, to enable the continuous exchange of 
knowledge throughout the year. The main aspect for longevity in the Humus Program contract 
itself, is the specification for its duration. Due to the fact, that result measurements of soil carbon 
contents are possible only after a minimum time span of 3 years after entering the contract solution 
and starting with the process of humus accumulation, up to a duration of humus accumulation of 
7 years, and, the 5-year phase of guaranteeing the stability of humus content after the result 
measurement and payment of the performance fee, the contract solution can be binding for up to 
12 years – and therefore particularly longer than any public AES available. Also, contracts can be 
easily prolonged after the result measurement, continuing the process of humus accumulation. 
Amongst the cases of collective implementation and collaboration, the criterion of longevity has 
been weighted particularly high for the success of the incentives for collective reservoirs (IT1), 
the integrated territorial projects (IT6), the CSFFs (UK1 and UK3), the 3WatEr LIFE Project 
(BE1) and the Natural grazing in Podkarpackie (PL1). However, of these 5 contract solutions, 
only IT1, IT6 and BE1 perform excellent in the criteria of longevity, particularly the CSFFs only 
poorly.  In the CSFFs the low score is somewhat unexpected, as the CSFFs put a lot of effort into 
training and education therefore some point shall be described here anyway: The CSFF training 
takes place through visits in farms of CSFF members or of neighbouring CSFF members’ farms 
and through events with invited speakers. These speakers come from various backgrounds, from 
practitioners in the farming industry to academics and consultants who deliver talks and training 
for topics of interest to farmers (e.g. NFM practices talks, carbon capturing and sequestration in 
soils, woodland creation and management, etc.). Also, member numbers are stable and increasing, 
even if starting and getting the farmers together obviously was difficult. Nevertheless, bigger 
number increase hasn’t taken place in the CSFFs as it is difficult for the group lead to manage 
very large groups given their limited time to devote to the activities (one day a week). Another 
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reason for the low scores in the criteria of longevity in the CSFFs might be that there are no plans 
available yet guaranteeing the persistence of the program.  
In IT1, the longevity of the program is given by the subject and kind of subsidy, being a one-shot 
transfer supporting the building of the water reservoirs, which are per se long-term infrastructures. 
Also, representing a win-win situation, support for this contractual solution in the farming 
community is high, moreover the Consorzio di Bonifica della Romagna Occidentale (CBRO) 
provides the technical skill for the project design and the subsequent management of the 
reservoirs. In the ITPs of Tuscany (IT6), no specific contract specifications have been reported 
by the experts that grant longevity. Nevertheless, it becomes clear that obviously a part of the 
solutions will be continued after the end of the program. Also, given the substantial support for 
the realization of specific and necessary investments for the arrangement of the territory, the 
community responds with much interest and enthusiasm with respect to the possibilities given by 
such kind of projects. Specific training meetings are also planned, whereat dissemination and 
training activities are managed by the coordinator together with the participants involved for the 
specific tasks and an indirect participant, whose main task is to ensure knowledge and 
acceptability of the proposed interventions. 
The excellent score in the criteria of longevity of the LIFE+ 3WatEr project (BE1) on the one 
hand bases on the continuity and the coordination of the project’s environmental objectives with 
the Flemish natural management plan, which will persist after the end of the lifetime of the project. 
Also, as being a LIFE+ project (and this also accounts for the Burren Program (IRL1) and Dviete 
(LV2)), the so-called AfterLife plan is focused on guaranteeing the maintenance of the 
effectiveness beyond the end of the “project”. In the 3WatEr project, excellent scoring in 
longevity is moreover seen in the fact, that education is at the centre of the realization of the 
Life+ project and its aftermath. The overall objectives of the project indeed covered not only the 
restoration of the 3watEr project area but put emphasis particularly on the expansion of 
educational activities and opportunities throughout the project area. The ecological and 
educational actions in the project have all been designed with economic use in mind – allowing 
landowners to be financially viable as well as economically responsible, with forestry and fish 
farming forming a long-standing economic staple of the area. The educational tools developed 
by the project such as the educational package for schools, the documentary, and the training 
of the Wijers-Guides (local volunteers trained by the project who can be asked to accompany 
walks in the area) will help ensure that existing and coming generations will know the area 
and its challenges much better – this will greatly help with public acceptance. 
The last example of a contract solution putting high weight on the criteria of longevity for its 
success, while simultaneously scoring excellent in this criterion, is the initiative Carbon Market 
Hiilipörssi (FI5). The major reason for the high score is the long-term objective of transforming 
restored peatland areas into private protected areas in line with the Finnish Nature Conservation 
Act of 1996 (also 1923). Within all CONSOLE in-depth studies, this is indeed the most permanent 
approach to guarantee a basically “forever” status of protection, as the conservation agreement 
binds, in the case of a change of ownership, also the new owner to the regulation to not reversing 
the restoration measures done. As regards the interest in the project, from side of the donors’ 
longevity seems currently granted as the number of donors interested in funding and buying 
certificates has been increasing sharply, meaning that there is a massive demand for such 
solution on the side of the buyers. However, as the initiative is rather new it is still difficult 
to assess the willingness of landowners to participate. During the past decades in the METSO-
protection program, forest owners have been quite willing to voluntarily protect parts of their 
forests. However, many of them want to avoid the permanent and official protection status, 
since they don’t want to make decisions on behalf of the next generation i.e. inheritors inside 
the family. 
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6.2.7 Acceptance 
The criteria of acceptance – as to be expected – was weighted as important for the success of all 
groups of contract solutions. Particularly in the group of result-based cases this criterion is 
weighted high for RBAPS (IRL2), Burren Program (IRL1) and, being a mixed instrument, for the 
Carbon Market Hiilipörssi (FI3), in the group of collective approaches for the collective 
reservoirs (IT1), the Kromme Rjin collective management (NL1) and the green jointly owned 
forests Tuohi (FI5), in the group of value-chain approaches for the cases of the water protection 
bread (DE5) and the case of integrated production in the olive groves (ES4), and in the group of 
land tenure approaches for both the EcoGrazing (FR1) and the conservation of grassland in 
Strandzha and Sakra mountains (BG4). Though, for these cases importance and actual an 
excellent scoring only match in the cases of collective reservoirs (IT1), water protection bread 
(FI5) and the 2 land tenure cases (FR1 and BG4). As acceptance however is a basic principle for 
implementation, and a higher-level performance criterion, the analysis in this sub-chapter 
focusses not only on best practice examples being matches between importance and performance, 
but will take an approach of highlighting most interesting cases throughout all groups of contract 
types with very good and excellent performance due to certain contract specifications.  
From the analysis of the contract solutions scoring very well or even excellent in the criteria of 
acceptance, it became clear that an important driver is the understanding of the sense of the 
measures and outcomes. On the one hand, this understanding is based on the recognition of 
objectives and the measures leading to the enhancement of AECPGs, on the other, it is based on 
the understanding of the “moral” sense of the contract solutions. From the in-depth descriptions 
on the question it became obvious that particularly result-based approaches as well as cases of 
collective implementation contain special design elements that enhance the understanding of the 
sense of the contract solutions: For example in the case of the result-based initiative EcoMethane 
(FR4), which scores excellent in the criteria of acceptance, the approach of lowering methane 
emissions via adaptations in the dairy cows’ feed ration itself is clear, based on scientific elements, 
recognized at the state and United Nations level and therefore understandable and credible to the 
farmers. Moreover, a shared environmental awareness of the partaking pioneer farmers leads to a 
high moral understanding that the objectives of the contract “make sense”. One of the interviewed 
farmers stated that EcoMethane finally brings what our grandparents have instilled in us for years: 
a methodology to have a better future and transmit a planet where we have limited the damage, 
and it makes us want to talk about it and that society recognizes it.” Also in the result-based 
initiatives RNP (AT3), Burren Program (IRL1), RBAPs (IRL2) and the Humus Program (AT4), 
the clear indicators, the transparent technical procedures of their measurement and upscaling, and, 
finally, the direct relationship between management and results, strongly enhance the 
understanding of the sense of the recommended (not obligatory) management measures. In the 
RNP (AT3) for examples, the elaboration of protection objectives and management measures 
together with the farmers, as well as a certain response to the personal interest of protection 
objectives of the farmers on their own fields, guarantees “technical” understanding as well as the 
moral conviction of the farmers that the subject of protection is worth it. In the RBAPS (IRL2) 
and Burren Program (IRL1), the initial assessment of the farm-individual status quo of 
environmental assets by means of the easily understandable scorecards and the management 
recommendations are the basis of a good understanding of what can why and how be achieved. 
Likewise, in the result-based Humus Program (AT4), the comparison of the results of the initial 
soil sampling, and the soil sampling for result measurements directly show changes in the 
AECPGs to the farmers, while the technical process of analysing carbon contents is transparent, 
not doubted and understandable for the farmers. Additionally, for the Humus Program the experts 
report that the partaking farmers are convinced about the sense of accumulation soil organic 
matter for a broad variety of soil functions, in parts due to the fact that they have been entering 
the program inspired by soil related scientific events, where they learned about the program. 
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However, the experts also perceive that in general the sense of enhancing soil carbon contents is 
not clear yet to most farmers outside the scheme.  In the cases of collaboration and collective 
implementation, the understanding of the sense of the measures often results from the collective 
design and elaboration of the landscape development plans. For example, in the ITPs (IT6), all 
actions and interventions were planned in concert with all participants under the conditions 
established by the Tuscany region as regards the presentation of applications and the selection of 
ITP projects. Moreover, the type of actions that can be financed are established through the PSR 
Regione Toscana, therefore the pack of available measure is a familiar tool for the participants. 
For the ITP, the experts believe that for the sake of common planning, there are no reasons for 
the participants to consider the contractual conditions unreasonable or morally questionable. Also, 
the participants proposed within a clear set of possible actions/interventions that could bring 
benefits and be realized within an established participation scheme. Also in the bottom-up 
approach of the 3WatEr project (BE1), the contract solution was commonly developed for 
achieving project actions suggested by each participant to be realized on parcels under their own 
management. Naturally, the own bottom-up development of objectives and measures per se 
involved an understanding of the necessity and sense of the measures.  
In the value chain approaches, it became clear that a major element for acceptance is trust. In the 
2 value chain case studies scoring excellent in the criteria of acceptance, namely Biobablsky 
(PL4), and the Wild farm (BG3), the trustful relationship is mainly due to a long-lasting and very 
close, personal relationship between on the one hand the producers and processor in PL4, and the 
well-established trust among the participants because of previously build trustful relations in 
BG3. In the initiative water protection bread (DE5), the high level of trust mainly bases on mutual 
respect of all project participants in combination with a great public relation work and the 
transparency within the initiative. Here, annual meetings offer the possibility to get insights into 
the activities of the other actors of the value chain, but it also allows exchanging news. The visits 
of a water utility, a farm, a bakery and a mill were important for the team spirit and contributed 
to strengthen the sense of community. In several cases there are long-term trade relations between 
farmers and mills as well as between mills and bakeries, so that some actors knew each other 
before participating in the initiative. The water suppliers and their cooperation farmers are 
collaborating since many years, too. The initiative benefited from this basis of trust. The larger 
the group of participants become, the more it is difficult however to keep a personal contact 
between the members. This difficulty is enforced by the fact that the initiative has been extended 
beyond Upper Franconia. Showing participants faces on the website of the water protection bread, 
but also opening the farm for activities in connection to the initiative as well as exchanges with 
the press requires trust between the participants including the project lead. On the other side – if 
successful – they can contribute to further strengthen acceptance.  
Throughout all types of contract solutions, communication within the contract solution plays a 
role in enhancing trust, understanding of the sense of the contracts and therefore acceptance. In 
some cases, communication is even an important factor of implementation feasibility. A good 
example is the case of EcoGrazing (FR1). Here, the partners are in constant contact (via 
WhatsApp) and every Tuesday when moving animals, with very frequent exchanges. Particularly 
in the collective approaches, communication is essential for the orchestration of measures and 
mostly an integrative part of the contract solution itself. In NL1, the collective management in 
Kromme Rjin for example, the board of the collective meets bimonthly and a general assembly 
takes place annually. In the CSFFs (UK1 and UK3), communication and exchange is the basic 
objective of the whole contract: Monthly meetings ensure that there is good communication and 
participation across the group while it takes a lot of effort from the facilitator to bring all members 
together and steer the direction of the group. Therefore, in the future, a new steering committee 
is expected to assist this process. In the Tuscan ITP (IT6), the communication process is managed 
by the project leader, who has the task of keeping the Tuscan region informed and ensuring 
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effective and timely communication between all participants. For example, in the initial phase, 
the project leader was the organizer and promoter of public conferences carried out as an 
animation activity, on-site, in close collaboration with the Tuscan Archipelago National Park 
Authority. Then, the lead partner has the task to ensure communication between the participants 
and the Region. Finally, communication includes meetings and conferences with the wineries 
participating in the ITP, supply of web and paper materials in order to make them as expert and 
operational as possible in the use of the "Smart Alert System" as well as guarantee the diffusion 
of good agricultural practices and projects results. 
6.2.8 Compatibility 
The importance of the criteria of compatibility of the contractual solution with the business design 
of the contractees and with the interest and attitudes of stakeholder has been weighted relatively 
low for the success of result-based, collective/collaborative and land-tenure approaches. In 
contrast, for the value-chain approaches, this importance of this criterion is weighted as clearly 
above average, and also the performance of all value chain contract solutions as regards this 
criterion is either very well or even excellent. In the case of BioBabalscy (PL4), high compatibility 
with the business design of the farmers results from the fact that the partaking organic arable 
farmers in the region already grow cereals within their crop rotation. Therefore, the possibility of 
selling grains to Babalscy Company at good prices makes the cultivation of cereals represents a 
more profitable win-win situation for them. The same situation applies to the farmers producing 
for Carta del Mulino (IT4). Here the contract is highly compatible with the business design of the 
stakeholders, as it is linked to regular agricultural production, even though additional costs can 
be foreseen by the compliance with the ten rules. In the case of the water protection bread (DE5), 
a basic knowledge about the real movements of the produced and processed goods was decisive 
for the success and a precondition to engage the different actors at regional level. In addition, it 
made it possible to set the framework conditions of the initiative in such a way that they fit for 
business operators and to obtain the desired product properties. For the production of wheat for 
the water protection bread, the participating farmers do not need to change their farming practices 
in general: they only adapt their management practices on the single fields where they grow wheat 
according to the specifications of the initiative. For the mills, too, there is no need for general 
modifications: the separate collection, storage and milling can be integrated into usual business 
procedures. The possibility for the bakeries to participate as “water protection bakeries” with at 
least 50% of the processed wheat coming from the fields of the initiative, allows a good 
integration into the business activities. One bakery decided to use at least 80% of its wheat flour 
originating from the initiative – covering all the bakery products. It was reported that this was 
done for the harvests 2017-2019 where even 85% of the wheat flour came from the water 
protection bread initiative. The participating bakeries got the wheat flour in the qualities they 
needed alongside with all important analytic parameters. The preparation of the dough 
nevertheless requires some extra effort as the baker needs to look “how the dough reacts” at any 
new delivery.  
For all these 3 value-chain solutions one can conclude, that the value-chain contract does not 
require a real restructuring of management, but only adds some specificities that are integrable 
without the need of e.g. changing technologies or business management. In the last case of value 
chain solutions to be exemplarily reported here, namely the Wild farm, integration goes even 
further. Here, the contractual solution and the whole business design around it has been designed 
and build-up by the farmers, so the solution is perfectly harmonized with the farming system and 
the farm management of the partaking farms. 
6.2.9 Feasibility of implementation 
The criterion of feasibility of implementation was not evaluated to be particularly important for 
the success of a certain group of contract types. Also, only 4 contract solutions report excellent 
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performance in this criteria, namely the 2 land tenure contract solutions (BG4, FR1), the value 
chain initiative Carta del Mulino (IT4) and the Wildlife Estates label (BE3). Nevertheless, 
especially when considering the transfer of functioning contract solutions to other context 
situation, or in the case of considering the replacement of existing approaches, such as area-based, 
farm-individual subsidies by collective or result-based schemes, or by initiatives of the value 
chain, the question of feasibility of implementation should be raised. Particularly important in this 
respect is information about program costs, considering transaction and implementation costs, as 
well as costs connected to the design of the (new) programs. To gather a more general view on 
the differences in the program costs of different kinds of contracts, also in this sub-chapter the 
analysis of the in-depth studies focusses not only on best practice examples, but will take a 
contract-type wise approach of highlighting most interesting statements about the feasibility of 
the single contract solutions investigated.  
Most of the result-based initiatives investigated in the CONSOLE in-depth case study sample 
report that particularly the costs for setting up the programs and projects have been rather high. 
Often this is due to the fact that such approaches have to be developed from scratch. In the case 
of the biodiversity monitor for dairy farming (NL3) for example, the conceptualization costs are 
estimated to be “relatively high”, because much time and research are invested for the 
development of this new conceptual tool. A similar statement accounts for the RNP (AT3) and 
for EcoMethane (FR4): In the RNP (AT3), a lot of effort has been spent in setting up the overall 
design of the program, the reporting tools for the farmers, as well as in training the farm advisors, 
as well as the controllers from the control authority. In the EcoMethane approach (FR4), the 
program itself has been perceived by the experts to be “very expensive” in terms of building the 
device. For the Burren Program (IRL1), the BP team estimates that about 15% of overall project 
cost is spent on delivering the program. 
As regards running costs of result-based schemes, these differ particularly for the different ways 
of monitoring: in result-based schemes with rather technological assessment and measurement of 
fixed performance indicators, such as in EcoMethane (FR4) and the Biodiversity monitor (NL3), 
running costs are comparably “low” or “medium”. For example, in FR3, the EcoMethane device 
is not expensive for the farmers and also the transaction costs are estimated to be relatively low. 
Running costs for the initiator Bleu-Blanc-Coeur consist in activities of engaging funding 
(communication costs, approaching funders). The EcoMethane approach is managed by Bleu-
Blanc-Coeur employees. Current costs of the process are particularly operating costs of the 
platform, costs of analysing the milk and the operating costs for Bleu-Blanc-Coeur personnel. 
Also for the Biodiversity monitor (NL3), implementation and running costs are expected to be 
“medium”. For the implementation of the monitor, some infrastructure and organizational 
elements had to be/are being built (e.g. the Biodiversity Monitor Foundation, and a new central 
database for the registration of nature & landscape elements on farms), however, for running the 
monitoring only minimal costs limited to some extra administrative burdens are expected.  
In contrast to these “technological” solutions, result-based programs with “on-field” monitoring 
of results by ecological advisors and/or controllers are estimated to have comparatively high 
running costs. In the Austrian RNP (AT3), these costs stem mainly from the farm-individuality 
of the objectives and measures: The most intensive cost position is estimated to be farm-individual 
advice, however this individuality is perceived as the key factor of success and the investment 
seems more sustainable due to learning effects/awareness building, etc. Also in the Burren 
Program (IRL1) and in the pilot planning for RBAPS (IRL2), implementation is evaluated to be 
rather complex and also costly, and requires investments in project teams as well as in specially 
trained farm advisors. Nevertheless, in the Burren program the result-based component of 
funding, namely the scoring intervention is estimated to cost 3 times less than the conservation 
works element of the program. Therefore, it is suggested that the result-based element is a more 
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cost-effective scheme to operate. In the Irish pilot RBAPS (IRL2) for a result-based RDP, 
resources required to implement the project were estimated to mirror those required for higher 
tier management-based schemes. It was assumed that the managing authority will have (or has 
access to) the relevant staff required (scientific experts, inspectors, financial, administrative, IT 
systems and data control), likely supported by a national farm advisory service. The establishment 
of local support offices, with the relevant expertise (agri-ecological scientists and administrators), 
may help to embed the scheme in the regions where they are being targeted. Here it was 
anticipated that the local office provides support, training and advice for farmers and farm 
advisors and acts as the liaison point with the managing authority (where this service is provided 
by an external agency). 
As regards contract solutions aiming at entering the carbon market, also here partly high costs for 
setting up the programs have been reported. In the case of the Humus program (AT4), particularly 
the costs of setting up the software and the farm data base have been evaluated by the experts as 
being high. Additionally, it was mentioned, that during the first 5 years of the program, the project 
had to be financed “without income”, as only after the end of the first accumulation phase first 
sales of emission certificates could start to finance the costs of the program (as well as providing 
payments to the farmers). For the Finish Carbon Market Hiilipörssi (FI3), it is reported that of 
the money invested in the project, 70% is devoted to restoration work, 10% to Carbon Market 
maintenance and other climate actions, 10% to development and marketing, and 10% to scientific 
and artistic activities supporting peatland restoration. According to this, the cost of setting up the 
contract solution are some 20% of the total cost which is not very much. According to the Carbon 
Market calculator, with 800 Euros donation it is possible to restore one hectare of peatland. From 
the perspective of producing AECPGs these costs are not high since the peatland area will 
permanently accumulate CO2 and produce additional PGs such as specific peatland biodiversity 
and habitats. However, it has also be mentioned that it is difficult to estimate whether these costs 
are high or low. 
For the case of contractual solutions fostering collective implementation or cooperation, mainly 
2 cost positions are discussed, namely transaction/overhead costs, and costs of coordination: In 
the collective management of Kromme Rjin (NL1), the collective agri-environmental management 
was introduced because the overhead in the previous funding system was with 41% particularly 
high. However, implementation costs have now shifted from governments to collectives, where 
for example the implementation budget in the Utrecht Oost collective accounts for 20%. Also for 
the collective reservoirs (IT1), transaction costs are reported to be relatively low for the public 
administration. Nevertheless, the coordination costs among farmers are expected to be normally 
very high, while in this specific case they are largely absorbed by the Consorzio di Bonifica della 
Romagna Occidentale (CBRO). Also in the ITP (IT6), coordination costs and other transaction 
and implementation costs that arise for the development of the contract, as well as costs of 
research and monitoring of the interventions are mentioned as important cost positions, without 
giving indications of their height. However, the main cost part of this 1.800.000€ program is 
devoted to the carrying out physical-structural interventions (investments) that involve a high cost 
in terms of materials, skilled labour and transport. In the 2 CSFF case studies UK1 and UK3, 
coordination costs and costs for consultants at networking events are the only occurring cost 
positions, mainly devoted to the compensation of the network lead and in a lesser extent to 
compensation to farmers for partaking to the monthly meetings. The offered compensation for 
such activities is considered to be sufficient and several times spending the full available funds is 
not possible due to meetings not always taking place. In total, UK3 members’ land includes more 
than £60k of value from different AES options under the Countryside Stewardship and 
Environmental Stewardship AES.  
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In value-chain based contract solutions, the height of the program costs is determined by the 
complexity of the solution, meaning there are differences in solutions representing improved 
seller-buyer relationships, and solutions representing approaches along the whole value chain. 
For the cases of BioBabalscy (PL4) and the Wild farm (BG3) for example, no specific costs are 
reported by the experts. In BioBabalscy, the experts note that extra costs are covered by the 
premium prices paid by the producers, in the Wild farm (BG3), transaction costs are estimated as 
negligible and the participation costs are considered by the farmers to be very low.   
The more complex value chain approaches of Carta del Mulino (IT4) and the water protection 
bread (DE5), involve cost positions along the whole chain. In Carta del Mulino (IT4), costs are 
expected to be substantial both from the point of view of the farmers and for the whole supply 
chain. An important feature that has been highlighted is that, in contrast to e.g. BioBabalscy, the 
increase in the costs due to the compliance to the rules by farmers, but also mills and bakeries, is 
not reversed on consumers but absorbed by Barilla, e.g. there is no increase in the price for the 
consumers. In the water protection bread initiative (DE5), besides the cost for the management 
of the initiative itself, there are costs occurring at the level of the water suppliers resulting from 
the voluntary agreement with the participating farmers in the water protection areas. The mills 
offer a guaranteed purchase and commit to pay prices taking into account the market prices for 
quality wheat regardless the lower protein content, complemented by a price increase for the water 
protection wheat. Without the payments of the water suppliers and the mills the farmers would 
not renounce to grow quality wheat with high protein content. 
Last but not least, from 2 cases of land-tenure solutions no major commonalties on cost positions 
and their different height could be derived. However, in the case of EcoGrazing (FR1), according 
to the initiator (head of Green Spaces), the feasibility of implementation is given as the costs of 
the program are reasonable for Brest Metropole mainly because the tenant is a producer breeder 
and no landscaper. The breeder has two sources of income, namely eco-pasturing and the sale of 
his sheep production, which has allowed to reduce the payment per ha of eco-pasturage compared 
to the fees that would be demanded by a landscaper, which have been reported to be 3 times as 
high. In the case of conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha and Sakra mountains 
(BG4), at least the initial contract transaction costs were described as high due to the negotiation 
phase. High costs also occurred for the implementation of restoration measures involving a 
conversion of arable land into pastures. However, the activities connected with the maintenance 
of the pastures in a conservational way are fully covered by the subsidy payments, so for the 
farmers they do not impose considerable costs. 
6.2.10 Effectiveness 
The importance of the criterion of effectiveness for the success of the contract solutions was 
weighted above average only for the group of cases fostering collective implementation and 
cooperation, while a broad number of cases across all groups of contract types report excellent 
performance in this criteria. From the point of view of programmers, but also practitioners, of 
course effectiveness is a major reason for the implementation of measures, while not only 
environmental effectiveness, that is the enhancement of the AECPGs targeted, but also the 
criterion of cost-effectiveness, relating the environmental outcomes to the costs involved, such as 
program-costs, transaction costs, farm level implementation costs etc., is envisaged. Being aware 
of the importance of this subordinate criterion, likewise for the criterion of feasibility of 
implementation and acceptance, the following analysis of the in-depth studies focusses not only 
on best practice examples, but will take an approach of highlighting most interesting findings 
about the effectiveness of the single contract solutions.  
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Environmental Effectiveness 
In the group of contract solutions fostering collective implementation and cooperation high 
weight is put on the criteria of effectiveness, while only 3 case studies (LV1, BE1, PL1) out of 
the 9 contract solutions in this cluster perform excellent in this criteria. The main reason for the 
relatively low performance is that the measuring of environmental results is obviously often not 
in the foreground of collective approaches, so no data supports the actual enhancement of the 
public goods targeted. Many case studies therefore report, that environmental effectiveness of the 
programs is difficult to be estimated. Also, some programs are very new, and effects on AECPG 
production are long term, so effects cannot be forespoken yet (e.g. FI5). However, most collective 
contract solutions in the CONSOLE in-depth case study sample are estimated to have positive 
environmental effects.  
E.g. in the case of the collective reservoirs (IT1), even if environmental effects are difficult to be 
estimated, the program is evaluated to at least reduce the trade-offs between environmental goals 
and farm viability. In the ITP (IT6), based on the integrative assessment of regional criticalities 
and the development of measures directly targeted to the problems identified, it is assumed that 
the interventions should be effective. However, also here most investments have not yet been 
made and it is currently difficult to forecast the results achieved. Also preliminary reporting for 
the CSFF initiative in UK3 show that lands that is part of the CSFF group have higher uptake of 
AES focusing on option richness and option diversity compared to nearby land that is outside of 
the CSFF group. These preliminary reports also show that CSFF participation leads to an 
enhancement of AECPGs because of the networking activities farmers are more informed about 
policies, alternative ways of farming that improve provisioning of AECPGs and future changes 
in funding. Also, farmers are more connected with one another and more information from peer-
to-peer learning is available. In the case of collective management in the Kromme Rjin (NL1), 
some more concrete results can already be reported: Here, the area of environmentally-friendly 
managed agricultural land increased and more measures are taken. However, the additionality of 
the program is not fully clear as also without the collective, this specific region seems to be fairly 
active in this regard. Nevertheless, the measures introduced by the collective are relevant for 
ecosystem services important to the area, including recreation. Also in the case of the 3WatEr 
project (BE1), positive results are reported in terms of environmental effectiveness, as the very 
concrete project objectives have been reached. Here, it seems clear that without the Life+ 3watEr 
project and the OVML vzw contractual structure, no such enhancement on private land would 
have been realized. The success of the Life+ 3watEr project also had the effect of creating a 
positive dynamic with public authorities, NGO's and other rural sectors for further developing the 
Midden-Limburg region, called "The Wijers" into an attractive landscape for tourism and the 
delivery of lots of different ecosystem services. In the case of natural grazing in Podkarpackie
(PL1), the “environmental” objective was to maintain grazing pastures in the region, as a 
landscape system providing a great number of AECPGs. Therefore, the environmental 
effectiveness can be measured by the participation of farmers, which has more than doubled since 
the implementation of the program in 2012 (715 farmers, 15,1 thousand hectares in the year 2019). 
Besides contributing to the protection of biodiversity in valuable natural areas, the grazing 
activities enrich the landscape and agricultural scenery. Additional environmental benefit of the 
program is moreover seen in improved soil quality (and health) through grazing, which promotes 
grass propagation, prevents soil erosion, and trampling and leaving droppings stimulate turf 
development. The program also contributes to social benefits and increases recreational access. 
The presence of animals on pastures increases the aesthetic value of the landscape, which 
contributes to increasing the tourist attractiveness of the region and rural viability and vitality.  
In the group of result-based contract solutions, the importance of the criteria of effectiveness has 
on average been weighted the lowest compared to the other groups of contract types. Also this 
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weight is astonishing, as particularly result-based approaches allow for actually measuring results, 
and therefore enable a more concrete statement about environmental effectiveness. However, as 
already pointed out earlier, result-based schemes in parts appear costly, so overall, effectiveness 
might be weighted lower. As regards only environmental effectiveness, for most result-based 
cases studies a good effectiveness is reported. In the Wildlife Estates Label in Flanders (BE3), the 
label is evaluated to be even very effective, as only few instruments in Flanders guarantee 
multifunctionality in favour of biodiversity. Multifunctionality integrates all aspects linked to 
biodiversity. Here, more than 8500 hectares have been labelled in 3 years’ time. Also the 
EcoMethane initiative (FR4) is evaluated to be an effective initiative in that it targets one of the 
main polluters of livestock farming. However, there is the limitation that for the time being, it is 
rather pioneers who invest in the process, and therefore farmers with rather virtuous practices, 
who already have a high environmental commitment. At the moment, this focus on pioneers limits 
additionality. For reaching overall environmental effectiveness it would take more committed 
breeders to have a significant aggregate effect. Nevertheless, as regards environmental 
effectiveness it is highlighted that through the EcoMethane approach, other public goods are also 
be provided, notably in terms of animal welfare, landscape maintenance and biodiversity – and 
as regards the target objective, namely the reduction of methane emissions, in 2017, the 
EcoMethane approach reduced the rate of methane emissions by about 10.9% per farm. However, 
also this rate could be further enhanced by allowing a greater increase in unsaturated fat in the 
rations, via a stronger financial incentive. In the Burren Program (IRL1), environmental 
effectiveness can on the one hand be proved by the changes achieved in the landscape: Physical 
outcomes from the BP include the area of scrub cleared, stone walls repaired, traditional gates 
installed, water and feeding systems upgraded and so forth. On the other hand, the review of the 
scores of a subgroup of 147 farms that have participated revealed that the average score over an 
area covering 7,300 hectares has increased from 6.6 in 2010 to 7.4 in 2018, meaning an increase 
of the environmental quality on the partaking farms and agricultural area. For the biodiversity 
monitor in dairy farming (NL3), evaluations on the actual effects on biodiversity are not yet clear: 
Even though the KPI are selected with care because of their scientific relationship with 
biodiversity (and several other sub-criteria such as healthy soils), the actual effect of KPI 
performance with biodiversity recovery is yet unknown. Monitoring of the casual relationships is 
highly necessary and therefore scheduled in future trajectories. Research proposals for several 
‘living labs’ are currently reviewed and implemented soon.  
For the Carbon Market solution Hiilipörssi (FI3), it has been reported that before the era of the 
carbon market, restoration of private peatland areas has been very rare. So it can be assumed that 
if the peatland areas, especially outside the present protected areas, are restored and protected 
with the aid of the Carbon Market, provision of AECPGs is successfully enhanced. As regards 
the technical measures of peatland restoration, environmental effectiveness is evident: 
Restoration speeds up the succession process back to natural state, or close to natural state, and 
in some cases restoration is the only way to enable this succession. However, both the recovery 
of the ecological processes towards natural state is slow and also the process of restoration 
(initiation from landowners, hearing neighbours, planning etc.) is slow. To increase the efficiency, 
there should be more restoration processes going on in Carbon Market. 
As regards the value-chain related contract solutions, all case studies investigated focus on the 
implementation and control of implementation of targeted and clear measures beneficial for the 
environment, rather than the assessment of the actual environmental outcomes. However, as 
regards the implementation of the measures, the value chain contract solutions are evaluated as 
rather effective: E.g. in the Barilla Carta del Mulino (IT4) example, the additional management 
requirements are considered as clearly suited to enhance environmental effectiveness. Also in the 
Wild farm case (BG3) environmental effectiveness is enhanced covering all of the directly 
addressed public goods of farmland biodiversity and animal welfare due to the extensive grazing 
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carried out by the farm. Here, moreover indirect provision of other public goods is reported, such 
as water quantity (e.g. water retention), soil quality (and health) and the public good of scenery 
and recreation enabling new forms of ecotourism. In the BioBabalscy case study (PL4), 
effectiveness is even evaluated to be extraordinarily good as it is profitable for both parties and 
generates environmental benefits without specific costs. Also here the role of the indirect 
enhancement of other public goods not directly targeted by the contract solution was emphasized: 
According to the experts, the BioBabalscy initiative (PL4) not only contributes to the biodiversity 
and environment protection in valuable natural areas, but also to social benefits, mainly through 
the building social capital. The last value chain initiative to be highlighted in the context of 
environmental effectiveness is the water protection bread (DE5) initiative. The initiative concerns 
single fields and therefore the environmental effectiveness is limited to the fields involved. Even 
though the positive effect of reduced nitrogen fertilisation is undeniable (and can be proved with 
the help of the Nmin values in autumn showing a decrease of 30 kg N / ha on average), a direct, 
measurable effect on the ground and drinking water is until now not verifiable. The concerned 
surface with its dispersed distribution is too small, in addition wheat is grown in rotation, so that 
only every few years’ water protection wheat is grown on the same field. But the reduction in 
nitrogen fertilisation does not only reduce the risk of nitrate leaching over winter into the 
groundwater, at the same time N-emissions can be reduced. This contributes to climate protection, 
with N-fertiliser savings around 70 kg N/ha.  
For the contract solutions focusing on land tenure, expectations on environmental effectiveness 
are mixed. In the case of conservation and restoration of grasslands in Strandzha and Sakra 
mountains (BG4), positive effects are reported that result from by targeted restoration of pastures 
and grasslands, providing a minimum level of maintenance of natural habitats allowing for 
mosaic-located single trees or groups of trees and shrubs and/or hedges. In the case of EcoGrazing 
(FR1) environmental effectiveness cannot be evaluated yet as the results are not monitored by 
measuring.  
Cost-effectiveness 
The last aspect to be included in the evaluation of the performance of the contract solutions in the 
CONSOLE in-depth case study sample is the aspect of cost-effectiveness. For the result-based 
contract solutions, cost-effectiveness is mostly impacted by high costs of setting up the schemes, 
and, in the case of farm-individual solutions, for advice and on-field monitoring. Nevertheless, as 
regards payments made to farmers, these are highly cost-effective, as they are only issued if a 
result is generated allowing for payment. Also, for the farmers the normally free choice of the 
selection of measures to reach objectives make it possible to choose such measures, which are 
most cost-effective in the framework of the individual farming systems and farm structure. In the 
EcoMethane approach (FR4) for examples, the breeder interviewed, evaluated the program to be 
profitable and particularly the measures taken in ration changes as beneficial also for animal 
health, therefore leading to the reduction of other costs coming along with intensive dairy 
husbandry. Nevertheless, the initial costs of developing the approach and the device was high, 
also it is difficult to estimate the exact time of BBC employees working on the EcoMethane 
approach, but this seems relatively light. If the approach can reach a critical number of breeders, 
it could be profitable. Also, EcoMethane is estimated to become more profitable when more 
donors can be found to pay the farmers. As it stands, BBC considers that the expected 
environmental benefits are worth the costs incurred, and would be worth more precisely to gain 
efficiency, especially since the approach targets the first GHG-emitting station in a dairy farm. In 
the biodiversity monitor for dairy farming (NL3), a recent study estimated that costs for the 70% 
lowest performing farms which want to achieve the KPI levels of the 30% best performing farms, 
could be on average 22 eurocents per litre milk, or 417 euro per hectare. These costs could 
partially be renewed from higher-valued produce (such as certified milk) and a redistribution of 
67 
public financial resources (such as CAP). However, probably not all costs can be marketed, and 
some will have to come from extra investments – ideally proportionally covered by all relevant 
supply chain stakeholders (businesses and governments). When approaching the issue from a 
more holistic perspective however, rather than purely financial, it could be argued that this model 
is cost-effective in the long-term because the sustainable supply chain and ecosystems services 
are enhanced. The current system also creates many external costs for climate, nature and human 
health, which could be severely reduced or even turned into societal profits when transitioning to 
a more sustainable dairy production system. Without the interference of programs like 
Biodiversity Monitor to promote sustainable production, the sector would face risks of losing the 
‘license to produce’ (societal acceptance) and a thriving future perspective of the sector. The 
Burren Program (IRL1), as the last example of cost-effectiveness in result based schemes stands 
for the cost-effectiveness of payments to the farmers: While there has been no official value-for-
money analysis conducted, the Burren program in its scoring system guarantees that no payments 
are made on scores from 0 to 5, meaning that funding is used very effectively, making the 
measures very cost effective.  
In collective approaches, one important aspect impacting on cost-effectiveness is transaction costs 
– which can be significantly lower in such schemes. For example, in the case of collective 
reservoirs (IT1) it has been reported that the inclusion of the collective conditionality constraints 
enables to reduce the transaction costs for the regional administration. Moreover, the program 
enables to benefit from the economies of scale that aggregating efforts entail. However, the 
implementation and the success of the solution seems to be possible only through the presence of 
a bridging institution. Also in the collective management of Kromme Rjin (NL1), due to the fact 
that the overhead has decreased, and that environmental effectiveness has increased via to the 
bundling of agri-environmental measures, cost-effectiveness is evaluated as positive. In the 
meadow bird areas, results are becoming obvious already, demonstrating a clear increase in 
meadow bird-friendly management with a better focus on where it is effective or not. Also this 
stronger focus on quality fosters an increase in cost-effectiveness. In the case of the collective 
initiative Natural Grazing in Podkarpackie Region (PL1), cost-effectiveness is evaluated 
positively mainly due to the fact that here a relatively small fund enables the coverage of a large 
area and a large number of animals, while implying only small transaction costs within a very 
simple governance structure.  
For the Tuohi (FI5) and for the ITP (IT6) limited scientific evidence on the cost-effectiveness is 
available and further analyses on cost-effectiveness are recommended. In Tuohi (FI5) at least 
public costs are estimated to be rather low: The initiative represents a voluntary and market-based 
contract solution that does not directly rely on public financing, except for those financial 
instruments which are specific for jointly owned forests in Finland. These instruments relate to 
some tax benefits and legal cadastral surveys. Tuohi may also receive state aid and compensations 
similarly to family forest owners. In the ITP (IT6), at a theoretical level, the paying agency carries 
out a control/monitoring of costs, so the participants are obliged to present the interventions 
carried out transparently. However, a certain degree of information asymmetry remains and at the 
collective level, it leads to a loss of effectiveness if the declared costs are superior to the effective 
sustained during the intervention. 
In the group of value-chain related contract solutions, unfortunately not too many details have 
been reported allowing for general statements on cost-effectiveness across this type of contracts. 
From farmers’ perspective, from an interview with a partaking famer in the water protection 
bread (DE5) it can be reported that the initiative seems cost-effective for the farmers, as they 
receive a price comparable to conventionally produced quality wheat as well as a compensation 
for fields inside water protection areas from the water suppliers, so no financial disadvantages 
occur. In the Carta del Mulino case study (IT4), in the context of cost-effectiveness again the role 
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of implementation costs has been highlighted. These can be substantial and a proper cost effective 
analysis would be required for assessing the cost-effectiveness of the program.  
The last example to be discussed in the context of cost-effectiveness is the land-tenure case of 
EcoGrazing (FR1). The initiator of the program considers Eco-grazing as cost-effective even if 
the cost of it is higher compared to the mowing system that was carried out before the 
implementation of the program. However, in terms of the social and environmental gain, of raising 
awareness of the living and nature of people who do not necessarily have access to it, this is 
certainly compensated. On the “balance sheet”, EcoGrazing for the project initiator is therefore 
beneficial compared to a measured extra cost (approximately 100-200€/ha counting the 
investment amortized over 10 years in a context of relatively strong financial constraints). 
Nevertheless, while the program in itself seems very effective, for the breeder the ecograzing 
itself is not economically sustainable. 
7 Conclusions 
In Deliverable D2.3, an ex-post qualitative assessment of existing and implemented contract 
solutions for the improved delivery of AECPGs in the EU has been carried out. Aim of this 
analysis was, on the one hand, to provide successful role-model examples to support the 
development of improved contract solutions in the further lifetime of the project, particularly 
providing a basis for further quantitative analyses in WP3 and WP4. On the other hand, focus of 
the analysis was on understanding, which framework conditions and contract specifications are 
necessary to make solutions successful and to better fulfil environmental objectives and 
efficiently address different types of performance.  
The qualitative analysis in Deliverable D2.3 is based on a set of 26 in-depth studies, namely 5 
contract solutions qualifying as result-based/result-oriented contract solutions, 7 as collective 
implementation/collaboration contract solutions, 6 as contract solutions based on the value chain, 
and 3 contract solutions characterized by land-tenure arrangements with environmental clauses. 
Moreover, 5 contract types represent combinations/hybrids of contract types. The analysis reveals 
that the investigated contract solutions have rather different mechanisms of implementation: As 
regards result-based solutions, 3 case studies are publicly funded (AT3, IRL2, IRL1), while 2 of 
these cases are even integrated into the countries’ AES under the national RDPs (AT3, IRL2). 3 
of the result-based contract solutions were brought to life by private and/or civil society initiatives, 
enabling private investors to enter an “AECPG” market (AT4, NL3 and FR3). Another “form” of 
result-oriented contract solution represents a European labelling initiative (BE3). As regards 
contract solutions based on collective implementation/cooperation, 6 in-depth studies are publicly 
funded (IT1, IT6, NL1, UK1, UK, PL1). 5 of these are integrated into national RDPs (IT1, IT6, 
NL1, UK1 and UK3), 1 receives regional public funding (PL1). Also publicly funded are 2 case 
study examples implemented in line with the European project funding schemes INTERREG and 
LIFE+. As regards value chain approaches, 3 of the in-depth case studies represent value-chain 
approaches mainly aimed at fostering the marketing of organic products (BG3, PL4, ES2). 2 
contract solutions (IT4, DE2) represent private, market oriented value chain approaches defining 
own production standards, independent of public funding for the contractees. The last value chain 
based contract solution represented by the CONSOLE in-depth studies is the case of integrated 
production (ES4). As regards land-tenure approaches, 2 case studies represent contractual 
solutions implemented in the aftermath of LIFE + projects (BG4 and LV2), in which land was 
bought and is now leased to interested farmers who continue environmentally friendly 
management. One land tenure-based contract solution (FR1) is implemented on publicly owned 
land, which is leased out to a farmer for environmental management.   
The analysis of the AECPGs targeted by the 26 in-depth case studies showed that biodiversity is 
most often addressed, followed by landscape and scenery. However, it became clear that 
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landscape and scenery is addressed always in combination with the provision of other AECPGs. 
Further AECPGs often considered are water quality, rural viability and vitality and cultural 
heritage, as well as soil quality. Climate PGs, such as carbon sequestration and GHG emission 
mitigation, as well as water related AECPGs are in parts addressed as sole AECPGs by the 
contract solution. It became obvious that particularly result-based and result-oriented contract 
solutions are strongly targeted to the improvement of only selected, specific AECPGs. In contrast, 
contract solutions putting forward collective implementation or cooperative elements, often 
address a territorial/landscape level of AECPG provision and therefore mostly target a broader 
bundle of AECPGs. Beyond that, it becomes evident that such solutions are particularly applied 
to AECPGs being delivered “across field borders”, meaning AECPGs which can hardly be 
improved by measures on singular fields and plots. Besides biodiversity, which is the most often 
addressed AECPG also in the collective/cooperation in-depth case studies, this accounts 
particularly for water related AECPGs (quantity and quality), and resilience to natural hazards. 
The contract solutions pushed forward by the value chain, or strongly integrating it, partly target 
few specific AECPGs, partly bundles of AECPGs. Particularly those examples supporting and 
marketing organic production naturally go along with a number of AECPGs addressed by this 
management system, while often even going beyond classical AECPGs touched by organic 
farming, by adding specific components, such as rare breeds and crop varieties. Amongst all in-
depth studies, the value chain contract solutions are the only examples directly addressing quality 
and security of products as AECPG objectives. The 3 contract solutions based on land tenure all 
deal with AECPGs related to grazing, while in all examples, biodiversity is a central AECPG.  
The analysis of framework conditions and context situations, influencing the design and 
implementation of contract solutions, focused on environmental conditions, agricultural/forestry 
background and socioeconomic features. Moreover, policy conditions, legal conditions, the role 
of institutions and formal structures and technology aspects have been taken into account.  
As regards basic conditions, the in-depth study sample stands for a broad variety of 
environmental, agricultural/forestry and socio-economic basic conditions throughout Europe. 
Consequently, the prerequisites for successful and accepted implementation in each contract 
solution differ, nevertheless communalities became obvious. The studies revealed that 
environmental conditions, where AECPG deterioration has negative effects on the production 
systems, trigger the implementation of innovative contract types in order to mitigate these 
perceptible negative effects on agriculture. Particularly in cases where the pressure of AECPG 
deterioration is felt by the agricultural sector itself, and the deterioration of the AECPGs has a 
felt, negative effect on production, acceptance is high. Also it became obvious that particularly 
land managers’ and land owners’ attitudes, will and a common understanding on the benefits of 
AECPG provision are strong triggers to develop and step into contract solutions counteracting 
AECPG deterioration. Particularly this becomes obvious in special, or in specifically sensitive 
ecosystems and landscapes, where deteriorations are personally felt and (also emotionally) 
regretted. Besides attitude and will, a common understanding within the landowners’ and farming 
community about the natural and agricultural ecosystem and the provision and benefits of 
AECPGs, are strong drivers too. Another catalyst for the implementation of new contract 
solutions turned out to be an already existing and sound basis of environment-oriented 
management:  Successfully (new) introduced contract solutions in the CONSOLE in-depth 
sample often have “jumped on an already moving train” of environmental protection, improving 
what is already there, or supporting, enhancing and securing developments that already take form. 
New contract solutions can for example be direct successors of “classical” AES, replacing or 
improving them even on the same areas of implementation and consequently on farms already 
having an interest to devote their area to nature conservation/AECPG provision. Another 
framework condition being a strong trigger for the implementation of agri-environmental 
programs are low agricultural incomes in systems of low intensive agriculture: Particularly in 
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regions characterised by sensitive habitats, often the agricultural production conditions necessary 
to maintain these habitats enable only low intensities of farming and, in some cases, set farmers 
under the economic pressure of abandoning, or intensifying farming activity. In such regions, 
successful contract solutions can be designed to significantly support and/or enhance the income 
of the partaking farmers. Similarly, but not fully the same framework condition can occur, when 
the environmental option is just economically more feasible for farmers and foresters, and is 
therefore perceived as a win-win situation that is chosen voluntarily. In the in-depth sample this 
situation occurred in the 2 Spanish case studies, where the better marketing possibilities provided 
by organic farming and integrated production meets a specific systems of permanent, work-
intensive agriculture in a specific agri-environmental environment, which is well suited for 
organic/integrated farming. Another context situation, in which new schemes are gladly accepted 
occurs if the risk taken to implement the contracts, are low, if income effects are negligible or 
positive, and if the measures are easily integratable into the farming system. Particularly under 
the framework condition of intensive farming systems, successful examples of contract solutions 
are result-based contract solutions, being perceived by the farmers as additional (market) 
opportunities and benchmarking system, with low risk, low income losses and, in the best case, 
income gains, as well as easily integratable into the farming systems. 
As regards policy conditions, many in-depth studies highlight the decisive role of the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). While of course the general framework of the CAP is the 
most relevant policy basis for agriculture in Europe, hereby particularly the Rural Development 
Programs with their individual national AES are mentioned. Certainly the direct impact of the 
CAP accounts for the contract solutions cases being directly integrated into the national RDPs. 
Particularly for innovative collective and result-based cases, the aim to develop and elaborate 
national RDPs towards more acceptable and innovative approaches were the main drivers for 
initiation and implementation. Besides this direct impact, the CAP also indirectly impacts on the 
implementation of innovative contract solutions outside RDP: Often, environmental 
developments introduced by the CAP, as well as long term experiences with RDP schemes are 
the basis for the development of measures implemented in new schemes. Moreover, the settled 
experiences of land-managers with RDPs enables them to deal with ‘innovative’ agri-
environmental programs at all. Besides the CAP, also other political conditions and pressures 
create momentum for the initiation and implementation of new contractual solutions. Some of the 
cases reported that changes in national but also EU policies, such as for example major changes 
in national nitrogen policies, or implementation of the water framework directive have been a 
trigger for the development of new solutions. Last but not least, some of the in-depth studies 
revealed that “political will” is a crucial trigger in implementing and supporting new instruments. 
The analysis of the role of legal conditions for the implementation of contract solutions showed, 
that particularly in the case of contract solutions implemented in sensitive or very specific 
habitats, often legal frameworks for protected areas have to be considered. These legal 
frameworks are in some cases perceived as a driver for the implementation of contractual 
solutions. On the other hand, new solutions can start a process of rethinking legal frameworks: 
One case reported that new contractual solutions, integrating the wishes of private landowners as 
from the start, can cause an instructive reflection on the content and interpretation of regulative 
constraints, as often the sole application of legal definitions and concepts do not serve the purpose 
they were intended to, as reality in nature management often takes precedence. The analysis 
further revealed that specific contract solutions sometimes require a specific orchestration of legal 
frameworks. Vice versa, legal frameworks can shape the design and implementation of new 
contract solutions and, by implication, eventually prevent the feasibility of their implementation. 
The 2 Finish case study examples show that contract solutions can be touched by legislative 
coverage in every aspect, reaching from the objective of the program, to the administrative 
implementation and finally the environmental measures foreseen. In parts legislation 
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changes/adaptations are necessary for contract solutions to be able to take place, e.g. legalising 
uneven managed forests in Finland (FI5). The importance of a sound and well-orchestrated legal 
framework as a basis for the implementation of contract solutions has been mentioned several 
times. It became obvious that large numbers of regulations for nature conservation and 
management, to which farmers have to comply might cause trade-offs due to their contradictory 
character. Already addressed in the above paragraph, the case studies revealed that also European 
level legislation can function as a strong driver for the need for action and therefore the initiation 
of new solutions, such as the European Water Framework Directive having triggered the water 
protection bread initiative (DE5).  
Looking at the role of institutions, formal structures and governance in the implementation of 
contractual solutions revealed that their success is driven by the institutions and formal structures 
involved in the implementation and management of the initiatives. Also, the governance system 
pursued has impacts on success factors such as acceptance, longevity, social capital, etc. The 
number and kind of institutions involved, as well as the modus of governance, strongly depend 
on the contract type. For more complex contract solutions, such as collective schemes, or schemes 
combining a number of different contract features, a larger number of institutions and actors is 
active, while in relatively “simple” approaches, such as land tenure contracts, a less complex 
interplay of institutions seems sufficient. The in-depth studies showed, that particularly in the 
development of new solutions, always a broad number of institutions and stakeholders is involved. 
This is for example the case in the result-based contract solutions investigated in the CONSOLE 
in-depth studies. Here, a rather broad number of actors and institutions are involved, which is 
partly this is due to the rather “new” character of such schemes, demanding the development of 
the contract solutions from scratch, with the necessary input of expert/stakeholder/institutional 
capital. It becomes obvious that particularly within the process of the design of new solutions, 
important “actors” integrated are typically research, but also affected stakeholders and farmers, 
guaranteeing the operationality of the programs particularly as regards result indicators. The 
result-based CONSOLE contract solutions also reveal that particularly the process of individual 
target setting, management support and also monitoring of results demands specifically trained 
experts/advisors/institutions, which in the best case are integrated right from the start. The case 
study AT3 revealed that the integration of the national control authority in the design of 
measureable and, consequently, controllable indicators is a major success factor. In case of a 
transfer of such schemes to other countries, such an integration is the basic recommendation of 
the experts. Also the contract solutions based on collective implementation involve a rather broad 
number of institutions and a high level of cooperation between contractors and contractees. The 
in-depth studies reveal that already the process of setting up the collectives can involve many 
players and that the implementation demands a high level of orchestration between institutions 
and their responsibilities. Moreover, the studies show that the individual program coordinators 
play a crucial role in collective implementation. Their engagement and steering skills, as well as 
their regional embeddedness are fundamental for the success of such contract solutions. Last but 
not least, the value-chain contract solutions show that if such solutions step into the chain only on 
the level of seller-buyer contractual agreements, rather few actors involved. In contrast, value-
chain contract solutions aiming at the whole chain and its transition to a more sustainable and fair 
construct, demand a high level of integration of the respective value-chain actors, as well as a 
distinctively good level of trust and fairness, while the latter element is also a reason for the 
success of good seller-buyer constructions. Compared to the other contract solution types, land 
tenure based contract solutions are relatively simple as regards involved institutions, as well as 
governance.  
The CONSOLE in-depth studies also aimed to describe the influence and the use of technology 
on/within the contract solutions. The results of the analysis of technology aspects revealed that 
technology is an aspect already “thought” in many solutions. However, unfortunately the sample 
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of in-depth studies included only few cases where the use of distinctively innovative technology 
influenced the implementation of the contract solution. A field of integration of technology 
naturally is indicator monitoring and measuring. Particularly in result-based solutions, where 
output indicators are the basis for remuneration, the use of technologies can strongly support 
indicator measuring (and calculation). Thereby not only monitoring technologies are crucial, but 
also sound technological approaches of calculation and upscaling of results. In the cases of AT4, 
NL3, FR4 technology is used to carry out e.g. soil sampling, milk analyses, CO2 determination. 
However, besides these 3 studies, monitoring technology is still rarely used, even in the result-
based in-depth contract solution case studies. Nevertheless, particularly for field monitoring, 
future technological solutions such as cameras and drones are met with high interest. Also the 
development of scoring apps, as well as apps to be used by farmers and advisors providing real 
time information on performance against targets are seen as highly welcome developments in the 
future. The in-depth results also revealed that the use of platforms is an option in market oriented 
result-based contract solutions (emission trading). As last technology aspect are communication 
tools: Also here, the in-depth studies showed that such tools are still rarely implemented. 
However, particularly in collective and cooperative based initiatives, communication tools 
enabling better coordination and information between institutions and actors involved seem 
crucial.  
Another major aim of the in-depth analysis was to evaluate the performance of the individual 
contract solutions under a set of different performance criteria identified during the project. Also, 
the analysis aimed to pinpoint most important design features for successful implementation. 
Derived from the CONSOLE framework (D1.1), most prominent aspects in this context were 
questions of targeting, flexibility, equity/fairness, compatibility, profitability, as well as the 
building of social/cultural capital, all impacting on further performance criteria such as longevity, 
effectiveness, and acceptance. Moreover, partly context related performance aspects such as 
feasibility of implementation were considered.  
The results of the analysis of different performance aspects for the success of the in-depth contract 
solution revealed that the aspect of targeting is particularly important in the result-based 
approaches. Excellent performance in this criteria is first and foremost reached, when 
conservation objectives are farm- and plot-individually elaborated, in the best case in direct 
collaboration with the farmers (AT3, IRL2). Additionality can be achieved by integrating tiered 
payment levels, providing financial incentives to the farmers to deliver the highest quality 
environmental product in their particular farm setting. In the other contract types, excellent 
targeting is achieved by setting clear sets of objectives and measures, guaranteeing a high degree 
of relation between management measures and AECPG improvement. As regards the 
performance criteria of flexibility, interestingly, this aspect was not evaluated as specifically 
important for any of the contract types. Only single result-based case studies (AT3, AT4) put 
emphasis on the importance of flexibility for the success of the contract solutions. Highest 
performance in the criterion of flexibility is mainly achieved in schemes, where no management 
requirements are prescribed to the farmers. Also flexible contract lengths, such as in AT4, where 
farmers can freely choose the period and duration of the phase of carbon accumulation, stand for 
high flexibility. As regards the criteria of equity and fairness, this criterion has been weighted 
particularly high for value-chain contract solution case studies while being rather “unimportant” 
for the other contract types. Particularly for collective implementation and cooperative 
approaches this result seems surprising, as the high level of common planning and also common 
risk would let expect that equity in the decision making and also the (fair) distribution of benefits, 
costs, and risks is a strong factor for success. High levels of equity and fairness are first and 
foremost achieved, if producers are involved in the discussion of contract arrangements, or if 
close and long-standing relationships exist between producers and retailers. Beneficial for 
perceived equity and fairness are reasonable, clear and acceptable contract conditions, and the 
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same rules and basic prices for all partaking producers. In contractual solutions based on 
collective implementation or cooperation, a key aspect for equity and fairness is contribution to 
and equity of decision making, which can be implemented via steering groups or other 
institutional arrangements. From the evaluation of the criterion of profitability it became obvious 
that profitability has been weighted highest for the success of result-based and value-chain 
approaches. However, almost none of the contract solutions in the whole sample of in-depth 
studies scores excellently high in this criteria, and, with the lowest performance evaluation across 
all case studies, this criterion is the one with the lowest average performance. The results reveal 
that in cases performing well in the criterion, profitability is not primarily grounded in the 
immediate price paid for the provision of an AECPG (e.g. AT4), or in the subsidies for the 
establishment of the reservoirs (e.g. IT1), but in the long-term effects on production. For the 
example of AT4, long term profitability is reached by the increase of organic matter in the soils, 
leading to higher productivity. In the example of IT1, water availability guaranteed by the 
reservoirs is key for the long-term maintenance of production. For the criterion of longevity, the 
evaluation showed a particular importance for result-based contract solutions, and for the cases 
of collective implementation and cooperation. Good performance is based on different aspects: 
Many studies show, that offering local/regional possibilities for education and training on the 
values of AECPGs and the implemented measures are assumed to be the most important driver 
for longevity. Beyond that, contractual arrangement with long project durations such as the 
Humus program (AT4) can manifest implemented measures and lead to changes in attitudes and 
awareness. Measures establishing protected areas, such as in the Finish Hiilipörssi (FI5), 
guarantee long term maintenance of protection status. Last but not least, long-term leasing 
contracts in protected areas, and long term management plans after the implementation of nature 
conservation projects, enable farmers for long-term planning and maintaining their extensive 
farming systems. The criterion of acceptance was weighted as important for the success of all 
groups of contract solutions. From the analysis of the contract solutions scoring very well, or even 
excellent, in this criterion, it became clear that an important driver for acceptance is the 
understanding of the sense of the measures and outcomes. On the one hand, this understanding is 
based on the recognition of the objectives and the measures leading to the enhancement of 
AECPGs, on the other, it is based on the understanding of the “moral” sense of the contract 
solutions. From the in-depth studies it became obvious that particularly result-based approaches, 
as well as cases of collective implementation contain special elements that enhance the 
understanding of the sense of the contract solutions: In result-based solutions, clear and easy 
indicators, transparent technical procedures of their measurement and upscaling, and, finally, the 
direct relationship between management and results, strongly enhance the understanding of the 
sense of the recommended (not obligatory) management measures. In cases of collaboration and 
collective implementation, the understanding of the sense of the measures often results from the 
collective design and elaboration of the landscape development plans. In value-chain approaches, 
as already indicated, a major element for acceptance is trust, achievable by long-lasting 
relationship between the producers and processor and/ a spirit of equity and fairness, in 
combination with high levels of transparency. Throughout all types of contract solutions, 
communication within the contract solution plays a key role in enhancing trust, understanding of 
the sense of the contracts and therefore acceptance. The importance of the criteria of compatibility
of the contractual solution with the business design of the contractees and with the interest and 
attitudes of stakeholders has been weighted relatively low for the success of result-based, 
collective/collaborative and land-tenure approaches. In contrast, for the value-chain approaches, 
the importance of this criterion is weighted as clearly above average, and also the performance of 
all value chain contract solutions as regards this criterion is either very well or excellent. In the 
value chain cases, high compatibility with the business design of the farmers mainly results from 
the fact that the partaking farmers already implement the crop rotations necessary for producing 
the products demanded by the value chain. Therefore, the participating farmers do not need to 
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change their farming practices in general but only adapt their management practices according to 
the specifications of the respective initiative. For most value-chain solutions presented in the in-
depth studies it can be concluded, that the value-chain contract does not require a real 
restructuring of management, but only adds some specificities that are integrable, without the 
need of e.g. changing technologies or business management. In the Wild farm, integration goes 
even further. Here, the contractual solution and the whole business design around it has been 
designed and build-up by the farmers, so the solution is perfectly harmonized with the farming 
system and the farm management of the partaking farms. When considering the transfer of 
functioning contract solutions to other context situation, or in the case of considering the 
replacement of existing approaches, such as area-based, farm-individual subsidies by collective 
or result-based schemes, or by initiatives of the value chain, the question of feasibility of 
implementation should be raised. Particularly important in this respect is information about 
program costs, considering transaction and implementation costs, as well as costs connected to 
the design of the (new) programs. The analysis of the in-depth studies revealed, that most of the 
result-based initiatives investigated report that particularly the costs for setting up the programs 
and projects have been rather high. As regards running costs of result-based schemes, these differ 
particularly for the different ways of monitoring: in result-based schemes with rather 
technological assessment and measurement of fixed performance indicators, such as in 
EcoMethane (FR4) and the Biodiversity monitor (NL3), running costs are comparably “low” or 
“medium”. In contrast to these “technological” solutions, result-based programs with “on-field” 
monitoring of results by ecological advisors and/or controllers are estimated to have 
comparatively high running costs. The high effort for on-field monitoring stems mainly from the 
farm-individuality of the objectives and measures: The most intensive cost position is estimated 
to be investments in project teams as well as in specially trained farm advisors. As regards contract 
solutions aiming at entering the carbon market, also here partly high costs for setting up the 
programs have been reported. For the case of contractual solutions fostering collective 
implementation or cooperation, mainly 2 cost positions are discussed, namely transaction/-
overhead costs, and costs of coordination: in many collective in-depth studies transaction costs 
are reported to be relatively low for the public administration while costs of coordination could 
not be numbered by any of the in-depth studies. In the value-chain based contract solutions, the 
height of the program costs is determined by the complexity of the solution, meaning there are 
differences in solutions representing improved seller-buyer relationships, and solutions 
representing approaches along the whole value chain. In the case of sole buyer-seller 
relationships, for the in-depth studies costs are estimated to be low/negligible and mainly covered 
by the high prices for the products. In the more complex value chain approaches however, cost 
positions along the whole chain are involved which are in parts expected to be substantial both 
from the point of view of the farmers and for the whole supply chain. The analysis of the 
performance of the last criterion assessed in the in-depth studies, namely effectiveness, reveals, 
that this criterion is especially important for the success of cases fostering collective 
implementation and cooperation, Nevertheless, only few case studies in the cluster of solutions 
with collective implementation perform excellent in this criteria. The main reason for this result 
might be that either the measuring of environmental results is often not in the foreground of 
collective approaches, or that the programs are new and effects cannot be forespoken yet. As 
regards cost effectiveness in collective approaches, some in-depth studies reveal that at lease 
transaction costs can be significantly lower in such schemes. In the group of result-based contract 
solutions, where measuring results actually enables a more concrete statement about 
environmental effectiveness, the importance of the criterion has been weighted the lowest 
compared to the other groups of contract types. The reason might be that result-based schemes in 
parts appear costly, so overall, effectiveness might be weighted lower. For result-based contract 
solutions, the sub-criterion of cost-effectiveness is mostly impacted by high costs of setting up 
the schemes, and, in the case of farm-individual solutions, for advice and on-field monitoring. 
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Nevertheless, as regards payments made to farmers, these are highly cost-effective, as they are 
only issued if a result is generated allowing for payment. Also, for the farmers the normally free 
choice of the selection of measures to reach objectives make it possible to choose such measures, 
which are most cost-effective in the framework of the individual farming systems and farm 
structure. As regards only environmental effectiveness, for most result-based cases studies a good 
effectiveness is reported. As regards the value-chain related contract solutions, all case studies 
investigated focus on the implementation and control of targeted and clearly defined measures 
beneficial for the environment, rather than the assessment of the actual environmental outcomes. 
As regards the implementation of the measures, the value-chain contract solutions are all 
evaluated as rather effective and therefore all report good environmental performance. Overall 
the analysis of the aspect of effectiveness across the in-depth studies reveals, that many new 
schemes might have limited additionality, as rather pioneers, already having a high environmental 
commitment, dare to step into new programs, perceiving a low risk of failure. In contrast, for 
reaching high overall environmental effectiveness it would take also farmers/foresters with still 
low environmental performance to step into such contracts. 
8 Outlook on further use of Deliverable 2.3 for scientific analyses and 
for practice  
8.1 Further scientific exploitation 
Operationally, Deliverable D2.3 will support task 1.2 and 1.3 towards the development of the 
operational framework to be developed in the CONSOLE project and tested with practitioners. 
Moreover, D2.3 informs tasks 1.5 and 1.6 in the analyses of legal and technological aspects. 
Finally, the results of the scientific analyses from deliverable D2.3 informs particularly WP3 in 
the development of farmers and stakeholder survey on the feasibility of new contract solutions in 
tasks T3.2 and T3.3.  
8.2 Use of the in-depth diagnosis for practitioners 
Agricultural and forest management has a strong influence on the provision of agri-
environmental-climate public goods (AECPG). Support provided under Europe’s Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) for more environment-friendly approaches in agriculture (but also for 
forestry) is increasingly discussed, as current agri-environmental measures are often 
unsatisfactory in terms of longevity, effectiveness and efficiency, and the deterioration of 
ecosystem services and public good provision in Europe is ongoing (Peer et al., 20193). Reacting 
on strong societal pressures, under the premise of the legislative proposal for the next CAP 
programming period and the recently published European Green Deal, it is therefore foreseen to 
pursue the path towards the provision of public goods in rural areas far stronger. Improvements 
may come from a flexible mix of promising new contract types, such as results-based payments 
or collective approaches, as well as by novel value chain strategies and land tenure contracts with 
environmental clauses.  
The presented diagnosis of 26 in-depth contract solution case studies details the knowledge of 
successful contract solutions in the EU. The diagnosis provides practitioners and programrs with 
in-depth information about the framework conditions and context situation in which promising 
and innovative contract solutions for the effective and lasting delivery of AECPG by agriculture 
and forestry can be set. Moreover, it provides insights into design features leading to successful 
3 Pe'er, G., Zinngrebe, Y., Moreira, F., Sirami, C., Schindler, S., Müller, R., … Lakner, S. (2019). A greener 439 path for the EU 
Common Agricultural Policy. Science, 365(6452), 449-451. doi: 440 https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aax3146.
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implementation and good performance in respect to criteria such as effectiveness, acceptance and 
longevity. The diagnosis serves as a knowledge basis for the development and design of future 
contract solutions to foster the provision of AECPGs by agriculture and forestry in the European 
Uninon and beyond. 
8.3 Dissemination 
Deliverable D2.3 will be published on the webpage of the CONSOLE project (www.console-
project.eu) in the category “Resources” 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 817949. The results presented reflect only the authors’ view, the Agency is not 
responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
9 ANNEX 1: Results of the Evaluation exercise 
contract types Scoring of performance of criterion on a scale from 1 -5  Weighting of importance of criterion for success of contract solution (100%) 
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AT AT3         3 5 5 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 5 10 15 10 5 10 5 10 15 15 
IRL IRL2   0 1 4 4 4 4 0 1 3 3 20 10 20 20 5 5 0 0 5 15 
AT AT4   5 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 15 10 10 5 5 5 10 12,5 12,5 15 
NL NL3   3,5 4 4 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
FR FR4     2 4 3 5 4 3 5 5 5 0 15 10 15 5 5 5 20 0 5 20 
IRL IRL1      5 5 5 4 4 3 4 5 5 2 20 10 12 12 10 3 10 10 10 3 
BE BE3      5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 10 10 13 10 10 10 13 10 7 7 
FI FI3     5 3 3 3 5 3 2 3 1 0 20 5 15 15 10 5 5 15 5 5 
IT IT1         5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 20 5 0 25 5 3 10 4 3 25 
IT IT6        5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 3 2 20 20 10 10 5 20 1 4 5 5 
UK UK1        2 3 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 1 15 15 5 5 5 5 40 4 3 3 
UK UK3        2 3 5 4 5 4 5 3 4 1 15 15 5 5 5 5 40 4 2 3 
NL NL1        3 3 3 4 4 2 0 4 2 3 10 12 8 17 5 10 5 10 5 18 
LV LV1        3 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 
BE BE1      5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 3 15 15 15 7 5 7 10 9 7 10 
PL PL1     4 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 2 3 20 20 10 10 5 10 5 10 0 10 
FI FI5     5 3 3 4 5 3 4 4 3 3 7 11 7 15 13 13 8 8 8 10 
BG BG3        3 4 4 5 5 4 2 5 5 4 5 10 10 10 10 10 5 15 10 15 
DE DE5        4 4 5 5 4 3 4 4 5 3 5 10 10 15 15 15 5 10 10 5 
PL PL4        5 5 3 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 10 15 10 10 10 10 15 5 5 10 
IT IT4        2 5 5 4 5 5 0 4 0 4 5 2 3 5 20 5 0 30 0 30 
ES ES2        5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 10 15 5 15 10 15 10 5 5 10 
ES ES4        4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 15 5 15 5 10 5 15 10 15 
BG BG4         4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 4 7 13 15 15 7 7 15 7 7 7 
FR FR1      4 4 4 5 3 5 5 5 3 1 5 10 5 20 5 10 10 5 10 20 
LV LV2         4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
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